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Abstract 
This thesis considers the concept of involuntary action in the criminal law. In particular it 
examines the defence of automatism. The discussion of the defence by the courts in England 
and Wales and jurisprudential commentary regarding involuntary action are considered. 
Present legal definitions of involuntary action do not take account of current scientific or 
philosophical debates relating to consciousness and the science of the mind. It is argued that 
modern neuroscientific definitions of consciousness are useful to the criminal law. They 
suggest how consciousness is used by the brain to assist in the carrying out of tasks and to 
monitor the interaction between the individual and the world in which her behaviour takes 
place. They provide evidence that conscious awareness of tasks differs according to the 
complexity of the task undertaken and the experience of a particular person in performing a 
particular task. On this view conscious awareness will exist in varying degrees according to the 
task which is being undertaken and the person performing that task. 
It is argued that a purely mechanistic or reductionist evaluation of consciousness will not assist 
in defining criminal responsibility. The thesis also examines differing types of explanation of 
action. These include philosophical definitions of action and discussions of how consciousness 
relates to action. The opinions of courts in five other jurisdictions on certain approaches to the 
automatism defence are considered. The problems of combining legal and philosophical 
definitions are discussed. A revised test of involuntariness is suggested. 
The research findings contribute to the fund of knowledge in a number of ways. Firstly they 
review the case law of automatism in England and Wales and certain aspects of the defence of 
automatism in five other jurisdictions. Secondly the research examines the relevance of modern 
neuroscientific research and the philosophy of consciousness in relation to the criminal law's 
approach to involuntary action. Finally the research findings are utilised to propose a new test 
of involuntariness. 
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At the root of the discussion concerning involuntary action and the criminal law there is a 
conflict. The conflict is between two methods of attributing responsibility for actions. There is 
a societal reaction to crime which finds expression through punishment and blaming individuals 
who have carried out actions which have resulted in harm There is also, within the legal 
system a pressure to attribute blame only to those who are proved by the due process of the 
law to be responsible for their actions. This attribution of legal responsibility may not be simply 
causal. In such a case the argument might be that a defendant had caused an act, in the sense 
that it could not have occurred had she not been present, but might nonetheless not be 
criminally responsible for that action because the act which caused the wrongful conduct was 
beyond her control. An example of this is where the act takes place whilst the defendant is 
suffering a hypoglycaemic episode. In Rv Padmore' such a claim was accepted by the 
prosecution and as a result the court hearing of the case against the defendant, who had killed 
during a hypoglycaemic episode, did not proceed. The reason given for the prosecution's 
decision was the acceptance that ̀ the defendant's condition [diabetes] of which he was 
unaware and unable to control at the time took over. ' Detective Chief Inspector Richard Taber 
commenting for the police said: 
that the victim's family, to whom police had spoken, had accepted that no one was to 
blame for the killing. `They do understand the reason why the court has reached the 
decision it has today. Mr Padmore now has to live with the consequences of his 
actions. It is a tragedy for him as well as those who knew and loved Mr Trent. I believe 
that justice has been served in this case'. ' 
The irony is that if Padmore had been suffering from hyperglycaemia, an alternative form of 
diabetic episode, the case might have resulted in a verdict of insane automatism - with very 
different consequences for the defendant. If the aetiology of his disease had been different, that 
is its cause internal rather than external, he might have been found not guilty by reason of 
insanity. The effect of such a verdict, because the charge was one of murder, would have 
I Lhweportod 
2 Both quotations The Times 176 December 1999 p. 3 
10 
meant that the court would have had no discretion in sentencing. The court would have had to 
make a hospital order which restricts a defendant's discharge without time limitation.; 
Smith, when considering criminal liability, states ̀[w]hat is clear is that the voluntariness of an 
act is a more fundamental element of criminal liability than the intention to cause, or foresight 
of, results of the act which we normally think of as mens rea. It is a defence, known as 
automatism, that this element has not been proved by the Crown. '4 Smith also highlights other 
forms of involuntary behaviour, such as brake failure, resulting in the loss of control of a 
vehicle and concludes: ̀that D should never be held criminally liable for an "act" or result of an 
act over which he has no control's The discussion in this thesis centres on the paradigm case 
of involuntariness in the criminal law, automatism 
In framing attributions of criminal liability the courts have examined the meanings of the words 
`voluntary' and ̀ act' and given them specialist meanings. It is argued in this thesis that the 
present definition of involuntary action is faulty in that it does not provide a satisfactory 
measure of when conduct is involuntary. Neuroscientific, biological, medical and philosophical 
definitions of involuntary action will be considered to examine whether they can assist in 
refining the legal definition of automatism. 
Mental and physical elements of criminal liability 
Smith discusses the requirements of a+ctus reus and wens rea and how criminal liability is 
established. Discussing actus reus and mens rea he writes: - 
It is a general principle of the criminal law that a person may not be convicted of a 
crime unless the prosecution have proved beyond reasonable doubt both a) that he has 
caused a certain event or that responsibility is to be attributed to him for a certain state 
3 Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 s 5(3) as amended by the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and 
Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 s5 and Schedule I 
4 SMITH, J. C. 1999. Smith and Hogan Criminal law. (91 edit. ). London: l3 worths. p. 38 
5 ShGTH, J. C. 1999. p. 41 
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of affairs, which is forbidden by the criminal law, and b) that he had a defined state of 
mind in relation to the causing of the event or the existence of the state of affairs. 6 
Smith then examines the requirements of criminal responsibility as laid down in Woolmington v 
DPP and concludes that: ̀ [t]he true rule is that the jury must acquit even though they are not 
satisfied that D's story is true, if they think it might reasonably be true. ' The exception to this 
rule is the defence of insanity. ̀To raise other defences at common law - for example, 
provocation, self-defence, automatism or duress - the accused need do no more than introduce 
some evidence of all the constituents of the defence; whereupon it is for the Crown to satisfy 
the jury that at least one of those constituents did not exist. '' 
Smith discusses the requirement hat both actus reus and mens rea need to be established 
before criminal liability may be imposed. There is no formal agreement between lawyers 
regarding whether the voluntary act requirement goes to mens rea or actus reus. 9 Indeed the 
utility of defining elements of criminal liability in this manner is questioned by Clarkson and 
Keating, who assert a strongly contrary view: ̀ [w]hether defendants are to be convicted should 
depend upon important principles aimed at deciding whether their conduct deserves 
condemnation as criminal; such questions should not be answered by reference to definitions 
such as actus reus and mens rea. Questions of policy should not be determined by reference to 
definition and terminology. "o 
6 SMITH, J. C. 1999. p. 27 
7 [1935] AC 462 
8 SMITH, J. C. 1999. All quotations p. 27. For a discussion of the burden of proof and the case law relating to 
automatism see chapter 2 
9 Norrie sees the voluntary act as going to actus reus., NORRIE, A. 1993. Crime Reason and History. London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicholson. p. 111. Smith is undecided but states that the argument that it must go to 
actus revs if it is to excuse liability in cases of strict liability is a fallacious reading of the meaning of 
strict liability. `The fallacy in this argument lies in the proposition that offences of strict liability 
require "no mens red' and the assumption that this means that the whole of the mental element 
involved in mens rea may be lacking. This is not so. If the mental element is part of the actus reus, 
there is certainly no way of dispensing with it; but it does not follow that it must be dispensed with 
where an offence is held to be one of strict liability. ' SMITH, J. C. 1999. p. 37. Emphasis in original. 
For a discussion of the philosophical problems associated with dividing descriptions of action into the 
mental and physical see chapter 4 
10 For a discussion of this and the difficulties caused when courts adhere to strict demarcations between actus 
reus and mens rea see CLARKSON, C. M. V. & KEATING, H. M. 1998. Criminal Law Text and 
Materials (4'° edit. ). London: Sweet & Maxwell. p. 91 
12 
Lord Simon in DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch described the interconnection of actus reus 
and mens rea as follows: 
Lastly, actus reus and mens rea are misleading terms; since (other than exceptionally) a 
mental state is not criminal without the accompanying mental element. Both terms 
have, however, justified themselves by their usefulness; and I myself shall myself 
employ them in their traditional senses - namely, actus reus to mean such conduct that 
constitutes a crime if the mental element involved in the definition of the crime is also 
present (or more shortly conduct prohibited by law); and mens rea to mean such mental 
element, over and above volition, as is involved in the definition of the crime. " 
It is not clear from this statement where Lord Simon places voluntariness in the criminal 
equation. He seems to see it as a separate item. Intuitively it seems this must be the case. As 
will be seen the common law presumes an act is voluntary unless there is evidence to the 
contrary. The academic argument regarding whether voluntariness goes to actus reus or mens 
rea is concerned, inter alia, with preventing criminal liability attaching to those who commit 
strict liability offences whilst in a state of involuntariness. " 
Legal historians trace the wens rea, actus reus doctrine back to Augustine. 13 The doctrine 
entered the criminal law via canon law, "' which was heavily influenced by the teachings of St. 
Augustine. Augustine based his philosophy of the mind upon three concepts: memory, reason 
and will. 'S Additionally he accepted the fundamental Christian doctrine that all men are equal 
11 [ 1975] AC 653,690 
12 SMITH, J. C. 1999. p. 37 
13 They trace the maxim `Et actus non facit reum nisi sit mens rea' via Coke's Third Institute vi to the ̀ Red 
Book of the Exchequer', which contains Leges Henrici v 28 and thence to St. Augustine's Sermons, 
where it appears as ̀ reuen linguam non facit nisi mess rea. ' BAKER, J. I . 1990. An Introduction to 
English Legal History. (31 edit. ). London: Butterworths. p. 597. POLLOCK, F. & MATTLAND, F. W. 
1989. The History of English Law. (21 edit. ). vol. 2. Cambridge University Press. p. 476. Though 
Pollock and Maitland stress St. Augustine used the concept only with reference to perjury 
14 BLACKBURN, R. 1995. The Psychology of Criminal Conduct. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. p. 254 
15 On the Trinity, Book X, chap. xi, 
`Since these three, memory, reason, and will, are not three lives but one life, not three minds but 
one mind, it follows that they are not three substances but one substance ... 
These three are one, 
in that they are one life, one mind, one essence. But they are three, in that I remember that I have 
memory and understanding and will; and I understand that I understand and will and remember; 
and that I will that I will and remember and understand. ' 
quoted in HUNT, M. 1993. The Story of Psychology. New York: Doubleday. p. 50 
13 
before God as members of a universal brotherhood. 1' Robinson points out that this created 
problems in explaining human error. Augustine's solution was to explain human conduct in 
terms of free will. `Without free will, evil had to be attributed to divine authorship, which was 
a notion not only heretical but one utterly incompatible with the concept of sin and personal 
responsibility. '" By the use of the concept, humans were ̀ elevate[d] ... to the status of morally 
responsible agents. "' Augustine's works not only influenced the development of the criminal 
law but as Hunt points out ̀ the principal notions that received the imprimatur of his authority 
... became the only acceptable psychology 
for the next eight centuries. "9 Implicit in 
Augustine's teachings is the notion of dualism. 
Dualism 
Dualism20 is the distinction made between mind and body most famously expressed by 
Descartes: 
I know with certitude that I exist, and because, in the meantime, I do not observe aught 
necessarily belongs to my nature beyond my being a thinking thing ... on the other hand I possess a distinct idea of body, in so far as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, 
16 ROBINSON, D. N. 1986. An Intellectual History of Psychology. University of Wisconsin Press. p. 127 
17 ROBINSON, D. N. 1986. p. 127 
18 ROBINSON, D. N. 1986. p. 127 
19 HUNT, M. 1993. p. 52 
20 Dualism. 
`The philosophical Theory that supposes that mind is essentially independent of the brain, 
though mental events run parallel with physical brain events. This leads to several suggested 
(usually causal) relations: (i) Mental and brain events run in parallel without causal 
interaction (epiphenomenalism). (ii) The brain `sew' mental events, rather as glands 
secrete substances. (iii) Brain and behaviour are controlled by an essentially autonomous 
mind. (iv) The mind is an emergent property of brain processes, rather as the properties of 
water emerge from the combined atoms of oxygen and hydrogen, which in isolation have very 
different properties (v) Mind and brain are essentially separate but have some mutual 
interaction (interactive dualism). This last was the view of Descartes. (vi) Mind is like 
`software' of the brain (hardware). ' 
GREGORY, R. L. (Ed. ). 1987. The Oxford Companion to the Mind Oxford University Press. p. 204 
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it is certain that I (that is, my mind by which I am what I am) is entirely and truly 
distinct from my body and may exist without it. 2' 
The link between mind and body for Descartes was the pineal gland. In Provisions of the Soul, 
Article XLI he wrote ̀ The whole action of the mind consists in this, by the simple fact of 
willing anything it causes a little gland, to which it is closely joined, to produce the result 
appropriate to the volition. ' This philosophy was developed further by a group of philosophers 
who followed Descartes' teachings and were referred to as the Cartesians. Hunt suggests that 
their aim was to prove that there was ̀no causal contact between body and mind'. The 
Christian idea of god was pivotal to these theories and enabled the explanation that physical 
happenings were parallelled by mental events. 22 
For Descartes will was a powerful mental entity, and the misuse of the will explained why man 
was sinful even though he was the creation of a Christian god: 
From all this I discover, however, that neither the power of willing, which I have 
received from God, is of itself the source of my errors, for it is exceedingly ample and 
perfect in its kind; nor even the power of understanding, for as I conceive no object 
unless by means of the faculty that God bestowed upon me, all that I conceive is 
doubtless rightly conceived by me, and it is impossible for me to be deceived in it. 
Whence, then spring my errors? They arise from this cause alone, that I do not restrain 
the will, ... 
it readily falls into error and sin by choosing the false in room of the true, 
and evil instead of good. ' 
Developments in scxsm and technology, Particularly the growth of behaviourist and 
materialist24 explanations of human behaviour, were inevitably to lead to a revision of the ideas 
21 DESCARTES, R. The Meditations and Selections from the Principles: Meditation VI. trans. VETTCH, 11988. La 
Salle, Illinois: Open Court. P. 91 
22 HUNT, M. 1993. p. 68 
23 DESCARTES, R. p. 69 
24 The distinction between materialism and dualism at its bamdary is hard to define. Possibly the best 
explanation of the distinction is the following: 
`The word ̀ materialism' sometimes misleads. The materialist is not committed to a Newtonian 
`billiard-ball' account of matter. Keith Campbell has spoken of the ̀ relativity of 
materialism'-its relativity to the physics of the day. Materialism is best interpreted as the 
(continued... )
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of Cartesian dualisnt25 It also led to the questioning of the causal power of will. ' Scientific 
arguments tended to question the traditional role of an omnipotent god creating the world and 
24(... continued) 
doctrine that the fundamental laws and principles of nature are exhausted by the laws and 
principles of physics, however ̀unmaterialistic' the latter laws and principles may be. Instead of 
speaking of 'materialism' some writers use the term ̀ physicalism'. 
Materialist accounts of the mind may be subdivided into peripheralist and centralist views. A 
more familiar name for the peripheralist view is behaviourism: the view that possession of a mind 
is constituted by nothing more than the engaging in of especially sophisticated types of overt 
behaviour, or being disposed to engage in such behaviour in suitable circumstances. 
Behaviourism as a philosophical doctrine must be distinguished from the mere methodological 
behaviourism of many psychologists who do not wish to base scientific findings upon 
introspective reports of processes that are not publicly observable. 
Very much more fashionable at the present time among philosophers inclined to materialism is 
the centralist view, which identifies mental processes with purely physical processes in the 
central nervous system. This view is sometimes called central-state materialism or, even more 
frequently, the identity view. Unlike behaviourism, it allows the existence of 'inner' mental 
processes which interact causally with the rest of the body. 
It remains to call attention to one important variety of theory intermediate between orthodox 
dualism and orthodox materialism. It is a ̀ one substance' view, denying that minds are things or 
collections of things set over against the material substance which is the brain. But it does involve 
a dualism of properties, because brain processes, besides their physical properties, are conceived 
of as having further non-physical properties which are supposed to make the brain processes into 
mental processes. Such views may be called attribute or dual-attribute theories of the mind-body 
relationship. A theory of this sort could be said to be a variety of identity view, since it also holds 
that mental processes are identical with certain brain processes. 
According to the doctrine of panpsychism, not simply brain processes but all physical things have 
a mental side, aspect, or properties, even if in a primitive and undeveloped form. 
Although the dual-attribute view is important, it inherits the considerable difficulty and confusion 
which surrounds the philosophical theory of properties. There are many difficulties in giving a 
satisfactory account of what it is for a thing to have a property, and these difficulties transmit 
themselves to this sort of theory of the mind-body relationship. 
ARMSTRONG, D. M. Mind Body Problem: Philosophical Theories. in GREGORY, R. L. (Ed. ) p. 491. 
Emphasis in original 
25 Darwin's theory of evolution, M &igin of Species was first published in 1859. As a result of increasing 
scientific knowledge man seemed to have a greater ability than before to examine and explain his 
environment and the behaviour of human beings, and this in turn led him to question the idea of 
separate mental states divorced from physical reality, linked to bodily states only through the medium 
of a pineal gland 
26 For a thorough critique of dualism see SMITH, P. & JONES, O. R. 1986. The Philosophy of the Mind. 
Cambridge University Press. See also for a selection of readings on the philosophical debate LYONS, 
W. (Ed. ). 1995. Modern Philosophy of the Mind. London: Everyman. For a review of mental causation 
see HEIL, J. & MELE, A. (Eds. ). 1993. Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. For an analysis of 
different approaches to the mind see HUNDERT, E. M. 1989. Philosophy, Psychiatry and 
Neuroscience - Three Approaches to the Mind Oxford University Press 
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to reject the Christian world view. Therefore, Augustine's and Descartes' notions of will were 
open to challenge scientifically. The relevance of will as a causal power was savagely attacked. 
If behaviorism and materialism possess a common ground, it is that upon which 
rejections of autonomous man have always stood. Both have judged the idea of 
autonomous man to be laden with mysticism, religiosity, and superstitious musing. The 
notion of `free will' in a determined universe violates every canon of parsimony, 
scientific unity and positivism. ' 
The argument concerning dualism and the separateness of mind and body states continues to 
this day as part of the debate surrounding philosophical and neuroscientific constructions of 
consciousness. Definitions of consciousness are relevant to this thesis because consciousness is 
used by the courts to evaluate what involuntary action in the sense of automatism might be. 
Discussions of what consciousness might be encounter difficulty when mechanistic, 
reductionist or materialistic definitions of the mind are put forward to explain human 
behaviour. Chalmers has argued that it is not possible to take consciousness eriously and 
remain a materialist? However, reductionist explanations of action have been employed by 
legal theorists in their explanation of voluntary movement. 
One of the problems for consciousness researchers lies in explaining the common perception 
that individual human behaviour influences events. Such explanations become complicated 
27 ROBINSON, D. N. 1986. p. 452. Emphasis in original 
28 CHALMERS, D. J. 1996. The Conscious Mind Oxford University Press. To Chalmers materialist 
explanations are seen as too reductionist. He argues that to obtain a satisfactory explanation of 
consciousness it is necessary to `embrace a form of dualism. ' Chalmers accepts that materialism has 
the advantage of simplicity but, states materialism cannot ̀ account for the phenomenum that need to 
be explained. ' Chalmers also rejects the inductive argument that ̀ materialism has always worked 
elsewhere'. He sees this as ̀easy to defeat', by the argument that materialism works where what is to 
be explained are 'structures and fimctions'. `But with consciousness, uniquely, we need to explain 
more than structures and functions, so there is little reason to expect an explanation to be similar in 
kind. ' Chalmers argues for a form of property dualism which occurs by a `natural supervenience 
network' which allows the physical and non physical to interact, thus the mental experience of self 
awareness upervenes on the physical process of neurons firing in the brain: `There is a system of 
[natural] laws that ensures that a given physical configuration will be accompanied by a given 
experience, just as there are laws that dictate that a given physical object will gravitationally affect 
others in a certain way. ' p. 168 - 70 
17 
when they are rooted in physical theories regarding the behaviour of matter. However, it is a 
common belief that people are responsible for their actions. Indeed the criminal law accepts 
this view of human behaviour. Lord Simon refers to the `legal axiom of the freedom of the 
will' and describes it as follows: 
Dr. Johnson in his Dictionary of the English Language defined ̀free will' as ̀ the 
power of directing our own action without restraint by necessity or fate, ' a definition 
repeated by the Oxford English Dictionary. Dr. Johnson was of course speaking in 
metaphysical or theological terms. But his definition seems to me equally relevant in 
law. 29 
It seems clear from this that Lord Simon is of the opinion that people may, normally, be held 
responsible for their own actions. Similarly, Penrose thinks that: 
The legal issue of `responsibility' seems to imply that there is indeed, within each of us, 
an independent `self with its own responsibilities - and by implication, rights - whose 
actions are not attributable to inheritance, environment, or chance. If it is other than a 
mere convenience of language that we speak as though there were such an independent 
`self, then there must be an ingredient missing from our present day physical 
understanding. The discovery of such an ingredient would surely profoundly alter our 
scientific outlook. " 
But how is the existence of such a self to be explained scientifically? Neither Penrose nor 
Chahners supply the answer to the question: how does conscious experience of an inner self 
arise from physical processes in the mind? Chalmers argues that the question is irrelevant; the 
search for such a connection is misguided. Even with fundamental physical laws, we cannot 
find a "connection" that does the work. Things simply happen in accordance with the law; 
beyond a certain point, there is no asking "how". As Hume showed, the quest for ultimate 
connections is ffultless. '31 
29 DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch [ 1975] AC 653,690. Emphasis in original 
30 PENROSE, R. 1994. Shadows of the Mind. Oxford University Press. p. 36. Emphasis in original 
31 CHALMERS, D. 1996. p. 170 
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Penrose is more circumspect: 
This book will not supply an answer to those deep issues, but I believe that it may open 
the door to them by a crack - albeit only a crack. It will not tell us that there need 
necessarily to be a ̀ self whose actions are not attributable to external cause, but it will 
tell us to broaden our view as to the nature of what a cause might be. A cause might be 
something that cannot be computed in practice or in principle. I shall argue that when 
cause is the effect of our conscious actions, then it must be something very subtle, 
certainly beyond computation, beyond chaos, and also beyond any purely random 
influences. Whether such a concept of `cause' could lead us any closer to an 
understanding of the profound issue (or the illusion? ) of our free wills is a matter for 
the future 32 
Searle sees the debate surrounding dualism as an and distraction from the meaningful 
discussion of consciousness. For Searle the way forward is to ' reject both materialism and 
dualism, and accept that consciousness is both a qualitative, subjective "mental" phenomenon 
and at the same time part of the ̀ physical world". ' Searle wants to abandon the distinction 
between mental and physical, to abandon ̀the traditional physical categories. ' These objectives 
provide a challenge to the traditional structure of the criminal law which views action as having 
separate and separable mens rea and actus reus elements. On Searle's view consciousness and 
the explanation of it is important because, `[o]nly to conscious agents can there ever be a 
question of anything mattering or having importance at all. '33 Searle argues that the choice is 
not between dualism and materialism: 
What I am trying to do is to redraw the conceptual map: if you have a map on which 
there are only two mutually exclusive territories, the ̀ mental' and the ̀ physical, ' you 
have a hopeless map and you will never find your way about. In the real world, there 
are lots of territories-economic, political, meteorological, athletic, social, 
32 PENROSE, R. 1994. p. 36 
33 All quotations in this paragraph taken from SEARLE, J. R. 1997. The Mystery of Consciousness. London: 
Granta. p. xiv 
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mathematical, chemical, physical, literary, artistic, etc. These are all parts of one unified 
world. 34 
Searle's construction of what it means to act has been influential and formed part of his 1984 
Reith Lecture Series. 35 His explanation of action has implications for the criminal law. 
Anglo-American criminal law recognises the importance of subjective mental processes in its 
doctrinal structure, that is the mens rea and voluntary act requirements. However it does not 
accept the premise that only subjective testimony is relevant to determinations of criminal 
liability. Indeed it could not because of the basic principle of the criminal law that the state 
must prove its case against the defendant beyond reasonable doubt. The defendant is not 
obliged to testify in her own defence. ' Therefore, objective evidence of subjective mental 
states may well be necessary for a determination of guilt or innocence to be made. Therefore 
any legal process built upon a Cartesian view of volition would immediately encounter 
insurmountable practical difficulties where a defendant refused to give evidence at trial. There 
would simply be no acceptable means of establishing the defendant's mental state at the time of 
the act. Cartesian dualism denies that others can have access to personal mental experiences. 
This would mean that the court could not know the thoughts of the perpetrator of a particular 
act. To subscribe to this line of argument would not be likely to achieve an adequate system of 
justice because from a Cartesian standpoint he drawing of inferences from behaviour is 
invalid. 
34 Searle does not see this as an easy task. 
`This is an obvious point, but such is the power of our Cartesian heritage that it is very hard to 
grasp. In my experience, undergraduates can grasp this point fairly easily, graduate students 
barely, but for most professional philosophers it seems too difficult. They think my position must 
be either 'materialism' or ̀ property dualism. ' How could one be neither a materialist nor a 
dualist-as absurd an idea as being neither a Republican nor a Democrat! ' 
SEARLE, J. R. 1997. p. 195 
35 Published as: 1984. Minds, Brains and Science. London: Penguin. For a discussion of Searle's explanation 
of action see chapters 4 and 5 
36 However, in England and Wales, ̀proper infeaenas' may now be dawn from her silence at trial under s 35 of the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
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However, as Lacey et aL point out the criminal law does show allegiance to a weaker form of 
dualism than that put forward by the Cartesians 
The actus reus/mens rea framework builds in at a deep level a commitment to 
philosophical dualism - the idea that a person's thoughts and her actions are separate 
and separable in our descriptions and analyses. On this view, we first of all describe 
what the defendant did, in terms of `colourless acts', and then infer from that what was 
in the defendant's mind. Yet, in practice, we do not react to human behaviour in this 
way, but rather make a global judgment which encompasses act and attitude, rather 
than separate mental state. " 
In examining constructions of involuntary action this thesis has to consider the role of the 
psychological element that Lord Simon describes as volition. It has to consider, amongst other 
questions, how a lack of `volition', to use Lord Simon's terminology may be asserted as a 
defence and how the discourses of the modem philosophy of the mind and neuroscience impact 
upon the criminal law's definition of what it means to `lack volition' and yet to `act'. 
The criminal law's requirement for voluntary bodily movement and mechanistic 
explanations of action 
Mackay states ̀[a]lthough the origin of the word "automatism" as applied to the criminal law is 
difficult to trace, its sudden appearance in the 1950's seems to have reflected the courts 
increasing awareness of the practical need for a voluntary act before an accused could be 
convicted. '38 
Fitzgerald, argues that the problem for jurists is that they conflate two separate questions; ̀(1) 
what is an act? (2) when is conduct involuntary? ' Fitzgerald suggests that 
37 LACEY, N., WELLS, C., & MEURE, D. 1994. Reconstructing the Criminal Law. London: Butt worths, 
p. 36-7 
38 MACKAY, RD. 1995. Mental Condition Defences in the Criminal Law. Oxford: Clarendon. p. 30 
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The problem of defining an act owes its importance partly to the constant recurrence 
throughout the common law of a certain theme, namely the requirement of an act ... 
This problem ... gains further significance from the recognition by the common 
law that 
... 
involuntary conduct, does not involve the actor in any responsibility because it is 
said there is in reality no act on his part. For this reason it becomes necessary to define 
the term `act' to provide the test by which we can decide whether a man's conduct 
should involve him in any responsbility. 39 
In his book, Act and Crime, Moore says ̀we end up, then, with the notion of an act as a willed 
bodily movement that is indeed the opposite (contrary or contradictory) of status, mental 
event, omission and involuntary bodily movement. '40 " It would seem from this statement that 
Moore is suggesting that a willed bodily movement is, on one description, the opposite of a 
mental event. This is an explanation of movement which some philosophers and neuroscientists 
would find hard to accept. Many neuroscientists would argue that all bodily movement with 
the exception of some reflexes or muscle spasms would be traceable to an event or series of 
events within the brain. ' Searle here would not distinguish the brain from the mind as some 
judges and legal commentators have done. 43 Searle would argue that it is distinctly unhelpful 
when describing action to separate mental and physical events in this way. The criminal law has 
however traditionally made some separation between the mental and the physical in terms of 
the attribution of criminal responsibility. 
Jurisprudentially an act has been expressed in terms of voluntary bodily movement. Moore 
bases his view of voluntary action in part on the explanation of voluntary action by John 
Austin. Austin wrote: ̀ [a] voluntary movement of my body, or a movement which follows a 
volition is an act. The involuntary movements which are the consequences of certain diseases 
39 FITZGERALD, P. J. 1961. Voluntary and Involuntary Acts. in GUEST, A. G. (Ed. ). Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence. Oxford: Clarendon. p. l 
40 MOORE, M. 1993. Act and Crime. Oxford: Clarendon. p. 39-40 
41 See (1994) 142 UPLR for a discussion of Moore's views and MOORE, M. 1997. Placing the Blame. 
Oxford: Clarendon 
42 See the discussion of Greenfield's work in chapter 4 
43 See chapter 5 and discussion later in this chapter 
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are not acts. 944 He rejected any idea of the will as a mental power, but said that: ̀ [c]ertain parts 
of the human body obey the Will. '45 In Austin's view the mind was not controlled by the will 
because it was impossible to will that thinking on a certain topic cease or the mind to 
remember something which had been forgotten. * Only the physical movements of the body 
were in Austin's view subject to volitional control Voluntariness in this sense is a very 
minimalist concept indeed. 
On the subject of how the body obeys the will Austin said ̀ [a]ll that I am able to discover 
when I will a movement of my body amounts to this; I wish the movement. "" Austin separated 
the desire for movement, ̀volition', from other wishes and desires by its ability to stimulate 
immediate bodily movement. On this explanation volition is a psychological element solely tied 
to bodily movement. Austin makes an ̀ incidental excursion into the philosophy of the mind"", 
in order to establish a framework of criminal liability. Austin's justification of the digression is 
threefold and is important because it shows the difficulty of defining action as a measure of 
criminal responsibility. 
Firstly, Austin wishes to make clear the meaning of `Duty' and to do this he needs to clarify 
the expressions `Motive' and ̀Will'. Secondly, he needs to make clear what items are the 
`objects of duties. These are "acts or forbearances. "' Herein lies the relevance of volition to his 
overall thesis. Austin says ̀every act and every forbearance from an act, is the consequence of 
a volition, or of a "determination of the will". '49 It is only for acts and forbearances that a 
44 Austin's conception of action has been widely discussed see, inter alia, FITZGERALD, P. 1961. p. 1-28, 
HART, H. L. A. 1968. Punishment and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. MOORE, M. 1993 and 
MACKAY, R. D. 1995 
45 AUSTIN, J. 1869. Austin on Jurisprudence. vol. 1(3'1 edit. ). London: John Murray. p. 423 
46 AUSTIN, J. 1869. p. 426 
47 AUSTIN, J. 1869. p. 424 
48 AUSTIN, J. 1869. p. 422 
49 AUSTIN, J. 1869. p. 423 
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defendant may be held criminally liable. Volition though a minimalist trigger is the root of 
criminal responsibility in Austin's explanation-so 
In order to avoid the concept of will becoming too powerful and to make his explanation of 
legal liability have some consistency, Austin was concerned to avoid definitions of will which 
placed too much emphasis on willing as a cause of action. He was influenced in his view of 
causation by Thomas Brown, " who wrote of the effect of will as a causal power, ̀ this same 
will is just nothing at aIL'Austin utilised Brown's description in his lectures, " Brown was 
examining ̀volition' as part of his overall thesis regarding cause and effect, preferring a 
modified Humean evaluation of causation. 53 Austin encounters problems in defining what an 
`act or forbearance' might be. In defining what actions are meaningful for legal responsibility 
difficulties arise in distinguishing between reasons for acting and acts as causes. The real 
problem for Austin's definition is whether his concept of volition describes anything that is 
meaningful. Whether it can actually distinguish between voluntariness and involuntariness. 
Austin reduces voluntariness to a contradictory notion. He does not explain why he does not 
consider it possible to will mental events though it is in his view possible to use a volition to 
cause bodily movements, he just asserts that this is so. A further problem with Austin's 
explanation is that it suggests that a volition to move muscles is something that is identifiable 
as a psychological item Such a description is not sustainable when examined in the context of 
50 AUSTIN, J. 1869. Austin says that it is necessary to distinguish between intentional and negligent injury. 
Thus ̀ intention' had to be distinguished from will. According to Austin ̀ volition' and ̀ intention' must 
be clearly defined to achieve this because: `although intention is not a volition the facts are inseparably 
connected. ' p. 423 
51 Brown T. (1778-1820). It has been argued that ̀ Brown's analysis [of causation] was better known in the 
first half of the nineteenth century than Hume's now classic discussion. ' SMITH, R. 1981.7mal by 
Medicine, Edinburgh University Press. p. 73 
52 AUSTIN, J. 1869. p. 424 
53 1818. Enquiry into Cause and Effect. (3'd edit. ) Constable. Hume wrote of volition: `The same difficulty 
occurs in contemplating the operations of mind on body; where we observe the motion of the latter to 
follow upon the volition of the former; but we are not able to observe or conceive the tie, which binds 
together the motion and volition, or the energy by which the mind produces this effect. ' HUME, D. 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Section N. Part II. in GEIRSSON, IL& LOSONSKY, 
M. 1998. Beginning Metaphysics. Oxford: Blackwell. p. 254 
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modem neuroscientific and philosophical descriptions of consciousness and action. However, 
Austin's description of voluntary action is still utilised by jurists today. Moore, has adapted 
Austin's definition to fit within a functionalist` description of how events in the mind might 
cause the body to move. " 
There are therefore questions with regard to criminal responsibility that reductionist or 
mechanistic explanations of human behaviour will find difficulty in addressing. Mechanistic 
descriptions of human action are based in the science of physics. Dennett sees physical laws as 
of use in explaining the emergence of a sense of self Considering how a mind might give 
directives to a brain, he writes: 
These [the directives] are not physical; they are not light waves or sound waves or 
cosmic rays or streams of subatomic particles. No physical energy or mass is associated 
with them. How, then, do they get to make a difference to what happens to the brain 
cells they must affect, if the mind is to have any influence over the body? A 
fundamental principle of physics is that any change in trajectory of a physical activity is 
an acceleration requiring the expenditure of energy, and where is this energy to come 
from? It is this principle of the conservation of energy that accounts for the physical 
impossibility of `perpetual motion machines', and the same principle is apparently 
violated by dualism. This confrontation between quite standard physics and dualism has 
been endlessly discussed since Descartes's own day, and is widely regarded as the 
inescapable flaw of dualism' 
However, there are difficulties with the acceptance of a purely scientifically based description 
of action. The difference between causal explanations and less reductionist views of the mind's 
interaction with the body is well expressed in The View ftom Nowheres' where Nagel 
challenges any account of behaviour which seeks to explain mental events solely in objective 
terms. Nagel argues that it is the quality of individual perceptions which determine what it is 
54 See footnote 66 
55 MOORE, M. 1993 
56 DENNETT, D. 1991. Consciousness Explained London: Penguin. p. 35 
57 1986. Oxford University Press 
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like to be a particular person. 58 Whilst Nagel accepts that `dualism of mind and body is 
conceivable, ' he feels it is ̀ implausible. ' However, he argues that physical reality is not the only 
reality. He writes: 
The reductionist program that dominates current work in the philosophy of mind is 
completely misguided, because it is based on the groundless assumption that a 
particular conception of objective reality is exhaustive of what there is. Eventually, I 
believe, current attempts to understand the mind by analogy with man-made computers 
that can perform superbly some of the same external tasks as conscious beings will be 
recognized as a gigantic waste of time. The true principles underlying the mind will be 
discovered, if at all, only by a more direct approach. " 
`The confrontation', as Dennett describes it, exists not just between dualists and materialists 
but also between those who view physical explanations as complete and those who do not. 
Nagel argues that there is ̀ more to reality than what can be accommodated by the physical 
conception of objectivity. '60 Most simply explained the confrontation relates to two types of 
explanations for events. "' The world, as viewed from the scientific viewpoint, as explained by 
Dennett is causally closed. This view of action restricts explanations in several ways. The 
explanation is couched in physical terms, so neurons firing in the brain cause movement, and 
the human action that results from the neuronal firings can only be explained from the point of 
view of a third person, the observer. Subjective explanations tend to dualism because some 
58 See NAGEL, T. 1974. What is it Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review, 1974, vol. 83,435-50 
59 NAGEL, T. 1986. p. 16 
60 NAGEL, T. 1986. p. 15 
61Dualist theories of the mind have attracted much academic criticism from materialists. Ryles was so irritated 
by the conception that he wrote ̀ The official theory. I shall often speak of it, with deliberate 
abusiveness, as the ̀ dogma of the Ghost in the Machine'... It is a big mistake and a mistake of a 
special kind ... a category mistake'. Ryle's argument, put simply, is that there is no separate mental 
life. Body and mind are unified, two complex structures but belonging to the same category, not extant 
on separate but parallel planes. Ryle totally rejected the dualist conception of an inner observer in the 
brain, his equivalent of the ̀ ghost in the machine'. RYLE, G. The Concept of the Mind. in 
PICKERING, J. & SKINNER, M. (Eds. ). 1990. From Sentience to Symbols. University of Torronto 
Press. p. 22. For a modern materialist discussion of conceptions of behaviour see CHURCHLAND, P. 
1995. The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 
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subjective explanations may be said to give precedence to the epiphenomenal62 in accounts of 
62 `Epiphenomenalism. Group of doctrines about mental-physical causal relations, which view 
some or all aspects of mentality as by-products of the physical goings-on in the world. 
The classic definition (e. g. in C. D. Broad, The Mind and its Place in Nature (1925)) ensures that 
epiphenomenalism is a species of dualism. Whereas Descartes, an interactionist, held that mental 
things both cause and are caused by physical things, the epiphenomenalist holds that mental 
things do not cause physical things although they are caused by them. The epiphenomenalist then 
can accept that there are no causal influences on physical events besides other physical events, 
and thus can escape one objection sometimes raised against dualism. But the epiphenomenalist's 
picture of mental events as tacked on to the physical world, having no causal influence there, is 
unappealing: she would seem to think that mental things feature in the world as accompanying 
shadows of the physical-in the realm of `pure experience'. 
Some non-dualist positions are accused of commitment to epiphenomenalism. The idea is that the 
mental is not caught in the physical causal net, but now not because mental things aren't caught 
there, but because mental properties of things aren't caught there, these not being causally 
relevant properties. The picture again is one in which mentality appears causally idle. 
Two contemporary physicalist doctrines are alleged to have specific epiphenomenalist conse- 
quences. The first is functionalism, which holds that types of mental states are definable in terms 
of the causal roles played by their tokens in an interconnected network. An objection has it that a 
causal account omits something crucial to some mental states-namely the intrinsic nature of 
those states, which is accessible only from a first-person perspective. Some functionalists concede 
the objection, and say that although the mental can be circumscribed by way of its operation in 
the causal world, none the less subjective features of experience, sometimes called qualia, must be 
acknowledged, and these indeed are epiphenomenal. 
Davidson's anomalous monism is the other physicalist position attacked on grounds of supposed 
epiphenomenalist commitments. Davidson holds that explanations which introduce terms like 
`believe' and ̀ desire' are causal explanations; and he argues that beliefs and desires are physical 
by arguing that vocabulary used in stating physical laws applies to them. An objection claims that 
because the real causal power of any state which has a mental property must be seen, from 
Davidson's perspective, to reside in some Jawlike physical property that it has, mental properties 
must be acknowledged by Davidson to be not genuinely causally relevant, but rather epiphenome- 
nal, inefficacious. An answer may be that, since there are two different sorts of causal 
explanation, some events simply do possess two different properties each of which has causal 
relevance. But a problem may remain: it seems that conceiving of mental events in the physical 
terms in which causal laws are framed, it can be hard to persist in thinking that our talk of than 
using mental terms can offer genuinely causal explanations of what happens. 
The objection made to Davidson might be made against any materialist who allows a gap 
between, on the one hand, the metaphysics of mental causation, which concentrates on properties 
characterized in the physical sciences, and, on the other hand, what we actually know about the 
nature and existence of mental causation, which derives from everyday explanations of people 
and their doings. ' 
HORN, 11995. Epiphenomenalism. in HONDERICH, T. (Ed. ). 1995. The Oxford Companion to 
Philosophy. Oxford University Press. p. 241. Emphasis in original 
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action. Therefore reductionist explanations of behaviour have been favoured by scientists 
because they focus attention on the bodily mechanisms that they seek to understand. Clearly 
such explanations are relevant to understanding movement in that they may illuminate common 
misconceptions. It is for example helpful to know the world is round and to understand the 
laws of gravity. A question that will be examined in this thesis is whether reductionist 
explanations of movement are useful to the criminal law? 
Morse discusses causation in the criminal law and its application to excuses. He points out that 
causation itself cannot be an excuse. Otherwise, no one could be criminally responsible for 
anything. 63 Therefore, what is important in assessments of culpability or blame is something 
other than causation. Rosenberg suggests that ̀ unlike other causes, beliefs and desires are also 
reasons for action: they render it intelligible. So, perhaps explanations in ordinary life work by 
showing actions are reasonable, efficient, appropriate or rational in the light of the agent's 
beliefs and desires. ' Rosenburg argues that in order to understand action we need to make it 
`rationally intelligible' and herein lies the problem with causal laws: ̀ [c]ausal laws don't 
provide intelligiibility. '' Rosenburg suggests that it is the rationality of actions which make 
them explicable. The explanation of actions in his view lies in exploring the philosophical 
concept of intentionality. "' 
The consideration of criminal responsibility and involuntary action is further complicated by 
the normative requirements of the criminal law. Austin in his discussion of intention and will is 
trying to outline the component parts of his normative explanation of the legal system In order 
to maintain the distinction between negligent and intentional injury, Austin distinguishes 
intention from volition. To do this Austin links ̀ intention' to the consequences of action. He 
63 ̀ If causation were an excuse, no one would be responsible for any conduct, and society would not be 
concerned with moral and legal responsibility and excuse. ' MORSE, S. J. 1996. Brain and Blame. 
(1996) 84 The Georgetown Law Journal 527-49. p. 532 
64 ROSENBURG, A. 1999. The Explanation of Human Action. in KATZ, L., MOORE, M., & MORSE, S. J. 
1999. Foundations of the Criminal Law. Oxford University Press. 204-13. p. 206. Emphasis in original 
65 See chapter 4 for a discussion of some of the philosophical explanations of action 
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seeks to supply some reason why action takes place and identifies a belief or desire which he 
calls ̀motive' which is a ̀ wish causing or preceding a volition'. Austin therefore ends up with 
three psychological items all related to each other and to movement. Volition may be tied 
solely to bodily movements, but it is caused by another psychological item, motive. 
However motive is not included within the most commonly cited part of Austin's discussion of 
voluntary action: 
Certain movements of our bodies follow invariably and immediately our wishes or 
desires for those same movements: Provided, that is, that the bodily organ be sane, and 
the desired movements be not prevented by any outward obstacle... These antecedent 
wishes and these consequent movements, are human volitions and acts strictly and 
properly so called... And as these are the only volitions; so are the bodily movements, 
by which they are immediately followed, the only acts or actions (properly so called). It 
will be admitted on the mere statement, that the only objects which can be called acts, 
are consequences of volitions. A voluntary movement of my body, or a movement 
which follows a volition, is an act. The involuntary movements which are the 
consequence of certain diseases, are not acts. But as the bodily movements which 
immediately follows volition, are the only ends of volition, it follows that those bodily 
movements are the only objects to which the term `acts' can be applied with perfect 
precision and propriety... Most of the names which seem to be names of acts, are 
names of acts, coupled with certain of their consequences. For example, if I kill you 
with a gun or pistol I shoot you: and the long train of incidents which are denoted by 
that brief expression, are considered (or spoken of) as if they constituted an act 
perpetrated by me. In truth, the only parts of the train which are my act or acts are the 
muscular motions by which I raise the weapon; point it at your head of body, and pull 
the trigger. These I will. The contact of the flint and steel; the ignition of the powder, 
the flight of the ball towards your body, the wound and subsequent death, with the 
numberless incidents included in these, are consequences of the act which I will, I will 
not those consequences, though I may intend them" 
If this explanation of action, which omits motivation is accepted, there is a further and 
immediate problem because it seems that volition as a psychological item can have little 
meaning in the equation of criminal liability. It is hard to imagine a movement which would not 
66 AUSTIN, J. 1869. p. 427-8. Emphasis in original. Quoted in HART, H. L. A. 1968. p. 98. Also quoted in 
MACKAY, RD. 1995. p. 9 
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be accompanied by this minimal ̀volition. ' Austin says: ̀A voluntary movement of my body, or 
a movement hat follows a volition, is an act. The involuntary movements which are the 
consequences of certain diseases are not acts. ' The question is, is the distinction valid? 
It seems that on a twenty first century view of the mind this is unlikely to be true. The 
movements of a diseased body may well be caused by the minimal desire in the brain for a 
bodily movement which Austin calls a volition. The exclusion of overarching wishes and 
desires for movement from the description of voluntary action; and the use of volition, as a 
psychological item, a specific type of desire for muscular contractions in Austin's definition of 
willed bodily movement is too reductionist. In fact it is arguable that it is so reductionist that it 
is meaningless. However this description of willed bodily movement, without reference to 
Austin's explanation of motivation is still utilised by criminal theorists today. 
Clearly science and philosophy must have a contribution to make to the definition of action, 
but certain types of action description are more useful to scientific evaluation than to 
explanations of human behaviour, particularly certain explanations of what it means to be 
`conscious' and to `act'. Philosophers such as Dennett claim that the idea of an omnipresent 
observer in the brain is an illusion. On this view the sense of volitional control of action is pure 
folk psychology. 67 However, such a view seems counter intuitive. As Penrose points out an 
`independent self is required before criminal liability may be imposed Criminal courts assume 
that people have conscious control over their actions and therefore may be liable for their 
outcomes. Perhaps this is why the interpretation given by the courts to the meaning of 
involuntary action, as it applies in the defence of automatism, is not so reductionist as Austin's 
discussion of voluntary bodily movement might suggest. In Bratty v Attorney General for 
Northern Ireland the Lord Chancellor defined automatism as: 
67 Folk psychology - `our first person "folk psychology" account of ourselves with our scientific understanding 
of the world. ' LIBET, B., FREEMAN, A., & SUTHERLAND, K. (Eds. ). 1999. The Volitional Brain. 
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1999, vol. 6, no. 8-9, ix-xxii, p. ix 
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Connoting the state of a person who, though capable of action, is not conscious of 
what he is doing ... It means unconscious 
involuntary action and it is a defence because 
the mind does not go with what is being done. " 
It has been argued that Austin's definition of volition and its relation to movement, because of 
its limited meaning is unhelpful in making evaluations of criminal responsibility based on action 
more intelligible. Viscount Kilmuir in Bratty seems to have considered consciousness as a 
useful tool in the evaluation of criminal responsibility. Is consciousness likely to be a more 
helpful conception? 
Whether consciousness of volitional control exists, has been the subject of intensive discussion 
in the Journal of Consciousness Studies. " In the introduction to the discussion the problem in 
the Journal the editors comment hat: ̀ most people are agreed that we all "know" that we have 
some degree of volition control over the sort of experiences we undergo. But when we try to 
reconcile this with our physics - and biology - based understanding of the world, we run into a 
series of serious and well documented problems. '70 
Not the least of these problems concerns the attribution of personal responsibility. The law 
assumes that people are responsible for their actions and that it is just to punish them for 
blameworthy actions. It considers personal testimony and evidence to determine whether a 
person's actions were voluntary. It is a requirement of the criminal law that a defendant's 
actions may be said to be voluntary before criminal liability is imposed. Even though it is 
presumed that this is the case unless there is evidence to the contrary. As previously discussed, 
Smith states that voluntariness is fundamental to criminal liability. However, if scientific and 
biological arguments which deny free will are accepted as the basis for action explanations, 
personal responsibility is either removed or demoted in the explanations of action. This raises 
68 Bratty vA. G. for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 396,401 (Viscount Kilmuir) repeating the definition given 
by the Court of Appeal 
69 See 1999, vol. 6, no. 8-9 and 1999 vol. 6, no. 10 
70 LIBET, B. et al. (Eds. ). 1999. p. ix 
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the question discussed earlier in relation to Morse's comments concerning reductive scientific 
explanations. Why hold someone responsible for their actions at all? 
The law presumes that personal choices are relevant in considering the culpability of a 
defendant. Indeed the criminal law is dependent in its constructions of liability upon the idea 
that people may be held responsible for their actions, and punishment is predicated upon this 
basis. " Some scientists argue that this is not a safe premise on which to found a legal system! 
The discussion of these matters is closely linked to the debates surrounding dualism and 
determinism The relevance of the debate to the criminal law is clearly expressed in The 
Volitional Brain: 
If the distinction between things we do through choice and necessity has no scientific 
validity, then the consequences need to be addressed as a matter of urgency. The 
problem is starting to move beyond the scope of armchair philosophers and concerns 
the future shape of society and civilization. Already scientists are starting to draw some 
very radical conclusions as to how our legal system could be recast on a more scientific 
basis (Blakemore, 1988; Crick, 1994). But many would say that such a fundamental 
change should grow out of a major debate in which philosophy, sociology, ethics, 
religion, law and political considerations all had a voice. ' 
This thesis aims to add a legal perspective to this debate, particularly an English criminal law 
perspective based upon a consideration of the defence of automatism and the discussion by the 
courts in England and in other jurisdictions as to how the defence might operate. The thesis is 
therefore split into three parts. Chapters 2 and 3 consider the law of automatism as it operates 
in England and Wales, some medical commentary on the defence of automatism, and some of 
the approaches adopted in other jurisdictions. Chapter 4 examines ome neuroscientific and 
philosophical approaches to action and their relevance to the criminal law. Chapter 5 looks at 
71 For a discussion of the philosphy relating to punishment see NORRIE, A. 1991. Law Ideology and 
Punishment. Kluwer 
72 See BLAKEMORE, C. 1988. The Mind Machine. London: BBC and CRICK, F. H. C. 1994. The Astonishing 
Hypothesis. London: Simon & Schuster 
73 This debate is discussed in relation to criminal responsibility in chapter 5 
74 LIBET B. et al. (Eds. ). 1999. p. xiii 
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constructions of responsibility within the criminal law, and considers whether neuroscientific 
and philosophical explanations of volitional control might assist the criminal law in judging 
when action is involuntary. The conclusion suggests amendments to the present law to remove 
inconsistencies and injustices. 
33 
Chapter 2 
The aim of the next two chapters is to examine the growth of the automatism defence within 
the law of England and Wales and to make reference to cases from other jurisdictions which 
either illuminate certain problems posed by the present operation of the defence or provide a 
contrasting approach to the definition of the defence. When reading the case law relating to 
automatism, ' it is striking how often reference is made by judges to the policy considerations 
underlying judicial attitudes to the defence. The reason for this emphasis on policy arises, in 
part, from the close overlap between the insanity and the automatism defences. Indeed the 
automatism defence in most of the jurisdictions examined divides into two categories. The 
first, non-insane automatism, which results in an acquittal and the second, insane automatism, 
which results in the court retaining powers of disposal over the defendant. ' The policy 
reasoning behind the limitation of the defence was discussed by the Canadian Supreme Court 
in Rv Stone3 which considered the Canadian case of Rv Rabey' and the English case of Rv 
Kemps and concluded that the defence of insane automatism had grown out of a requirement 
by the courts to retain control over those who were thought to be suffering from what the law 
described as a ̀ disease of the mind'. The courts were concerned that those who were legally 
insane, but acted as an automaton should not go free. In Stone, Binnie J. considered the 
following comment made by Devlin J. in Kemp: 
In the eyes of the common law if a man is not responsible for his actions he is entitled 
1 This thesis examines the case law of six jurisdictions: England and Wales, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
Scotland, and the United States of America. It should be noted that in America dint States 
recognise different forms of the defence. Some see automatism as a species of the insanity defence, 
some refer to it as automatism, others as unconsciousness, ome do not admowledge the defence. For 
a full review of the American case law see 27" ALR 41 p. 1067-1143. For a discussion of the concept 
of automatism in the United States see LA FAVE, W. R. & SCOTT, A. W. Jr. 1986. Criminal Law 
(god edit. ). St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co. 383-7 
2 The precise terminology may vary. For example in Canada in Rv Stone (1999) 134 CCC (3d) 353 the court 
said that in accordance with s. 16 of the Canadian Criminal Code insane automatism should be 
referred to as mental disorder automatism 
3 (1999) 134 CCC (3d) 353 
4 [1980] 2 SCR 513 
5 [195613 All ER 249 
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to be acquitted by the ordinary form of acquittal, and it matters not whether his lack of 
responsibility was due to insanity or to any other cause. " 
Binnie J. concluded that this common law position had been seen as unacceptable to the courts 
and that: 
In response to the public danger posed by such an outcome, and to a developing 
understanding of mental disorder, the courts started down the path that eventually 
subsumed the notion of involuntary conduct into the concept of insanity where the 
involuntary conduct could be identified as the product of a disease of the mind. A 
successful plea of insanity led to the verdict of `not guilty by reason of insanity', which 
carried with it the possibility of indefinite detention at the pleasure of the state. ' 
For these policy reasons courts have sought to control the defence of automatism in order to 
avoid the acquittal of defendants whom the court felt posed a danger to society. 
The history of the defence and moral insanity 
Historical evidence of automatism cases is limited. In Trial by Medicine, Smith offers an 
explanation for this from his reading of Victorian medical literature. This revealed that 
although medical experts cited cases of automatistic behaviour caused by: ̀ sleepwalking, 
hypnotic trances, spiritualist seances, or hysterical phobias, ... it was unusual for any of these 
to result in criminal proceedings. " Walker, " refers to the occasional nature of automatism, 
which he describes as a condition in which it `is said, a person may perform apparently 
purposive actions, automatically, without being in conscious control of his bodily movements. ' 
He notes that of these unusual conditions sleepwalking was the first ̀ to be recognised'10, and 
6 [1956]3AllER249,251 
7 (1999) 134 CCC (3d) 353,395-6 (Binnie J. ) 
8 SMITH, R. 1981. p. 97 
9 WALKER, N. 1968. Crime and Insanity in England "1.1. Edinburgh University Press. See particularly 
Chapter 10 Automatism and Drunkenness 
10 WALKER, N. 1968. p. 165. Both quotations 
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traces European sleepwalking defences back to the fourteenth century. " Although he notes 
`English lawyers were sufficiently insulated from their contemporaries from the fourteenth 
century onwards to avoid the importation of this defence'. "
Walker refers to the cases of Colonel Cheyney Culpepper, and Esther Griggs in England (both 
unreported cases) and to the case of Simon Fraser in Scotland. Culpepper was tried in 1686 
for shooting a Guardsman and his horse. He claimed his sleepwalking was a common 
occurrence, and had evidence to support the assertion. He was found to be insane but eight 
days later he was pardoned. Esther Griggs threw her child out of the window whilst 
sleepwalking because she believed her house was on fire. She did not have to stand trial 
because the grand jury declined to `find a true bill against her. ' Walker comments ̀They were 
thus in effect acquitting her of responsibility for what she had undoubtably done'. " Fraser 
battered his baby son to death, but the jury found that he was not responsible for his actions. 
An unusual verdict was returned which whilst not an acquittal meant that the only restriction 
on Fraser's liberty was that he gave an undertaking that he would sleep alone1'. 
Both Smith and Eigenfs cite the growth of medical literature regarding unconscious mental 
states in Victorian times as giving impetus to certain claims of involuntariness in the 
courtroom. "' Eigen expresses this as follows: 
11 As early as 1313 the Council of Vienne was responsible for a resolution to the effect that if a child, a 
madman or a sleeper killed or injured someone he was not held to be culpable. WALKER, N. 1968. 
p. 166 
12 WALKER, N. 1968. p. 167 
13 WALKER, N. 1968. p. 169 
14 HMAdvocate v. Fraser (1878) 4 Couper 78 
15 EIGEN, J. P. 1995. Witnessing Insanity. Yale University Press. p. 172-5 
16 `In 1837 a man indicted for stealing explained to the court: "I will not deny that I did take the 
fironts, but I was not conscious of what I was doing-I was labouring under an aberration of 
mind. " The prisoner directly asserted the possibility that mental fimctioning and (criminal) 
behavior could operate more or less independently. He was pleading not a blackout or memory 
failure but rather an inability to comprehend how and why he took the items. Ten years earlier, 
consciousness was mentioned by a sailor whose "contusions in [his] head" rendered him inca- 
pable of knowing what he was "about" when he drank. He summarized his role in the theft by 
saying, "I was unconscious of anything till I found myself in the watchhouse. " Certainly one 
approaches the use of so significant a term as "consciousness" with caution. The prisoner may 
(continued... ) 
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Cultural inquiry into mind-body relations broadened in the last decades of the 
eighteenth century. A host of human actions-pulse and respiration, for 
example-were noted to take place ̀unattended' by consciousness. Epileptic or 
hysterical displays afforded compelling evidence of physical action without conscious 
motor control. Courtroom testimony suggests the currency of the notion of behavior 
unattended by consciousness, of a cultural imagination embracing the idea of variable 
states of `knowing' akin to sleepwalking or automatism. The prospect of assigning 
moral blame to such mental states had to have been daunting. How was the jury to 
respond to a defense phrased as follows: `It was like a dream to me, when I saw the 
deed was done it struck me with terror instantly'? " 
Smith suggests that the term automatism is derived from the tendency of 19t° Century medical 
writers to refer ̀ to "automatic", "instinctive", or "impulsive" acts, which they interpreted in 
the light of contemporary reflex action theories. "8 An example of this type of physiological 
theory is quoted by Bucknill and Tuke 
Modem physiology teaches that there is a reflex action of the cerebrum, as well as of 
the spinal cord; and thus satisfactorily explains the existence of the automatic or 
instinctive acts. To such cases Dr. Carpenter alludes when he says, ̀So far as the 
directing influence of the will over the current of thought is suspended, the individual 
becomes a thinking automaton, destitute of the power to withdraw his attention from 
any idea or feeling by which his mind may be possessed, and is as irresistibly impelled, 
therefore, to act in accordance with this, as the lower animals are to act in accordance 
with their instincts. "
Victorian psychiatrists used this physiological information to explain and excuse purposive 
16( ... continued) 
well have intended to signify his being "aware" or some other relatively ordinary state of 
'knowing. " Whatever his object, there remains the very real issue of what meaning "not 
conscious" conveyed to the jury when coupled with "labouring under an aberration of mind. " 
What conception of the mind explained such testimony? ' 
EIGEN J. P. 1995 p. 172 
17 EIGEN, J. P. 1995. p. 173 
18 SMITH, R. 1981. p. 97 
19 1858. A Manual of Psychological Medicine. [5], London: Churchill, p. 193 quoting from CARPENTER 
W. B., 1853, Principles of Human Physiology (416 edit. ). London: Churchill. p. 840 quoted in SMITH 
1981. p. 97 
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actions2° which would otherwise attract criminal liability, claims of this sort were made under 
the medical description of moral or impulsive insanity. "
Voluntary action and developments in the criminal law. 
The courts disagreed with such medical explanations of human behaviour. Indeed the 
acceptance by the courts of the M'Naghten Rules to govern criminal responsibility in cases of 
insanity was to a large extent a rejection of these theories. The rules were stated by Tindal C. J. 
in answer to questions put by the House of Lords regarding the defence of insanity. The 
questions were asked because of publicly expressed fears that in acquitting Daniel M'Naghten, 
of the murder of the Prime Minister's secretary, on grounds of insanity the court which tried 
him had widened the common law insanity defence, and had recognised a defence of 
irresistible impulse. 
The rules are: 
the jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is presumed to be sane and to 
possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes until the contrary 
be proved to their satisfaction, and to establish a defence on the ground of insanity it 
must clearly be proved that, at the time of committing the act the party accused was 
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the 
nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know 
he was doing what was wrong. ' ' 
20 This explanation of human action would not be accepted today. See Chapter 4 for a discussion of 
consciousness and how it relates to action 
21 SMITH, R. 1981. p. 96-113. Smith sets out the argument both between different sectors of the medical 
profession and between the medical profession and the courts 
22 M'Naghten's Case All ER Rep. (1843) 10 C&F 200,8 Eng Rep 719,11943-60] All ER Rep 229 at 233. 
Note that there is considerable variation in the spelling of M'Naghten's case. For the history of the 
insanity defence see ROBINSON, D. N. 1996. Wild Beasts and Idle Hwnou s, Harvard University 
Press, and see EIGEN, J. P. 1995 
23 Wrong in this sense has been interpreted by the courts as legal wrongness see Rv Windle [ 1952] 2QB 826. 
See MACKAY, R. D. and KEARNS, G. 1999. More Facts about the Insanity Defence. [1999] Crim 
LR 714-25 for a discussion of whether the courts employ this test of legal wrongness and a suggestion 
that in fact the courts tend to consider wrongness in this sense as moral wrongness. For a critique of 
the insanity defence generally see. MACKAY, R. D. 1995, Chapter 2 
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The M'Naghten Rules became the test of criminal insanity and determine the boundary 
between insane and non-insane automatism. As will be seen from the following discussion of 
the case law, those who claim an automatism defence and are deemed by the court to be 
suffering from an impairment caused by disease of the mind, will receive a verdict of not guilty 
by reason of insanity rather than an acquittal" 
Notions of free will were also important in Victorian England. Wiener argues that in early 
Victorian England ̀law reform had Evangelical as well as Utilitarian dimensions'. Fifoot notes 
that the ̀ utilitarian frame of mind' of the judiciary did not prevent them having an ̀ itch to 
moralise'. 25 Wiener argues that Victorian law reform saw the law as a vehicle for developing 
the idea of self restraint. ' 
The Victorian age was a period of great law reform and it was during this era that the criminal 
law began to assume the form it has now achieved. Norrie describes the preceding period, the 
eighteenth century, as a time when ̀ the bloodiness of the law substantially increased' 27 As a 
result by the early nineteenth century there was a growing interest in reforming the law to 
reflect the needs of the new age. Wiener suggests that ̀ underlying early Victorian reform of 
criminal policy was the supposition that the most urgent need, and possibility, of the age was 
to make people self-governing and that the way to do this was to hold them ... responsible 
for 
the consequences of their actions'. " Paralleling the emergence of these concepts were 
developments in the theory of punishment. Retributivist theories were based upon the notion 
of the autonomous individual possessing certain rights. 
24 In this connection it is necessary to point out that the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) 
Act 1991 introduced a degree of flexibility into the sentencing of those receiving an insanity verdict 
25 FIFOOT, C. S. 1959. Judge and Jurist in the Reign of Victoria. London: Stevens. p. 55, quoted in 
WIENER, M. 1994. Reconstructing the Criminal Law. Cambridge University Press. p. 53 
26 WIENER, M. 1994. p. 56 develops this argument from Patrick Atiyah's assertion that the Victorian's 
`believed in principles of behaviour which if taken over all, would produce the greatest happiness; but 
they did not believe that each individual act should be weighed in the balance (at least by the common 
herd) to decide whether it would promote the greatest happiness or not. ' ATIYAH, P. S. 1979. The 
Rise and Fall of the Freedom of Contract. Clarendon. p. 354-6 
27 NORRIE, A. 1993. p. 18 
28 WIENER, M. 1994. p. 11-12 
39 
Kant and Hegel insisted that punishment was a matter first and foremost, of the right 
of the individual. Because of this, the individual's guilt had to be established in advance 
of punishment, and, most importantly, punishment had to equal the crime.... The 
demand for individual justice was a central demand of liberal thought in this period, 
and it is crucial to note its theoretical basis in the birth of a particular model of the 
legal subject as a free and responsible agent .' 
In order to hold someone responsible for an individual act the notion developed that 
the act must be willed or voluntary. This emphasis on free will, and the ideal of a rational 
individual using self restraint to further his own interests, arose as a response to the old order 
and its absolutist politics. ' In England, Norrie suggests that the revolution was achieved 
through Benthamism. `The key conception was that the social world was founded upon 
individual self interest and rights ... the core idea ... involved the embrace of free individualism 
in every discourse, and this provided a firm basis for the criticism and rejection of the old 
absolutist method of social control through a punitive reign of terror. " 
In 1833 Law Commissioners were appointed by the government 32 Hood and Radzinowicz 
comment: 
On reading the Commissioners' reports, one is struck by the affinity between their ideas 
and those of Cesare Beccaria33 They were indeed rather proud to acknowledge their 
debt to hin. Their penal doctrine was, in this sense, an English adaptation of what has 
been called classicism They were classicists in their unadulterated belief in free will 
and the exercise of unfettered choice by individuals in deciding whether or not to 
29 NORRIE, A. 1993. p19 
30 NORRIE, A. 1993. p. 19 
31 NORRIE, A. M. p. 19 
32 Their terms of reference were: 
, to digest into One Statute all the Statutes and Enactments touching Crimes and the Trial and 
Punishment thereof and also to digest into One other Statute all the Provisions of the common or 
unwritten Law touching the same, and to inquire and report how far it may be expedient to 
combine both these Statutes into One Body of the Criminal Law. ' 
House of Lords Session Papers (1847-48) vol., 41,224, quoted in HOOD, R& RADZINOWICZ, L. 
1986. A History of English Criminal Law, vol. S. London: Stevens. p. 723 
33 See BECCARIA, C. 1764. Del delltti e delle pence, trans. PAOLUCCI, H. 1963. On Crimes and 
Punishments. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 
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commit crime, or crimes of different gravity. 34 
Stephen35 in his History of the Criminal Law vol. II, says ̀ The act must be voluntary, and the 
person who does it must be free from certain forms of compulsion... The act must be 
intentional. ' For Stephen clearly voluntariness and compulsion are to be distinguished, `there 
is no opposition between voluntary action and action under compulsion. The opposite to 
voluntary action is involuntary action, but the very strongest forms of compulsion do not 
exclude voluntary action ... Freedom is opposed to compulsion as voluntary 
is to 
inVoluntary. '37 
Smith suggests that the average Victorian juryman would have a clear concept of volition. The 
Victorian layman's understanding of the word came from the fact that 
`Victorian' is almost synonymous with `willpower'; a genre of popular writing 
exhorted readers to exercise their innate mental power over thoughts and acts. ' 
Responsibility resulted when this power was, or might have been exerted. Individual 
wills were facts to Victorians: ̀Every human creature attaches to the words ̀ to will, ' 
or their equivalents, as vivid a meaning as every man with eyes attaches to the words 
`to see'. 38 
However it is debatable whether the law in England ever gave the priority to the voluntary act 
that Smith's comments might suggests. Hart, considering the then Jewish Legal doctrine that 
an ̀ exercise of will is necessary for [criminal] responsibility', stated 
34 HOOD, R. & RADZINOWICZ, L. 1986. p. 727 
35 STEPHEN, IF., was involved in the reform of the criminal law in England in a variety of ways. He was a 
judge, a Law Commissioner, wrote, inter alia: 1863. A General View of the Criminal Law Of England, 
London: McMillan and Co. 1883 A History of the Criminal Law of England. New York: Burt 
Franklin., 1894. A Digest of the Criminal Law (5'h edit). London: MacMillan and Co. and was 
responsible as a Royal Commissioner for assisting in the preparation of the draft Homicide Law 
Amendment Bill 1874 and a draft Criminal Code 1879. 
36 STEPHEN, J. F. 1883 vol. 11, p. 97 
37 STEPHEN, J. F. 1883 vol. II, p. 102. 
38 SMITH, R. 1991 p. 72-3. Quoting from STEPHEN, J. F. 1863. p. 77 
41 
English Lawyers though they may admire this bold step cannot use as an escape route 
from the confines of the McNaughten rules the similar doctrine that for any criminal 
liability there must be a `voluntary act' which many authorities have said is a 
fundamental requirement of English criminal law. For this doctrine has always been 
understood merely to exclude cases where the muscular movements are involuntary as 
in sleepwalking or `automatism' or `reflex action. '39 
Had traces the root of this doctrine back to John Austin. 
Stephen's definition of action is subtly different from Austin's, though still firmly linked to the 
idea of bodily motion. In his General View of the Criminal Law of England, Stephen 
considered that `the sensations which accompany every action and distinguish it from mere 
occurrence are intention and will'. The process of willing was according to Stephen, an 
essential part of the theory of action and was described by him as ̀that inward state which as 
experience informs us, is always succeeded by motion, whilst the body is in its normal 
condition. '40 It seems from this comment that Stephen saw willing as a psychological item. For 
Stephen volition arose from an ̀ act of choice, which means no more than the comparison of 
motives. The distinction between this definition and Austin's4' is that Stephen's explanation is 
less reductionist in that it depends upon choice. In Stephen's definition of volition, he avoids 
some of the problems of describing involuntary action by referring to motion ̀ whilst the body 
is in its normal condition. 'a2 
Stephen is quite clear in his definition of voluntary action: 
a voluntary action is a motion or a group of motions accompanied or proceeded by 
volition and directed towards some object. Every such action comprises the following 
elements - knowledge, motive, choice, volition, intention; and thoughts, feelings and 
motions adapted to execute the intention. ... Whatever controversies there may be as 
to the nature of human beings and as to the freedom of will, I do not think that there 
39 HART, H. L. A. 1965. The Morality of the Criminal Law. Lionel Cohen Lectures Tenth Series - 1964, 
Oxford University Press. p. 5 
40 STEPHEN, J. F. 1863. p. 76-7. Both quotations 
41 See Introduction p. 22-5 & 28-30 for a discussion of Austin's explanation 
42 STEPHEN, J. F. 1863. p. 77 
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can be any question that this is a substantially correct account of normal voluntary 
action. 43 
For Austin criminal liability was tied to the tracing of an action to a voluntary bodily 
movement. For Stephen action was the result of a choice, volitions must be present in the form 
of a ̀ determination to take some particular course' of action. Stephen describes choice as, ̀ no 
more than the comparison of motives. Choice leads to the determination to take some 
particular course and this determination issues in a volition, a kind of crisis of which everyone 
is conscious but which is impossible to describe otherwise than by naming it'. 44 Stephen's 
account is mainly practical and attempts to avoid philosophical problems by avoiding the 
controversy regarding the ̀ nature of human beings' and ̀ freedom of will'. However, these 
problems have remained elements in the juristic debate of voluntary actions until the present 
day. A further problem which is not resolved by either Stephen or Austin is the problem of 
distinguishing involuntary from habitual action. 
Twentieth Century Case Law 
In examining the case law of England and Wales it is proposed to evaluate cases in which 
automatism is claimed to avoid liability from road traffic offences separately from other cases 
in which automatism is claimed because of the rigid definition attributed to the word `driving' 
by the courts in England and Wales. 
It is proposed first to look at those cases which do not involve driving offences and to start by 
examining the case of Rv Charlson. 45 Evidence at the trial suggested that Charlson might have 
been suffering from a cerebral tumour, a condition which might be manifested by sudden 
motiveless violence. He had made a violent attack on his son which seemed to be unprovoked. 
In his statement to the police, Charlson admitted that he had attacked his son but said he did 
not know why. Charlson was charged on three counts: firstly grievous bodily harm with intent 
43 STEPHEN, J. F. 1883 vol. II, p. 100-1 
44 STEPHEN, J. F. 1883 vol. II, p. 100 
45 [1955] 1 WLR 317 
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to murder his son, secondly causing grievous bodily harm, and thirdly `inflicting grievous 
bodily harm without "any specific allegation as to his intention". 
Barry J. instructed the jury regarding consciousness, firstly pointing out that accidental acts do 
not attract criminal liability: 
For example, an act that otherwise might be an assault would not be an assault, if it 
were done purely accidentally. You or I in a public street might suddenly put our hands 
up to stop our hat being blown off and hit a passer-by on the nose without knowing he 
was there. If we had consciously put out our hands, whatever the motive, to hit the 
passer-by on the nose, it would be an assault; but it would have to be a conscious act. 
If it were purely accidental, no assault would be committed; the element of 
consciousness would not be present. "' 
and with relation to action where control of bodily movement is affected by disease, Barry J. 
used the example of an epileptic fit: 
Similarly in the case of certain diseases, a person suffering from a disease may be 
deprived of the control of his actions. We all of us know something about the effects 
of epilepsy and the actions of a man who is suffering at any given moment from an 
epileptic fit. A man in the throes of an epileptic fit does not know what he is doing. 
Thus if a friend bends over to assist the epileptic and in the midst of his fit the latter 
grips that friend by the throat, not knowing what he is doing, and in so doing throttles 
him and causes his death no offence has been committed against the criminal law; 
because the actions of an epileptic are automatic and unconscious, and his will and his 
consciousness are not applied to what he is doing; he is not in control of his actions. " 
With regard to the defence of automatism, Barry J. instructed the jury to ask themselves 
whether the accused ̀knowingly' struck his son: 
If you are left in any doubt about the matter and you think that he may well be acting 
as an automaton without any real knowledge of what he was doing, then the proper 
verdict would be ̀ not guilty', even on the third and least serious of these alternative 
46 [1955] 1 WLR 317,318 
47 [1955] 1 WLR 317,319-320 
48 [1955] 1 WLR 317,320 
44 
charges. 49 
Following this instruction the jury returned a verdict of not guilty on all three counts. 
Charlson's case is of interest, as Barry J. 's view of the defence differs profoundly from that 
set out in subsequent case law. If Barry J. 's judgment was an accurate reflection of the case 
law when Charison's case was heard the subsequent judgments have significantly narrowed the 
defence of non-insane automatism. As will be seen the reasons for the narrowing of the 
defence relate directly to policy issues concerning the insanity defence and the disposal of 
dangerous defendants. 
A different view of automatism was taken by Devlin J. in the case of Rv Kern? where a 
husband had made an unprovoked attack on his wife with a hammer and was charged with 
causing grievous bodily harm to his wife. It was accepted that he was suffering from 
arteriosclerosis at the time of the attack which had caused him to lose consciousness and that 
it was the effect of this loss of consciousness which had caused him to attack his wife. The 
court found that Kemp's case could be distinguished from Charlson's because those giving 
medical evidence in Kemp's case were not in agreement. 
Devlin J. instructed the jury that the evidence in the case pointed to insanity not autonnatism. 
Kemp's counsel argued that the arteriosclerosis was not yet so far advanced as to constitute a 
disease of the mind. Devlin J. rejected this argument: 
The main object, in my judgment, was that it should be decided whether there was a 
defect of reason which had been caused by a disease affecting the mind; if it were so 
decided, then there would be insanity within the meaning of the rule in M Waghten's 
Case. The hardening of the arteries is a disease which is shown on the evidence to be 
capable of affecting the mind in such a way as to cause a defect, temporarily or 
permanently, of its reasoning and understanding, and is thus a disease of the mind 
within the meaning of the rule. I shall therefore direct the jury that it matters not 
whether they accept the medical evidence of the prosecution or the defence, but that 
on the whole of the medical evidence they ought to find that there is a disease of the 
49 [1955] 1 WLR 317,321-322 
50 [1956] 3 All ER 249 
45 
mind within the meaning of the rules' 
Temporary or permanent insanity satisfied the M'Naghten rules. Following this ruling the jury 
found that Kemp was insane at the time of the offence. Mackay points out that by this ̀ wide 
definition of what constitutes a "disease of the mind" within the M'Naghten Rules, his 
Lordship was able to ensure that the only defence available to the accused was one of insanity, 
thus avoiding the result reached in Charlson, namely an unqualified acquittal. 'S2 
The cases of Kemp and Charlson are first instance cases decided on similar facts but with very 
different consequences for the accused. The stance taken by Devlin J. in Kemp was confirmed 
by the House of Lords in Bratty v Attorney General for Northern IrelanaP and the approach 
in Charlson was questioned, particularly Barry J. 's direction to the jury `that insanity did not 
come into the case'. ' This argument that insanity was not relevant was contestable on the 
legal definition of insane automatism given in Bratty, since Charison's condition was one 
which might lead to sudden motiveless violence. " 
Bratty murdered a woman, and claimed, inter alia, that when he committed the murder he was 
in a state of automatism. Once the jury had rejected the defendant's insanity plea, the judge at 
first instance refused to put the defences of either automatism or diminished responsibility to 
the jury. The House of Lords considered two issues. The first was whether his plea of insanity 
having been rejected, the accused could rely on an automatism defence and the second was if 
51 [ 1956] 3 All ER 249,253 
52 MACKAY, R. D. 1995. p. 36 
53 [1963] AC 386 
54 [1963] AC 386,408 (Viscount Kilmuir) 
55 As Lord Denning pointed out: 
`But in Charlson's case [1955] 1 WLR, 317, Barry J. scans to have assumed that other diseases 
such as epilepsy or cerebral tumour are not diseases of the mind, even when they are such as to 
manifest themselves in violence. I do not agree with this. It seems to me that any mental 
disorder which has manifested itself in violence and is prone to recur is a disease of the mind. At 
any rate it is the sort of disease for which a person should be detained in hospital rather than be 
given an unqualified acquittal. ' 
[1963] AC 386,412 
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the answer to the first question was in the affirmative, whether in Bratty's case there was 
sufficient evidence to be put to the jury. 56 The first part of this argument was rejected both by 
the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, because in the opinion of both courts the 
automatism defence was based upon evidence of a defect of reason caused by disease of the 
mind. Thus it was argued that when the jury rejected Bratty's insanity plea they also rejected 
the automatism defence because both defences rested on the same issues, the medical evidence 
in the case relating only to insanity. With regard to the evidence necessary for the defence of 
automatism: 
It is necessary that a proper foundation be laid before a judge can leave ̀automatism' 
to the jury. That foundation in my view, is not forthcoming merely from unaccepted 
evidence of a defect of reason from disease of the mind. There would need to be other 
evidence on which a jury could find non-insane automatism. " 
Lord Denning supported the comments made by the Lord Chief Justice, Viscount Kilmuir, 
regarding claims of automatism based on insanity and made the following policy statement: It 
seems to me that any mental disorder which has manifested itself in violence and is prone to 
recur, is a disease of the mind. " Lord Denning supported this assertion by the following 
reasoning: 
Suppose a crime is committed by a man in a state of automatise or clouded 
consciousness due to a recurrent disease of the mind. Such an act is no doubt 
56 According to Viscount Kilmuir the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant was as follows: 
`1. The ultimate burden on the Crown is to prove that the crime was a conscious and voluntary 
act. 2. There was a volume of evidence showing that the act was not conscious and voluntary. 3. 
The jury should be told to examine this evidence with a view to answering the following 
questions: A. Are you satisfied that the acts resulting in the death were involuntary or 
unconscious conduct? B. If this is so, you must go on to consider whether this was due to a defect 
of reason from disease of the mind of such a kind that the defendant did not know the nature and 
quality of his act, in which case the form of acquittal would be guilty of the acts charged but 
insane at the time. C. If you are satisfied that the acts were not conscious and voluntary, but not 
satisfied that they are due to a defect of reason from disease of the mind, then the verdict should 
be not guilty because the prosecution have failed to satisfy you that the acts were conscious and 
voluntary. D. If you are left in doubt as to whether the acts were conscious or voluntary then, if 
the acts were not within the M'Naughten Rules, the proper verdict would still be not guilty. ' 
[1963) AC 386,402 
57 [1963] AC 386,405 (Viscount Kilmuir) 
58 [1963] AC 386,412 
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involuntary, but it does not give rise to an unqualified acquittal, for that would mean 
that he would be let at large to do it again. The only proper verdict is one which 
ensures that the person who suffers from the disease is kept secure in a hospital so as 
not to be a danger to himself or others. That is a verdict of guilty but insane. "' 
Viscount Kilmuir, Lord Denning and Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest were of the opinion that 
dependent on the facts of the case a defence of automatism might exist if a defendant could 
provide evidence of sleepwalking6° during the commission of the criminal act. Lord Denning 
also made reference to concussion as a cause of automatism. 61 
Burden of proof 
On the question of what evidence was required to found a defence of automatism Lord 
Denning stated: 
Whilst the ultimate burden rests on the Crown of proving every element essential in the 
crime, nevertheless in order to prove that the act was a voluntary act, the Crown is 
entitled to rely on the presumption that every man has sufficient mental capacity to be 
responsible for his crimes: and that if the defence wish to displace that presumption 
they must give some evidence from which the contrary may be reasonably inferred. 62 
Thus the law, following Bratty, required that a defendant who wiled to raise the issue of sane 
automatism should provide some evidence which would support the automatism defence. 
Such evidence will not always be easy to provide. The defendant may commit the alleged 
offence without witnesses being present and any medical evidence produced in court is likely 
to be the result of an examination of the accused some time after the alleged involuntary action 
took place. The Court of Appeal made the following disparaging remarks about medical 
evidence in the case of David Peter Stripp, 
59 [1963] AC 386,410 
60 [1963] AC 386,403 (Viscount Kilmuir), 414 (Lord Denning) and 415 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Ckst) 
61 [1963] AC 396,414 
62 [1963] AC 386,413. Emphasis in original 
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The defence called a Dr. Stamp, who is a registrar in psychological medicine at Kings 
College Hospital. He did not examine the appellant until some two months or so after 
the events and the appellant in fact had been referred to him for investigation of what 
he called an amnesiac episode. He gave the best evidence that he could, entirely 
hypothetically based. It is not very easy to know quite what Dr. Stamp was saying. 
He was talking about concussion in a very general way, saying that some people 
concussed very easily and others were quite resistant. His evidence was inevitably 
unspecific and not particularly helpful. 63 
In his judgment Ormrod L. J. considered the burden of proof imposed on a defendant who 
asserts a defence of automatism, ' and adopted Lord Denning's reasoning in Bratty quoted 
above. Needless to say Stripp's appeal was not successful. 
An additional complication is the fact that the evidence required to found an insanity defence 
differs from other defences. " Therefore, there is a distinction between the burden of proof in 
non-insane and insane automatism. Non-insane automatism as defined in Bratty and 
subsequently applied by the courts requires the raising of some evidence on which an 
automatism defence may be founded. The insanity defence at common law requires the 
defendant to establish insanity on the balance of probabilities. Devlin J. acknowledged this in 
Hill v Baxter: '[als automatism is akin to insanity in law there would be great practical 
advantage if the burden of proof were the same in both cases. But so far insanity is the only 
matter of defence in which under common law the burden of proof has been held to be 
completely shifted. ' " Lord Hope discussed this distinction in Rv Director of Public 
Prosecutions, ex parte Kebilene and others and said: `[t]he judges throughout the United 
Kingdom have resisted the temptation to extend that exemption to the defence of 
automatism' . 
67 
This then leaves the two branches of the automatism defence in the peculiar position of 
63 (1978) 69 Cr App R 318,323 
64 (1978) 69 Cr App R 318,321 
65 Woolmington v. DPP [1935] AC 462 
66 [1957] 2 WLR 76,82 
67 [1999] 3 WLR 973,990. The discussion in the House of Lords of automatism is arguably obiter 
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attracting differing evidential standards at common law. Jones considers this and comments 
`[t]hus the placement of the burden depends upon the distinction which the law recognises 
between sane and insane automatism' He concludes that the `courts have not drawn the 
necessary distinction with any degree of subtlety. ' In English law this results from the wide 
definition given to disease of the mind by Devlin J. in Kemp and its confirmation in Bratty. 
This has led judges in some trials to instruct juries to consider an insanity verdict when a plea 
of non-insane automatism has been raised. This in turn has caused some defendants, whose 
defence of automatism has been limited to a defence of insane automatism by the judge 
presiding at the trial, changing their plea to guilty to avoid an insanity verdict " 
The internaVeaternal focus to distinguish between cases of insane and non-insane 
automatism 
On occasions the courts have attempted to escape from the confines of an insane automatism 
verdict in an attempt to avoid a verdict which was felt by the court to be inappropriate. In Rv 
Quick and Rv Paddison7° this was achieved by making the legally identified cause of the 
automatism central to determining whether the automatism claimed is insane or non-insane 
automatism. The court stated that the type of automatism is dependent upon whether it is an 
internal or external trigger which causes the automatism. If the cause is internal, the resulting 
automatism is insane automatism. If the cause is external, the resultant automatism is of the 
non-insane variety. This approach has caused some difficulties as will be seen as the English 
case law is examined in some detail. 
In Quick, the appellant, a nurse at a mental hospital, contested the ruling of the judge at first 
instance that the only defence open to him was insanity. The Court of Appeal had to consider 
whether a hypoglycaemic episode which resulted in an assault on a patient could form the 
68 JONES, T. H. 1995. Insanity, Automatism and The Burden of Proof on the Accused (1995) 111 LQR 
475-516. Both quotations p. 497-8 
69 In two of these cases, Rv Quick and Rv Sullivan, the accused subsequently appealed against 
sentence in a bid to overturn the ruling of the judge at first instance that the only defence available to 
them was insanity 
70 [1973) 3 WLR 26. Hereinafter referred to as Rv Quick or Quick 
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basis of an non-insane automatism defence. The court noted that Quick's own behaviour that 
day could have caused the fall in blood sugar. As on the morning of the attack, following his 
taking of insulin, Quick had drunk alcohol but consumed very little food. " However, the court 
was of the opinion that Quick's defence should at least have been tested and Lawton L. J. 
giving the judgment of the court said: 
In this case Quick's alleged mental condition, if it ever existed, was not caused by his 
diabetes but by his use of the insulin prescribed by his doctor. Such malfunctioning of 
his mind as there was, was caused by an external factor and not by a bodily disorder in 
the nature of a disease which disturbed the working of his mind. It follows in our 
judgment that Quick was entitled to have his defence of automatism left to the jury and 
that Bridge J. 's ruling as to the effect of the medical evidence called by him was wrong. 
Had the defence of automatism been left to the jury, a number of questions in fact 
would have had to be answered. If he was in a confused mental condition, was it due 
to a hypoglycaemic episode or to too much alcohol? If the former, to what extent had 
he brought about his condition by not following his doctor's instructions about taking 
regular meals? Did he know that he was getting into a hypoglycaemic episode? If yes, 
why did he not use the antidote of eating a lump of sugar as he had been advised to? 
On the evidence which was before the jury Quick might have had difficulty in 
answering these questions in a manner which would have relieved him of responsibility 
for his acts. We cannot say, however, with the requisite degree of confidence, that the 
jury would have convicted him. It follows that his conviction must be quashed on the 
ground that the verdict was unsatisfactory! 
Emphasis was placed in Quick on establishing the culpability of the defendant by focussing the 
jury's attention upon his conduct leading up to the hypoglycaemic episode. This emphasis has 
to be welcome. However, the use of an external/internal distinction to clarify the distinction 
between insane and non-insane automatism which continues to be used by the courts has 
caused difficulty and led to criticisms of judicial decisions. 
What made the external/internal distinction even harder to makdain is the Court of Appeal's 
subsequent application of Quick in Rv Hennessy. ' As a result of this judgment diabetics are 
only able to plead non-insane automatism when they suffered one type of diabetic episode a 
71 [1973) 3 WLR 26,29 
72 [1973] 3 WLR 26,35-6. 
73 [1989] 1 WLR 287 
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hypoglycaemic one, which had an external cause. The other type of diabetic episode, a 
hyperglycaemic episode, has been stated by the judiciary to have an internal cause, because it 
has to do with the regulation by the body of blood sugar levels, and thus gives rise to an insane 
automatism plea. Such an arbitrary distinction seems unjust. M 
In Hennessy the court had to consider the case of a diabetic who, because he was suffering 
from `stress, anxiety and depression' failed to take his proper dose of insulin, and then stole a 
car. Hennessy claimed he did not know what he was doing. The reason he gave was that he 
was suffering a hyperglycaemic reaction at the time of the criminal offence. The court of first 
instance, and the Court of Appeal held the defence to be one of insane automatism The 
reasons given by the Court of Appeal were that `in Quick's case the fact that his condition 
was, or may have been due to the injections of insulin' which ̀ meant hat the malfunction was 
due to an external factor and not to the disease' gave him the right to a defence of non-insane 
automatism. Whereas in Hennessy's case ̀hyperglycaemia, high blood sugar, caused by an 
inherent defect, and not corrected by insulin is a disease" and therefore if automatism was 
claimed, the defence would have to be considered under the M'Naghten Rules. 
In answer to the defence argument hat the ̀ appellant's marital troubles and depression' were 
a ̀ sufficiently potent external factor' to explain the diabetic episode Lord Lane said: 
In our judgment, stress, anxiety and depression can no doubt be the result of the 
operation of external factors, but they are not, it seems to us, in themselves eparately 
or together external factors of the kind capable in law of causing or contributing to a 
state of automatism. They constitute a state of mind which is prone to recur. They lack 
the feature of novelty or accident, which is the basis of the distinction drawn by Lord 
Diplock in Reg. v. Sullivan [1984] A. C. 156,172. It is contrary to the observations of 
Devlin J., to which we have just referred in Hill v. Baxter [1958] 1 Q. B. 277,285. It 
does not, in our judgment, come within the scope of the exception of some external 
physical factor such as a blow on the head or the administration of an anaesthetic. ' 
74 For a full analysis of the internal/external distinction see MACKAY, R. D. 1995. p. 36-51 
75 [1989] 1 WLR 287. All quotations 293 
76 [198911 WLR 287,294 
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The approach taken to diabetics by the courts has from its inception led to adverse medical 
commentary, particularly as it is not only diabetics who are affected by the decision. Those 
who are otherwise physically well might suffer from one of these two conditions. In the 
discussion of automatism following the House of Lords' decision in Rv Sullivan" the point 
was made that `[t]he distinction between inherent and intrinsic causes is arbitrary and has no 
medical significance - the logic is not enhanced by the knowledge that epileptic seizures can be 
precipitated by hyperglycaemia or hypoglycaemia even in a person otherwise well'! Indeed in 
Toner79 the possibility of an automatism defence based on a mild hypoglycaemic episode, 
following the ingestion of food after a period of fasting, was considered by the Court of 
Appeal. The court concluded that a defence to a criminal charge based on such a claim was a 
possibility and therefore the medical evidence which might have supported such a claim ought 
to have been heard by the jury. Accordingly the case was remitted for a retrial. 
If the decision in Toner is contrasted with that in Hennessy, there seems to be something 
arbitrary in the internal/external test in the automatism defence. Why should a defendant who 
fasts possibly because of stress, and following eating commits a criminal act have the 
possibility of a defence of non-insane automatism: whereas, a diabetic, who as a result of 
stress fails to take insulin and then commits a crime during a hyperglycaemic episode, if she is 
to plead automatism, must plead insane automatism? 
Epilepsy is another condition which has been held to have an internal trigger and to be a 
`disease of the mind' and therefore an automatism defence which utilises medical evidence of 
epilepsy results in an insanity verdict. In Sullivan, the House of Lords held that an epileptic, 
who seriously assaulted an elderly acquaintance when in a state of automatism following an 
epileptic f t, could only plead insane automatism. In view of the possibility of an insanity 
verdict, Sullivan had previously accepted the opportunity to change his plea to guilty and 
subsequently appealed against the first instance judge's ruling which had deprived the jury of 
77 [1983] 2 All ER 673 
78 ROYAL SOCIETY OF MEDICINE. 1985. Epilepsy and the Law a Medical Symposiwn on the Current 
Law. International Conference and Symposium Series no. 81, Oxford University Press, p. 52 
79 John Toner (1991) 93 Cr App R 382 
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the opportunity to consider his automatism defence, and had meant the only plea available to 
him was insanity. The House of Lords said that what was important was that the effect of 
epilepsy was to impair the faculties of `reason, memory and understanding'. ' These faculties 
were affected in a manner which meant that the M'Naghten Rules8' applied, that is either 
Sullivan ̀was labouring under a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the 
nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it he did not know he was doing 
what was wrong. ' The only defence available to the defendant was insane automatism. Lord 
Diplock stated ̀it matters not whether the aetiology of the impairment is organic, as in 
epilepsy, or functional, or whether the impairment itself is permanent or is transient and 
intermittent, provided that it subsisted at the time of the commission of the act. '83 
Sullivan's counsel had argued that his condition was one of functional impairment and 
therefore Sullivan's defence should be automatism not insanity. He explained the argument as 
follows: 
First were the House of Lords constrained to apply the McNaghten Rules? I believe 
that they were not, but it did not get me anywhere. We wanted to argue for Sullivan 
that the McNaghten Rules did not apply, because they refer to a man knowing the 
nature and quality of his act, and this presupposes the exercise of some function of the 
mind. We wished to argue that the McNaghten Rules do not operate in the case of 
hypoglycaemia or of an epilepsy (sic) because, for practical purposes, there is no 
exercise of the mind function, as the law recognizes it.... 
our fundamental premise for Mr Sullivan was that the law recognizes an act as being a 
muscular contraction consequent upon determination of the will and that the law has 
never recognized any movement as an act unless there is that fundamental premise. 
The next stage, we argued, was that where there is no will in the ordinary sense the 
McNaghten Rules do not apply. We were content that the McNaghten Rules should 
define insanity as the prosecution so defined it - but the House of Lords would not 
have it. They replied that they did not require argument from us as to whether or not 
80 [1983] 2 All ER 673,677 
81 [ 1843-60] All ER Rep 229,233. For a full review of the insanity defence and the problems created by the 
M'Naghten Rules. See MACKAY, R. D. 1995. Chapter 2 
82 All ER Reprint [1843-60] 220,233 
83 [1983] 2 All ER 673,677 
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the McNaghten Rules applied. The House went on to rule that the McNaghten Rules 
are the comprehensive definition of insanity in this branch of the law. ' 
Again the reason for the decision in Sullivan is related by the court to the policy of protecting 
`society against recurrence of the dangerous conduct. ' This was a concern however brief the 
period of automatism might be: ̀ [t]he duration of a temporary suspension of the mental 
faculties of reason, memory and understanding, particularly if, as in the appellant's case, it is 
recurrent cannot on any rational grounds be relevant to the application by the courts of the 
M'Naghten Rules, ' though such considerations might be relevant to the Secretary of State 
when considering the appropriate sentence for such an offender. Lord Diplock admitted that it 
was ̀natural to feel reluctance to attach the label of insanity to a sufferer from psychomotor 
epilepsy' but nonetheless the court did not have it within its power to change the law. `Only 
Parliament can do that. It has done so twice; it could do so once again'. " 
Criticisms of Sullivan 
Following the House of Lords' decision in Sullivan a medical symposium was held to discuss 
the problems it created. 86 Lionel Swift QC, Sullivan's barrister, acknowledged that the present 
law had the advantage of permitting the detention of those who were dangerous, but identified 
the following disadvantages: 
The disadvantages, however, are many. I will mention just two: first, the compulsory 
order to commit a person to a mental hospital may be ill-advised, unnecessary and 
wasteful, both for that person and society as a whole. The second major disadvantage 
lies in the practical and emotional consequences of the verdict, not guilty by reason of 
insanity. How far that is a realistic practical consequence is a matter for you. 
Epileptics, for example, must in any event in various aspects of their everyday life 
declare that they are epileptics. "' 
84 ROYAL SOCIETY OF MEDICINE. 1985. p. 28 
85 [1983] 2 All ER 673. All quotations 678 
86 ROYAL SOCIETY OF MEDICINE. 1985. Records this discussion 
87 ROYAL SOCIETY OF MEDICINE. 1985. p. 12. Emphasis in original 
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It should be noted that the practical consequences of an insanity verdict have been to some 
extent mitigated by the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991, which 
amended section 5 of The Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 and provides a wider range 
of disposal options for those found to be not guilty by reason of insanity by the courts. 88 
However, the stigma attached to an insanity verdict still remains. Perhaps the problem is 
expressed most poignantly by Sullivan himself as reported to the conference by Dr. Taylor: 
We told him that the judge was prepared to consider him not guilty because of 
insanity. `But I'm not insane, ' said PS. We advised him, because of the consequences 
of this to plead guilty. `But I'm not guilty, ' said PS. Even the eloquent counsel paused, 
then PS spoke again: `But you're three intelligent, educated people - I'll do what you 
say. , s9 
Dr. Taylor highlights the difference in the approach adopted by the courts and the medical 
profession: ̀the law and medicine, are systems in parallel. They work side by side but with 
quite independent definitions of the problems and often differing concepts of what may be in 
the best interests of the client, let alone what may be in the best interests of the public affected 
by his behaviour. '90 
88 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (INSANITY) ACT 1964 
5-Powers to deal with persons not guilty by reason of insanity or unfit to plead etc 
(1)This section applies where - 
(a) a special verdict is returned that the accused is not guilty by reason of insanity; or 
(b) findings are recorded that the accused is under a disability and that he did the act or made the 
omission charged against him. 
(2) Subject to subsection (3) below, the court shall either - 
(a) make an order that the accused be admitted, in accordance with the provisions of Schedule I to 
the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991, to such hospital as maybe 
specified by the Secretary of State; or 
(b) where they have the power to do so by virtue of section 5 of that Act, make in respect of the 
accused such one of the following orders as they think most suitable in all the circumstances of the 
case, namely- 
(i) a guardianship order within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1983; (ii) a supervision and 
treatment order within the meaning of Schedule 2 to the said Act of 1991; and (iii) an order for his 
absolute discharge. 
(3) Paragraph (b) of subsection (2) above shall not apply where the offence to which the special verdict 
or findings relate is an offence the sentence for which is fixed by law. 
89 ROYAL SOCIETY OF MEDICINE. 1985. p. 15 
90 ROYAL SOCIETY OF MEDICINE. 1985. p. 16 
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The problem of defining disease of the mind was the subject of considerable debate at the 
symposium. " In his summary of the discussion Fenwick stated that `the concept of mind is so 
abstract that it should be dealt with by philosophers' . 
92 Earlier in the discussion Dr. Howard 
considered the role played by the words ̀ disease of the mind' in explanations of automatism 
and concluded that it: 
is being asked to play a part in four very different types of discourse. 
(1) in explaining how an action comes to be performed; 
(2) in ascription of responsibility, both for the state of mind and for the action; 
(3) in the prevention of recurrence; and 
(4) in terms of psychiatric diagnosis or formulation. 93 
This statement by Dr. Howard highlights a very real problem for the law in identifying how to 
define the mental states which may be excused on the grounds of automatism. It also raises the 
question of whether the law can employ a definition of automatism which accords with a 
medical definition of automatic states. In the forum discussion Dr. Mackeith supplies one 
answer to this question: ̀I would like to support the argument that disease of the mind as a 
legal concept, and disease as a medical concept are, and always will be, two entirely separate 
things. The law must reflect what public opinion accepts and what it will tolerate. '' So, once 
again social policy issues are seen as being of paramount importance in this area of law. 
One of the issues that was covered by the symposium was the transient nature of Sullivan's 
affliction and whether as such it could merit an insanity verdict. Particularly when research 
evidence suggested that the risk of a crime being committed by an epileptic, particularly a 
violent crime, was very low. " The transient nature of automatism and the problems this causes 
91 ROYAL SOCIETY OF MEDICINE. 1985. p. 23-36 
92 ROYAL SOCIETY OF MEDICINE. 1985. p. 41. For a discussion of consciousness and the problems of 
defining mind see Chapters 4&5 
93 ROYAL SOCIETY OF MEDICINE. 1985. p. 36 The problem of defining involuntary action has also been 
subject to similar comment see discussion of Fitzgerald's comments see Introduction p. 21 
94 ROYAL SOCIETY OF MEDICINE. 1985. p. 24 
95 ROYAL SOCIETY OF MEDICINE. 1985. Dr. Taylor, p. 19 
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for the courts in sentencing was discussed by Lawton L. J. in Quick ̀ The difficulty arises as 
soon as the question is asked whether he should be detained in a mental hospital. No mental 
hospital would admit a diabetic simply because he had a low blood sugar reaction'. % 
Sleepwalking 
If problems had arisen for the courts in deciding whether diabetics or epileptics could be 
allowed to plead non-insane automatism, the defence became even narrower following the 
pleading of sleepwalking by Rv Burgess. 97 Burgess appealed to the Court of Appeal against 
the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, the result of the trial judge's ruling that only 
insane automatism could be considered by the jury regarding his defence of non-insane 
automatism caused by sleepwalking. In earlier automatism cases obiter discussion had taken 
place regarding criminal responsibility for the actions of a sleepwalker, " which was often seen 
as the paradigm case of acting purposively but without conscious control of bodily 
movements. 
95 (... continued) 
`McDonald (1969) found only two examples of crimes committed as a result of epileptic seizure in a 
series of 1000. Since 1889 there have been only 15 cases in the whole of the United States in which 
epilepsy has been used as a defence against violent or disorderly conduct (Delgado-Escueta et al 
1981). In a survey of all male epileptics in some form of custodial care in Britain in 1967 only one 
man was found in the entire prison or borstal population who had probably offended during an 
epileptic attack (Gunn 1978: Gunn and Fenton 1971) and only two among 38 epileptics in one Special 
Hospital, Broadmoor (Gunn and Fenton 197 1). Taking a wider view to try and develop an impression 
of the risk of becoming one of this select group, a small number of studies have examined rates of 
automatic behaviour among epileptics. The most relevant here, because it examines an out-patient 
sample, is that of Knox (1968). 14e reviewed 434 epileptics attending one clinic. He found that 43 (10 
per cent) of the cases showed some form of automatic behaviour in relation to a fit but only one 
subject who had acted violently in this context. This does not of course imply that even as many as 10 
per cent of all epileptics are at risk from automatic behaviour. Epileptics attending hospital clinics 
might be expected to have a lower rate of such complications than those few patients in an epileptic 
colony or a mental hospital, but it is likely that they would show a higher rate than other epileptics in 
the community. The College of General Practitioners Report (1960) showed that at most 75 per cent 
of epileptics in the community saw hospital consultants. ' 
96 [1973] 3 WLR 27,31 
97 Rv Burgess [ 1991] 2 All ER 769. For a discussion of the case see MACKAY, I. 1992. The Sleepwalker is 
Not Insane. (1992) 55 (5) MLR 714-20 
98 See Lord Denning's discussion of sleepwalking in Bratty v Attorney General for Northern Ireland [1963] 
AC 386,414 
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However in Burgess the court considered that the defendant's behaviour amounted to insane 
rather than non-insane automatism. Burgess hit a female friend over the head with a bottle and 
a video recorder while she was sleeping, a series of acts which he claimed were committed 
whilst he was sleepwalking. Lord Lane made reference to the fact that: ̀ [t]here have been 
several occasions when during the course of judgments in the Court of Appeal and the House 
of Lords observations have been made, obiter, about the criminal responsibility of sleep 
walkers, where sleep walking has been used as a self-evident illustration of non-insane 
automatism'. ' Lord Lane considered the evidence of both defence and prosecution which he 
summarised as follows: 
His case was that he lacked the mens rea necessary to make him guilty of the offence, 
because he was ̀ sleep walking' when he attacked Miss Curtis. He was, it was alleged, 
suffering from ̀ non-insane' automatism and he called medical evidence, in particular 
from Dr. D'Orban and Dr. Eames to support that contention. 
The prosecution on the other hand contended that this was not a case of automatism at 
all, but that the appellant was conscious of what he was doing. It contrary to that 
contention, he was not conscious of what he was doing, then the case fell within the 
M'Naghten Rules (see M Naghten 's Case (1843) 10 CL & Fin. 200), and accordingly 
the verdict should be not guilty by reason of insanity. 10° 
Lord Lane referred to the Canadian case of Rv Parks101 where the defendant successfully 
pleaded automatism as a defence to a charge of murder. The Canadian court accepted that 
sleepwalking was not a ̀ disease of the mind', but a ̀ natural, normal condition - sleep' l02. 
According to Lord Lane two matters must be considered when the defence of automatism was 
raised: ̀[t]he first is whether a proper evidential foundation for the defence of automatism has 
been laid. The second is whether the evidence shows the case to be one of insane automatism, 
... or non-insane automatism"' 
On the latter question Lord Lane considered the evidence of 
the medical experts in the case. The medical evidence for the defence, from Dr. D'Orban, 
99 Rv Burgess [1991] 2 All ER 769,774 
100 [ 1991] 2 All ER 769,771 
101 (1990) 56 CCC (3d) 449. Ontario Court of Appeal 
102 (1990) 56 CCC (3d) 449,465-66. Quoted in Rv Burgess [ 199112 All ER 770,775 
103 [1991] 2 All ER 769,771 
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suggested that the defendant's sleep disorder, was caused by an internal factor and was ̀ liable 
to recur'. 104 The other defence witness, Dr. Eames, agreed with Dr. D'Orban. 
The prosecution expert, Fenwick, argued that if Burgess was unconscious of what he was 
doing at the time of the attack on Miss Curtis he was not sleepwalking but in a ̀ hysterical 
dissociative state'. "' Having considered this evidence and Fenwick's comments regarding 
violent acts in sleep - `[s]erious violence does recur, or certainly the propensity for it to recur 
is there, although there are very few cases in the literature - in fact I know of none - in which 
somebody has come to court twice for a sleepwalking offence. "' Lord Lane concluded that: 
on this evidence the judge was right to conclude that this was an abnormality, albeit 
transitory, due to an internal factor, whether functional or organic, which had 
manifested itself in violence. It was a disorder or abnormality which might recur, 
though the possibility of it recurring in the form of serious violence was unlikely. 107 
The legal principles were as the trial judge had found them to be. Although sleepwalking has 
traditionally been cited as the paradigm case of automatism its acceptance as such in law was 
made more difficult by the defence expert's statement hat the cause of the disorder was 
internal, and by the rejection by the court of the argument in Parks that the defendant's acts 
resulted from a ̀ natural normal condition - sleep'. Lord Lane was of the opinion that the 
evidence indicated that ̀ sleepwalking particularly violence in sleep is not normal'. 1" Once 
again the policy behind the insanity defence played a part. ̀ It seems to us that if there is a 
danger of recurrence that may be an added reason for categorising the condition as a disease of 
the mind. " To a layman the classification of sleepwalking as a disease of the mind may seem 
absurd. Part of the problem with this classification is that such a defence may well be received 
sympathetically by both medical personnel and juries who have had experience of similar 
104 [1991 ]2 All ER 769,775 
105 [1991] 2 All ER 769,775 
106 [1991] 2 All ER 769,776 as summarised by Lord Lane 
107 [1991] 2 All ER 769,776 
108[1991]2AllER769,775 
109 [1991] 2 All ER 769,774 
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events. 
In May 1986, Colin Kemp was acquitted of murder at the Old Bailey when the jury accepted 
his explanation that he had killed whilst asleep and fighting for his life against Japanese 
soldiers. ̀Later it was revealed that during the five day trial dozens of people had written to 
court describing their own very real nightmares and the fears they had. ' 10 The reports in the 
press reveal that evidence heard by the court was very different in quality from that reviewed 
by Lord Lane in Burgess. 
In Colin Kemp's case the Sunday Times"' reported 
Professor Ian Oswald a psychiatrist at Edinburgh University who recently wrote a 
paper about night terror - in which a nightmare moves into physical action -cites it 
as a form of behaviour ̀as old as mankind'. 
`Acquittals like this have been going on for hundreds of years, ' he said yesterday. The 
first recorded in Britain was in the 1600s when a soldier in the grip of night terror 
killed his colonel. He was cleared on the grounds that when a man is asleep he cannot 
form the intent essential, to a conviction. 
The Daily Telegraph' 12 reported that one of the medical experts ̀Dr. Tony Whitehead a 
consultant at Bevendean Hospital, Brighton said yesterday he even had a slightly similar 
experience himself when he knocked a nurse across the room' Dr. Paul D'Orban, who is 
presumably the same medical expert as gave evidence in defence of Burgess, said of night 
terror which was the condition from which Kemp was suffering ̀[i]n a third of cases it 
involved sleep walking or some other action. In some cases it involved injury to others or self- 
i1juy. "113 Interestingly though the Sunday Times states "`Women's groups" yesterday 
110 Guardian 3d May 1986 p. 3 
111 4dl May 1986, p. 9 
112 Daily Telegraph 3'd May 1986 p. 3 
113 Daily Telegraph 31" May 1986 p. 3 
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described it as a "charter to kill"'. 14 There is no reference in the press reporting of the case to 
any consideration in court of the insanity defence or of the policy considerations relating to 
dangerous behaviour. In many ways this case seems an unreported aberration, although it did 
receive wide press coverage at the time and was the subject of an article in New Law Journal 
which pointed out its inconsistencies with the House of Lords' decision in Sullivan. "S 
However, given the obiter statements made regarding sleepwalking in other cases it could be 
seen as an interpretation by the Central Criminal Court of sleep as being a natural condition 
and not a disease of the mind. Alternatively, it could have been the decision of a sympathetic 
jury. As it is unreported it is impossible to say what the basis for the decision might have been. 
Burgess, the decision of the superior court, remains the leading case, and therefore, on this 
basis, it would seem extremely difficult for any defendant to argue sleepwalking as a non- 
insane automatism defence. "' 
Cases where automatism has been used as a defence to driving offences. 
In the driving cases it has been held that the destruction of voluntariness has to be total for the 
defence of automatism to be put to the jury. The approach taken by the courts to driving 
offences generally is arguably stricter than in the case of other offences. "' To this extent it is 
possible to distinguish two approaches adopted by the courts to the defence of automatism. In 
driving cases once the defendant may be said to be driving the defence of automatism is 
unlikely to be available. If the accused is in some way driving, that is she has some, albeit 
limited, control over the vehicle then she is still driving the vehicle and cannot claim non-insane 
automatism. This was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Attorney General's Reference (No 
114 4th May 1986 p. 9 
115 WELLER, P. I. 1987. Perchance to Dream. (1987) 137 (6288) NLJ 52. See also a case of burglary 
whilst sleepwalking Rv Dennehy (unreported), where the CPS accepted medical evidence that it was 
a `classic case of automatism' and offered no evidence. McCONNELL, B. Sleep, perchance to dream. 
(1989) 139 (6437) NLI 1772 
116 However, note the potential impact of the Human Rights Act 1998. This is discussed at the end of this 
chapter 
117 For a discussion of this and the problems it creates in terms of the offence of careless driving see SMITH, 
J. C. 1999. p. 488 
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2 of 1992). "' The relevant point of law for consideration by the Court of Appeal was 
`[w]hether the state described as "driving without awareness" should, as a matter of law, be 
capable of founding a defence of automatism. ' 19 Lord Taylor reviewed the case law relevant 
to automatism as he was of the opinion that the answer to this question required a review of 
the ̀ requirements and limits of the defence of automatism'. 12° 
Lord Taylor, having reviewed the authorities argued before him and employing Lord Lane's 
two part test from Burgess, stated that the appeal fell at the first hurdle because: 
the `proper evidential foundation' for the defence of automatism was not laid in this 
case by Professor Brown's evidence of `driving without awareness. ' As the authorities 
cited above show, the defence of automatism requires that there was a total destruction 
of voluntary control on the defendant's part. Impaired, reduced or partial control is not 
enough. 12' 
Whether the total destruction of voluntary control is required in cases of automatism which do 
not entail driving offences is a moot point. The House of Lords did not require the total 
destruction of voluntary control for insane automatism in Sullivan, and in Quick the defendant 
exhibited some control over his movements. In Burgess the Court of Appeal restricted the 
ambit of the defence of non-insane automatism by the use of the internal/external distinction. 
However, in the driving cases total loss of voluntary control has been required. 1221n Attorney 
General's Reference (No 2 of 1992) expert evidence had, in Lord Taylor's judgment, shown 
118 [1993]4AllER683 
119 [1993] 4 All ER 683,685 
120 [1993] 4 All ER 683,685 
121 [1993] 4 All ER 683,689. Cases refwed to in Lord Taylor's opinion: Bratty v A-G for Northern Ireland 
[196113 All ER 523, [ 1963] AC 386, [196113 WLR 965, HL., Broome v Perkins [1987] RTR 321, 
DC, Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 All ER 193, [1958] 1 QB 277, [1958] 2 WLR 76, DC, MWaghten's Case 
(1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200, [1843-60] All ER Rep 229,8 ER 718, HL, Rv Burgess [1991] 2 All ER 
769, [1991] 2 QB 92, [1991] 2 WLR 1206, CA., Rv Hennessy [1989] 2 All ER 9, [1989] 1 WLR 287, 
CA., Rv Quick Rv Paddison [1973] 3 All ER 347, [1973] QB 910, [1973] 3 WLR 26, CA. Rv 
Sullivan [1983] 2 All ER 673, [1984] AC 156, [1983] 3 WLR 123, HL, Rv Toner (1991) 93 Cr App 
R 382, CA., Roberts v Rmnsbottom [1980] 1 All ER 7, [1980] 1 WLR 823, Watmore v Jenkins [1962] 
2 All ER 868, [1962] 2 QB 572, [1962] 3 WLR 463, DC. 
122 Attorney General's Reference (No 2 of 1992) [1993] 4 All ER 683,688 
63 
that the defendant had retained some control of the lorry he was driving, albeit very limited 
control. However, this was sufficient to mean that the ̀ learned recorder ought not to have left 
the issue of automatism to the jury in this case. "' 
In Hill v Barter, Pearson J. considering the defence's case that their client could not be said to 
be driving because he was in a state of automatism said: 
the question at issue was and is whether he was driving the car. In any ordinary case, 
when once it has been proved that the accused was in the driving seat of a moving car, 
there is, prima facie, an obvious and irresistible inference that he was driving it. 124 
The driver of a car has an ̀essential duty' to keep himself awake. Only some ̀extraordinary 
mischance' which renders a driver ̀ unconscious or otherwise incapacitated from controlling 
the car' will provide a defence of automatism. However, in Hill v Baxter there is a suggestion 
that a defendant who is by the ̀ onset of some disease ... reduced to a state of coma and is 
completely unconscious' or `having an epileptic fit, so that he is unconscious and there are 
merely spasmodic movements of his arms and legs' may have a defence. '25 If this was the law 
in 1957 then the later driving cases and Sullivan have narrowed the defence. 
It is arguable whether Pearson J. meant those reduced to a state of coma to include diabetics, 
But if he did, social policy has also affected the defence of automatism with regard to diabetics 
in driving cases. In Moses v Winder, ' the defendant had an accident following the onset of a 
diabetic coma which he thought he had controlled by eating some sweets. He was charged 
with dangerous driving, but the charges against him were dismissed by the magistrates who 
heard the case. On appeal by the prosecution to the High Court, Roskill L. J. said of the 
defendant: `[i]n those circumstances he fail plainly to take those precautions which in those 
circumstances he ought to have taken, both in his own interest and in the interest of public 
safety. To allow a defence of automatism to succeed in a case of this kind would add greatly 
123 [1993] 4 All ER 683,690 
124 Hill v Baxter [1957] 2 WLR 76,83 
125 Hill v Barter [ 1957] 2 WLR 76,83. All quotations in this paragraph 
126 [1981] RTR 37 
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to dangers to the life and limbs of those on the roads. ''Z' The case was remitted to the justices 
with a direction to convict. 
In Moses v Winder the issue of prior fault was relevant. That is the question of how far the 
criminal law should excuse a defendant who has to some extent rendered herself open to the 
risk of automatism? Should she have the right to claim the defence when the automatism 
occurs? Clearly if a driver is aware of the onset of coma then there are issues apart from the 
automatism that ought to be considered. The question of whether the defendant's own 
behaviour either triggered the automatism or she was aware that she might be entering an 
automatic state may affect her ability to claim the defence. 128 
However this proviso does not apply in the case of diabetics who suffer a diabetic coma 
without warning as was the situation in Broome v Perkins" and in Watmore v Jenkins. 130 
There is some evidence that changes in insulin may bring on diabetic comas in those whose 
illness has until the change been perfectly manageable. An article in the Guardian13' has shown 
that the British Diabetic Association withheld a report13. showing that diabetics were at risk 
from genetically engineered insulin. This insulin has been used by the medical profession since 
the 1980's and has the alleged unfortunate side effect of causing hypoglycaemic episodes 
without warning in 10% of patients using the treatment. The report claimed that ̀ doctors and 
specialists had failed to listen to their patients and the distress and dangerous symptoms had 
127 [198 1] RTR 37,41 
128 In Rv Bailey [ 1983] 2 All ER 503 the Court of Appeal stated that ̀ self induced' automatism caused by the 
defendant's failure to take food after a dose of insulin was insufficient fault on the part of an accused 
to permit the defence of automatism to be withdrawn from the jury. The court discussed Rv Lipman 
[196913 All ER 410 and DPP v Majewski [1976] 2 All ER 142. In Bailey it was said that 
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129 (1987) 85 Cr App R 321 
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been ignored. ' The researchers who compiled the report had considered 400 of 3,000 letters of 
complaint received by the British Diabetic Association following the introduction of genetically 
engineered insulin. `[M]any correspondents reported that a diabetic condition which had been 
stable and controlled over many years and allowed a full and normal life, suddenly changed and 
became problematic and life disrupting. '133 The report stated ̀ There were several reports of 
people who had been prosecuted by the police after being involved in accidents while having a 
hypo'. It is hard to make a sustainable case for the imposition of criminal liability in cases such 
as these. But given the inflexibility of the definition given to driving by the courts it is unlikely 
that such a defendant would escape liability. 
Determinations of Criminal Responsibility 
On occasions the courts seem to have shown an ambivalence towards the automatism defence 
because of worries that it might be misused. ̀It is not sufficient for a man to say "I had a 
black-out"; for "black out" as Stable J. said in Cooper v McKenna, Exparte Cooper "is one of 
the first refuges of the guilty conscience as a popular excuse. ""' In Sullivan, Lawton L. J. 
described the case as ̀ untainted by the possibly bogus element of most defences of 
automatism'. 135 In David Peter Stripp, Ormrod L. J. referred to the Australian case of Cooper v 
McKenna' and having quoted with approval the statement cited above, he continued: ̀for a 
defence of automatism to be "genuinely raised in a genuine fashion", there must be evidence 
on which a jury could find that a defence of automatism exists. 1,137 From this it is possible to 
deduce that certain judges have revealed a scepticism towards the defence. This is well 
expressed, in an American case by Sharp C. J. ̀ Judges everywhere distrust the plea of 
133 The Association is reported as stating that `The message of The Posner Report was right it was just too 
alarmist, ... It is a message that we're still trying to get out. ' 
134 Bratty [1963] AC 386,413-4 (Lord Denning). Repeated in Broome v Perkins (1987) 85 Cr Ap R 321,328 
(Glidewell J. ) 
135 [1983] 1 All ER 578,579 (CA) 
136 ex pdrte Cooper [1968] Qd LR 406 
137 (1978) 69 Cr App R 318,321 . 
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unconsciousness and apprehend that jurors may repose hasty confidence in it'. 138 Perhaps this 
is because, non-insane automatism alone amongst the mental condition defences provides a 
complete acquittal for the defendant because the voluntariness of his action has not been 
proved. 139 
In determining criminal responsibility the courts consider voluntariness where the evidence 
suggests that the presumption of voluntariness may be rebutted. However, more often the 
consideration of a court will focus on the actus reus and mens rea of the crime. Academically, 
it is a matter of debate whether questions regarding voluntariness should go to mens rea or 
actus reus. Norrie sees voluntariness as a ̀ central requirement' of the actus reus. 140 Smith is 
more circumspect, but he is clear that voluntariness is in some way more ̀ fundamental' than 
the elements which are normally thought of as ̀ mess rea'. 141 Neither do Lord Simon's 
comments in DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch clarify the matter. They seem to suggest that 
voluntariness as a mental element is separate from either wens rea or actus reus. 142 Presumably 
Lord Simon sees volition either as going to actus reus via the medium of the voluntary act or 
as a separate element, the voluntariness of the act to be proved by the prosecution, but clearly 
he does not see it as going to mens rea. 
If the voluntariness of the act is a separate element and yet fundamental anyone who raises 
sufficient evidence of involuntariness must be acquitted. 143 However, the courts have restricted 
the possibility of outright acquittals for automatism. They have achieved this by dividing the 
138 State v Cadell (1975 NC) 215 SE 2d 348,369 
139 The philosophical and jurisprudential basis for the defence will be discussed in Chapter 5 
140 NORRIE, A. 1993. p. 1 11 
141 SMITH , J. 
C. 1999. p. 38 
142 `Lastly, actus revs and mens rea are misleading terms; since (other than exceptionally) a mental 
state is not criminal without an accompanying act and an act is not criminal without some 
accompanying mental element. Both terms have, however, justified themselves by their 
usefulness; and I shall myself employ them in their traditional senses - namely, actus raus to 
mean such conduct as constitutes the crime if the mental element involved in definition of the 
crime is also present (or, more shortly, conduct prohibited by law); and mens rea to mean such 
mental element, over and above volition, as is involved in the definition of the crime. ' 
[1975] AC 653,690 
143 Sufficient evidence for a jury to doubt hat the Crown had proved voluntariness 
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defence of automatism into two parts non-insane automatism resulting in an acquittal and 
insane automatism resulting in a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity where the court 
retains the right of disposal Presumably the insane automaton will be seen as claiming, under 
the M'Naghten Rules, that because of `disease of the mind' he did not know the ̀ nature and 
quality of his act'. In reality insane automatism forms part of the insanity defence. In practice, 
the manner in which the M'Naghten rules have been applied has been substantially determined 
in cases in which involuntariness in the sense of automatism has been asserted. ' 
In Burgess the test of automatism was said to be twofold: `[t]he first is whether a proper 
evidential foundation for the defence of automatism has been laid. The second is whether the 
evidence shows the case to be one of insane automatism, ... or non-insane automatism. 
" If 
this is correct, when insane automatism is considered as a defence to a criminal charge, the 
evidential burden regarding voluntariness has already been fulfilled by the defence. By 
considering an automaton not to know the nature and quality of her act then issues of mens rea 
are removed. ' Thus, the jury in an insane automatism case may find someone to be excused 
responsibility, by reason of insanity, without either the voluntariness of the act or mens rea 
having been established. Because of the effect of an insanity verdict this seems to predicate 
wrongdoing over culpability. The defendant may be found insane and subject to disposal 
simply because of her wrongdoing without sufficient consideration of whether she is culpable 
or of whether her condition equates to insanity from a medical rather than a legal perspective. 
She may be detained simply because, following Burgess, the legal cause of her behaviour is 
deemed to be internal and she has done something wrong; even where the danger of her 
repeating the ̀ dangerous' behaviour is very slight. The rationale for imposing criminal 
responsibility and punishing insane automatons seems entirely based on considerations of 
public policy. 
The question arises: is involuntariness a defence that provides a separate and distinct 
144 See for example the impact on the law of insanity of the following automatism cases Rv Kemp, Bratty v 
Attorney General for Northern Ireland, Rv Sullivan, Rv Quick, and Rv Hennessy 
145 [1991] 2 All ER 769,771 
146 See SMITH, J. C. 1999. p. 201 
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exemption from criminal liability? Or, is it simply referred to as a defence, but in fact it 
constitutes a failure by the prosecution to prove one of the fundamental requirements of 
criminal liability, the voluntary act, once an evidential burden has been fulfilled by the defence 
which displaces the normal presumption of voluntariness. The difficulty seems to be that the 
law is not clear as to what the role of voluntariness/involuntariness is in determining criminal 
liability. A further complication exists, the evidential burden varies dependent upon what type 
of automatism is to be pleaded. 
Smith's answer seems to be that automatism operates as an independent defence. ̀To raise 
other defences at common law - for example, provocation, self defence, automatism or duress 
- the accused need do no more than introduce some evidence of all the constituents of the 
defence; whereupon it is for the Crown to satisfy the jury that at least one of those constituents 
did not exist. '''" Again there is a difficulty in viewing automatism in this sense, Smith's last 
phrase is not true in the case of automatism, where the Crown, once evidence of the 
automatism is raised, has to prove something did exist - voluntariness. 
So, is automatism really a defence at all or is it an assertion of something more fundamental to 
criminal liability, lack of agency? Ashworth discusses this problem in Principles of Criminal 
Law: 
Automatism is not merely a denial of fault. It is more a denial of authorship, a claim 
that the ordinary link between mind and behaviour was absent; the person could not be 
said to be acting as a moral agent at the time - what occurred was a set of involuntary 
movements of the body rather than ̀ acts' of D. '48 
Ashworth also points out that ̀ [a]lthough it is common to refer to automatism as a "dem", 
in practice vohmtary conduct is assumed in all cases. ' The suggestion seems to be that 
automatism may be being referred to as a defence for ease of terminology, because of the 
restrictions placed by the courts on the criminal law doctrine which requires voluntariness, and 
147 SMITH, J. C. 1999. P. 27 
148 ASHWORTH, A. 1999a. Principles of the Criminal Law. (3rd edit. ). Oxford University Pram p. 101 
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because of the evidential burden of raising some evidence of automatism. 149 Ashworth when 
considering whether automatism should be categorised as a defence states that: ̀ the discussion 
that follows has more in common with the treatment of various excuses'. 150 But is automatism 
or involuntariness an excuse, if there is no authorship of an act, is it that the defendant is being 
excused from criminal liability or is it that she has no criminal liability, because the act is not 
hers? There seems to be a distinction here that would explain the fundamental nature of 
voluntariness in this sense. This explanation would also explain the tension between the 
conflicting needs of social protection and a clearly delineated boundary for criminal liability, or 
as expressed above between culpability and wrongdoing. 
This may help to clarify matters with regard to automatism, and it makes it possible to see 
voluntariness as fundamental to criminal liability. However, it would seem that for it to be 
fundamental to criminal liability voluntariness must go to both actus reus and mens rea. 
If it goes to actus reus then the raising of an automatism defence displaces the presumption of 
voluntariness. Then the actus reus is not proved if the defence is successful. This reasoning 
justifies the verdict in non-insane automatism cases - criminal liability cannot be imposed and 
the defendant is acquitted. But this analysis does not serve in the case of insane automatons, 
unless it is assumed that criminal liability rests solely on the danger such behaviour may pose 
to society, whether or not there is a likelihood that such behaviour will recur. In Bratty, 
Viscount Kihnuir was uncertain as to whether automatism went to actus reus or to mens rea. 
Considering the principles laid down in Woolmington's case he said: 
Nevertheless, one must not lose sight of the overriding principle, laid down by this 
house in Woolmington's case [1935] AC 462, that it is for the prosecution to prove 
every element of the offence charged. One of these elements is the accused's tate of 
149 ̀ The presumption of mental capacity of which I have spoken is a provisional presumption only. It does 
not put the legal burden on the defence in the same way as the presumption of insanity does. lt leaves 
the legal burden on the prosecution, but nevertheless, until it is displaced, it enables the prosecution to 
discharge the ultimate burden of proving that the act was voluntary. Not because the presumption is 
evidence itself, but because it takes the place of evidence. In order to displace the assumption of 
mental capacity, the defence must give sufficient evidence from which it may reasonably be inferred 
that the act was involuntary. The evidence of the man himself will rarely be sufficient unless it is 
supported by medical evidence which points to the cause of the mentally incapacity. ' BraW [1963] 
AC 386,413-4 (Lord Denning) 
150 ASHWORTH, A. 1999a. p. 101 
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mind; that he acted consciously and voluntarily, and the prosecution need go no 
further. But if, after considering evidence properly left to them by the judge, the jury 
are left in real doubt whether or not the accused acted in a state of automatism, it 
seems to me that on principle they should acquit because the necessary mens rea - if 
indeed the actus reus - has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. "' 
If, as Smith asserts, the ̀ voluntary act is a more fimdaniental element of criminal liability than 
intention to cause, or foresight of results which we normally think of as mens rea': 152 then a 
further question has to be addressed. Should something so fundamental be overridden by 
public policy considerations? Clarkson and Keating suggest that such matters should be 
determined by principle not by reference to actus reus and mens rea. 
In Attorney General's Reference (No 3 of 1998)' 53 the Court of Appeal expressed concern 
about ̀ public safety considerations being employed to justify the making of orders against 
those who have done nothing which can fairly be stigmatised as a criminal act. ' These 
difficulties were seen by Judge L. J., who gave judgment on behalf of the court, to become the 
more pronounced when crimes of a serious nature are committed. 154 
Where on an indictment for rape it is proved that sexual intercourse has taken place 
without the consent of the woman, and the defendant has established insanity, he 
should not be entitled to an acquittal on the basis that he mistakenly but insanely 
understood or believed that she was consenting. But when an individual surrounded by 
a group of much larger, aggressive and armed youths, strikes out and lands a blow on 
one of them who unfortunately falls to the ground sustaining a fatal head injury, it 
would be unjust if he were prevented from inviting the jury to consider that his violence 
might have been lawful, merely because as a result of insanity, he believed the mob was 
a group of devils attacking him because (as the defendant in the present case believed) 
he was Jesus Christ. Excluding this individual's own damaged mental faculty at the 
time, the jury might conclude that although he caused death, his actions were not 
unlawful, and so did not constitute the actus reus of murder, or manslaughter. '" 
151 [1963] AC 386,407 
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What Judge L. J. seems to be saying, in this hypothetical example, is that whilst both 
defendants appear to be suffering from delusions which lead them to draw invalid conclusions, 
one should be held criminally liable and the other should not. One defendant could on the 
evidence before the court be said to be acting in self defence in circumstances which would not 
be unlawful, though his appreciation of those circumstances was not accurate. His insanity is 
not relevant to his act though his act was dangerous. The appellant whose insanity leads him to 
believe that the woman is consenting to sexual intercourse appears to be viewed to be 
suffering from an insane delusion which is relevant to his criminal culpability. There is an 
inconsistency in this reasoning with regard to social policy as it is applied in cases of 
automatism. The defendant who thinks he is Jesus Christ and attacks other individuals in the 
community could be viewed as having committed a dangerous act. If this type of defendant 
deserves an acquittal why is an acquittal not available to an epileptic when, in the words of 
Sullivan's counsel: ̀there is no exercise of the mind function as the law recognizes it'? ̀  
What Judge L. J. 's speculation does reveal however is that the courts are concerned with the 
problems created by the law in this area. This is perhaps better expressed in Rv Antoine, 
which confirmed the decision in Attorney General's Reference (No 3 of 1998). 
Throughout history, seriously anti-social acts, particularly acts of violence, have been 
committed by people whose mental capacity was such that they were not responsible, 
or not fully responsible, for their acts, or could not fairly be required to stand trial. 
Such cases pose an inescapable public, moral and human rights dilemma: for while such 
people may present a continuing danger from which the public deserve to be protected, 
it would be offensive to visit the full rigour of the law on those who are not mentally 
responsible, or not able to defend themselves, as an ordinary person of sound mind 
would be taken to be, and who may (despite their mental incapacity) have done nothing 
wrong or dangerous. '57 
In automatism cases it seems that this need to do justice sometimes leads to disparities 
between the law as declared by the higher courts and the law as practised. How often this 
occurs is difficult to establish because as previously stated few automatism cases are reported. 
156 ROYAL SOCIETY OF MEDICINE. 1985. p. 28. 
157 [1999] 3 WLR 1204,1208 (CA) (Bingham L. C. J. ) 
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However research reveals the following cases which seem to be at variance with the law as 
stated by the appellate courts. 
In Broome v Perkins, "' the justices who heard the case at first instance found that: 
(a) The defendant, a diabetic, had spent the morning at work. He followed his normal 
daily routine but on his way home had an attack of hypoglycaemia. The defendant had 
taken all reasonable steps to prevent himself from acting involuntarily and could not 
reasonably have foreseen the attack. 
Relying on the medical evidence provided by the defence the justices stated: 
We accepted that at some stage on his journey home the defendant lapsed into what 
could be described as ̀ automatic pilot'. Although he was not in a coma, we were of the 
opinion that the defendant was not conscious of what he was doing and that his actions 
were involuntary and automatic. '59 
The Court of Appeal remitted the case with a direction to convict, on the basis that the 
justices' findings were incorrect in law. The Court of Appeal accepted the prosecution 
argument that the accused must have been driving for certain parts of the journey. Glidewell 
L. J. acknowledged that the case had been given serious consideration by the justices and that 
in some way the defendant's behaviour following the dangerous driving must be taken into 
consideration: 
Their case is admirably stated and, albeit I am of the opinion that I have just expressed, 
that they should have convicted, it is clear that the facts set out in the case provide 
much material for mitigation, both as to the defendant's medical state and as to his 
conduct after he recovered when he and his wife first checked to see if there had been 
an accident and then went straight to the police station. The justices, when they have to 
reconsider the matter, are, of course, fully entitled to take all of that into account in 
deciding what penalty they should impose. 160 
Despite the Court of Appeal's decision in this case and in Attorney General's Reference (No 2 
158 (1987) 85 Cr App R 321 
159 (1987) 85 Cr App R 321,328 
160 (1987) 85 Cr App R 321,333 
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of 1992) the courts are still refusing to convict some motorists who plead automatism. Though 
it is clear that on the meaning given to driving in the appeal cases the defendant's might be 
described as ̀ driving' in the legal sense. In 1999 in the unreported case of Rv Milne, a diabetic 
obtained an acquittal on the grounds of non-insane automatism to a charge of dangerous 
driving because he suffered a hypoglycaemic episode which resulted in the offence being 
committed. 16' In Rv Whoolley'62 the driver of an HGV wagon which crashed into a column of 
slow moving traffic was acquitted on the grounds that sneezing could produce a state of 
automatism. This was despite the fact that the accident which resulted involved seven other 
vehicles, closed the M62 motorway for a `couple of hours' and caused some serious injuries. 
Whether a sneezing fit is sufficient to found a defence of automatism is a moot point, does 
someone who has a sneezing attack retain some control over their vehicle? In Attorney 
General's Reference (No 2 of 1992) the law regarding driving was stated as being that some 
control, `albeit limited' was sufficient to found criminal liability. Lord Taylor said `the defence 
of automatism requires that there was a total destruction of voluntary control on the 
defendant's part. Impaired, reduced or partial control is not enough. "' 
However, in the civil law in the case of Mansfield v Weetabix, 'T' Legatt L. J. in the Court of 
Appeal found that the civil law in assessing negligence required a different standard of driving 
with regard to automatism than the criminal law. In this case automatism prevented a lorry 
driver from controlling his vehicle with the result that it crashed into a shop owned by the 
plaintiffs, causing serious damage. This failure to control the vehicle was held to be due to 
automatism and not to the driver's negligence, even though the onset of the automatism was 
slow. The driver of the lorry was unaware that he had a malignant insulinoma, this ̀ resulted in 
a hypoglycaemic state in which his brain was starved of glucose and unable to function 
properly. That was what caused the accident" Leggatt L. J. considered that: ̀ [t]here is no 
reason in principle why a driver should not escape liability where the disabling event is not 
161 Thanks to Jo Martin of the Camberwell CPS for this information 
162 Unreported November 13"' 1997 
163 [199314 All ER 683,689 
164 [1998] 1 WLR 1263 
165 [1998] 1 WLR 1263,1265 
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sudden, but gradual, provided that the driver is unaware of it. ''" Despite Legatt L. J. 's 
insistence that there was no necessity for the requirements regarding driving to be the same in 
the civil and criminal law, it seems to say the least odd that they should have such divergent 
views. There seems to be no policy reason why standards of care in driving should differ so 
markedly between the civil and the criminal law, or as to why whether someone's brain is 
functioning properly should be relevant to determinations of civil liability but not criminal 
liability. Yet Roberts v Ramsbottom1b7 which considered ̀civil and criminal cases 
indifferently"" was disapproved. 
Judges' sympathies have extended to those who are traumatised, although in Rv Hennessy, 
Lord Lane said that `stress, anxiety and depression' were not in themselves `separately or 
together external factors of the kind capable in law of causing or contributing to a state of 
automatism. " In RvT 10 the trial judge permitted the consideration of a defence of 
automatism to a charge of robbery and assault. The defence was based upon the claim that the 
defendant had been in a dissociative state at the time of the offence as a result of being raped 
some three days earlier. 171 
A number of defendants have been acquitted of assault following a successful automatism plea. 
Mackay refers to an epileptic, Sandra Mcfarlane, who assaulted a police officer and comments 
that the court appeared, ̀to ignore completely the obvious impact of Sullivan'. 'n The Daily 
Star 13 reported that Steve Stott `accused of a bedroom attack on a woman was freed 
yesterday after a court heard he had been sleepwalking. ' At Worcester Crown Court, ̀ lawyers 
agreed he was asleep and the indecency charges were dropped. ' Similarly in Rv Turner, 
166 [1998] 1 WLR 1263,1265 
167 [1980] 1 WLR 823 
168 [199811 WLR 1263,1266 
169 [198911 WLR 287,294 
170 [1990] Crim LR 256 
171 She was found guilty by the jury 
172 MACKAY R. D. 1995. p. 39 
173 Wednesday 20"' September 1995. p. 7 
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another unreported case, a woman who had been involved in a road accident and when 
breathalysed found to have excess alcohol in her bloodstream had the charge of driving under 
the influence of excess alcohol withdrawn by the prosecution. Dr. Koch commenting on the 
case summarised the psychological evidence and legal issues as follows: 
The evidence was consistent with somnambulism. The ̀ duty of care' issue, and her pre- 
accident drinking, was not thought relevant as she had never before performed 
complex motor tasks whilst asleep and therefore did not feel her previous sleepwalking 
was a significant problem 
The outcome: It was argued that the appropriate outcome should be an acquittal on 
the grounds of non-insane automatism/somnambulism. The expert evidence after due 
consideration, and presumably expert review, was accepted and the prosecution case 
dropped. "a 
In his commentary on the case he states: ̀Defences of sleepwalking are being constructed in 
other areas of behaviour e. g. sexual behaviour, indecent assault. Somnambulism is a discreet 
condition which requires careful assessment as do duty of care issues. " If he is right, it seems 
that the medical experts and possibly the prosecution lawyers have digressed to some 
considerable xtent from the Court of Appeal's decision in Burgess. In Burgess the Court of 
Appeal appeared to view sleep disorders as having an internal cause and therefore only 
founding a defence of insane automatism. 
The problem with trying to assess how many successful non-insane automatism pleas are heard 
by the courts is lack of reporting. Recently the Times reported that: 
an advertising executive made legal history yesterday when he became the first accused 
killer believed to have been cleared because he suffered from a severe attack of 
diabetes. Alasdair Padmore, 37, flew into an uncontrollable rage and stabbed a 
Department of Trade and Industry official to death with a kitchen knife after entering a 
state of hypoglycaemic automatism. Nicholas Trent, 45, his landlord and house mate, 
died from a single wound to the heart. He was found in the garden of a house two 
doors away, where he had fled after jumping over fences in a desperate attempt to 
174 KOCH, H. C. A 1999. Rv Turner (1999) 9 (3) Pil Case Notes. Emphasis in original 
175 KOCH, H. C. H. 1999 
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escape. 176 
The case will not be reported in the law reports because ̀Mark Dennis, for the prosecution, 
dropped the case at the Old Bailey after accepting that the defendant's condition, of which he 
was unaware and unable to control at the time, took over. '' This case, the case of Abdul 
Janjirker" and the case of Colin Kemp prove that it is possible to gain an acquittal to the most 
serious criminal charge on the grounds of non-insane automatism. 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
It is important to note here, that the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) 
will add a new dimension to this debate. ' Both in terms of what it has to say about 
deprivation of liberty and in terms of the right to a fair trial. These may affect the disposal of 
those found to be insane automatons and the burden of proof in automatism cases. 
Barden of Proof. 
In terms of the burden of proof the relevant Convention Article, 6(2), states that ̀ Everyone 
charged with a criminal offence should be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to 
the law. ' The relevance of Article 6(2) to the defence of automatism is that it may be argued 
that the reversal of the burden of proof particularly in the case of insane automatism is a 
contravention of the presumption of innocence. The English courts have considered the 
presumption of innocence in relation to the burden of proof imposed upon defendants in cases 
176 The Times 17th December 1999. p. 3 
177 The Times 176 December 1999. p. 3 
178 Abdul Janjirker killed `a teenager in a road rage confrontation. ' His case was heard by two juries as the 
first jury were unable to reach a verdict with regard to manslaughter whilst acquitting him of murder. 
At his retrial he was found not guilty. His defence was stated in newspaper reports to be based on Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder, following a blow on the head by a brick. Daily Express 26.9.2000. p. 6 
179 Human Rights Act 1998 particularly s2 which requires a court when making a determination affecting a 
Convention right to take into consideration, inter alia, any ̀judgment, decision, declaration or 
advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights. ' 
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of diminished responsibility, special defences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971180 and the 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989.18' 
Lord Woolf, giving judgment in the Court of Appeal in Rv Lambert and others, '82 rejected the 
appellants' claim that the imposition of a persuasive burden of proof contravened Article 6(2). 
He referred to the European Court of Human Rights' judgment in Saliabaku v France '" and 
reiterated Lord Hope's comments in Kebilene ̀[a]s a matter of general principle therefore a 
fair balance must be struck between the demands and general interest of the community and 
the protection of the fundamental rights of the individual. i184 The appellants argued that their 
fundamental rights in this respect meant that the burden of proof should be evidential. This 
argument was forcefully rejected by the court who viewed the arguments expressed by the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Canadian Supreme Court in Rv Chaulk'" as 
supportive of their decision that the burden of proof in cases of diminished responsibility did 
not contravene the Convention. ' The reason given for the court's decision was that: ̀ [t]he 
change in the law bought about by s. 2 [Homicide Act 1957] was of benefit to the defendants 
who were in a position to take advantage of it. It does not matter whether it is treated as 
creating a defence to a charge of murder or an exception or as dealing with the capacity to 
commit the offence of murder ... s. 2 still does not contravene art. 6. ''g' 
180 The burden of proof in the case of diminished responsibility is the same as that in insane automatism, that 
is the burden of proof is on the defendants to prove diminished responsibility, on the balance of 
probabilities 
181 Rv DPP, ex parse Kebilene and others [ 199913 WLR 972 
182 Rv Lambert, Rv Ali, Rv Jordan, (2000) Times September 5. The cases were heard together. Rv All 
and Rv Jordan were cases where a plea of diminished responsibility had been made in response to a 
charge of murder. Lambert concerned the special defence provided by Section 5(4) of the Misuse of 
Drugs Act. 
183 (1988) 13 EHRR 379 
184 Rv DPP, ex parte Kebilene and others [ 1999] 3 WLR 972,997 
185 [1990] 3 SCR 1303 
186 For a discussion of the burden of proof in relation to the Convention see ASHWORTH, A. 1999b. Article 
6 and the Fairness of Trials. [ 1999] Crim LR 261-272, p. 265-67 and CAPE, E. 2000 The Human 
Rights Act Points for Defence Lawyers. November 2000 Legal Action 29-30. See also the commentary 
on Rv Kebilene [2000] Crim LR 486 
187 Rv Lambert, Rv Ali, Rv Jordan (2000) Times September 5. 
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Where does this leave the differing burdens of proof in automatism? In Lambert the structure 
of the offences was seen as important. In the case of the offence under the Misuse of Drugs 
Act 1971 the court took the view that, as Parliament had decided to structure an offence so as 
to create a defence based on a persuasive burden of proof, Parliament was in a better position 
than the court to evaluate the social policy issues underlying the creation of the defence. 
However Lord Woolf also stated that where `the defendant is being asked to prove an essential 
element of an offence this will be more difficult to justify'. '" If it is accepted that in the case of 
automatism what is being argued is that a fundamental element of criminal responsibility was 
missing at the time of the commission of the wrongdoing then this would seem to fall within 
Lord Woolf s category of burdens placed on defendants which are `more difficult to justify'. 
If Lord Woolf is right and placing a persuasive burden of proof on a defendant is less 
sustainable when a defendant ̀is being asked to prove an essential element of an offence' then 
the burden of proof in insane automatism cases is open to question. Such an approach would 
create real problems for the courts, not the least being how they would separate the 
requirements of the insanity defence from the defence of insane automatism which is based 
upon the voluntary act requirement. ' If the distinction made by Lord Woolf is correct then 
the burden of proof in cases of insane automatism seems to be open to challenge. 
However, it should be noted that Lord Woolf also remarked that ̀ what fairness requires can 
differ depending on the circumstances of the case. ' 190 Additionally at the beginning of his 
judgment Lord Woolf referred to the need in decisions of this type to balance the 'fundamental 
rights of the individual' against the ̀ demands and general interests of the community'. It seems 
therefore that once again if the argument is raised before a court questions of social policy will 
be taken into consideration. 
188 (2000) The Times September 5 
189 Though a similar argument might be made in respect of the insanity defence. That is that the sanity of the 
defendant might be said to be an essential ingredient of a particular offence because it is a prerequisite 
of criminal responsibility 
190 (2000) The Times September 5 
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Liberty and Security of Person 
A further problem arises in respect of the plea of insane automatism with regard to Article 5 of 
the Convention. 19' The Convention itself needs to be interpreted in the light of its case law. 
The question is whether it would be a contravention of someone's rights under the Convention 
to deprive that person of her liberty because of a temporary malfunction of her mental 
faculties. In the Winterwrp case guidance was given as to the protections which should be 
afforded to individuals: 
In the Court's opinion, except in emergency cases, the individual concerned should not 
be deprived of his liberty unless he has been reliably shown to be of `unsound mind'. 
The very nature of what has to be established before the competent national author- 
ity-that is, a true mental disorder-calls for objective medical expertise. Further, the 
mental disorder must be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement. What 
is more, the validity of continued confinement depends upon the persistence of such a 
191 Article 5 
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save 
in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: 
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; 
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court 
or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; 
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the 
competent legal authority on a reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is 
reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having 
done so; 
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his 
lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority; 
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of 
persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; 
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into 
the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or 
extradition. 
2. Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the 
reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph l (c) of this Article 
shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power 
and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be 
conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. 
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by 
which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if 
the detention is not lawful. 
S. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this 
Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation. 
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disorder. '92 
In insane automatism cases where defendants are found not guilty by reason of insanity there 
will usually be medical evidence of some malfimction. The question is whether it will be 
acceptable as evidence of unsoundness of mind and whether, applying Winterwerp, this will be 
sufficient to satisfy the Convention that deprivation of liberty is necessary. It must at least be 
questionable whether deprivation of liberty will be justified, if imposed, in cases of insane 
automatism from diabetes or sleepwalking because of the need for a person to be ̀ reliably 
shown to be of unsound mind' which ̀ must be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory 
confinement'. The point at issue in such cases is likely to be the strength of the medical 
evidence with reference to these issues. However, it is not clear whether Winterwerp would be 
of assistance to those who are found to be insane automatons but subjected to a supervision 
and treatment order rather than detention. 193 '.. 
192 (1979) 2 EHRR 387 Para 39. In Varbanov v Bulgaria Application No 31365/%. Judgment given 
5.10.2000. The European Court of Human Rights confirmed the three requirements set out in 
linterwrp regarding the deprivation of liberty on the grounds of unsoundness of mind 
193 Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 s 5(2) as amended by the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and 
Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991. I am indebted to Professor R. D. Mackay for pointing this out to me. 
194 The only application regarding the operation of the automatism defence was declared inadmissible by the 
European Commission of Human Rights in 1995. Foster v UK Application no 24725/94. The 
application, concerned a claim that the English courts in rejecting the claim of automatism had 
violated the applicant's rights , the complaint was made under Articles 5,6,7 and 13 of the 
Convention on the grounds, inter alia, that the judge at his trial refused to allow psychiatric reports to 
be submitted and that the judge did not leave the defence of automatism to the jury. The Commission 
rejected his claims on the grounds that the offence with which he was charged was a criminal offence 
in England, his appeal had been heard by the Court of Appeal who rejected his claim that he was 
convicted of an 'offence unknown to law' at the time of the commission of his actions, and there were 
no procedural deficiencies in the hearing of his case. Foster's application undoubtably was weakened 
by the fact that his counsel had advised him that he had no defence of automatism, and the trial judge 
whilst excluding submission of the psychiatric reports did allow oral evidence as to Foster's 
psychiatric state at the time of the act of arson on his sister's home 
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Summary 
The single most potent force in the shaping of the law of automatism appears to have been 
social protection. That is the policy enunciated by the courts that in the case of involuntary 
behaviour resulting in a criminal charge, ̀ [i]t seems to us that if there is a danger of recurrence 
that may be an added reason for categorising the condition as a disease of the mind', "' and 
thus insane automatism. Lord Denning in Bratty said `any mental disorder which has 
manifested itself in violence and is prone to recur is a disease of the mind'. '" It seems that the 
courts have indeed ̀ started down the road' where involuntary conduct has been ̀ subsumed' 
into `the concept of insanity' where such conduct could be identified as ̀ the product of a 
disease of the mind'. " It is this policy which has led to the definition given to `disease of the 
mind' in Kemp and confirmed in Sullivan. 
In order to escape from the confines of the decisions in Kemp and Bratty, Lawton L. J. in 
Quick, developed the notion of an internal/external trigger as a cause of automatism. This 
distinction has been employed by the courts and has distinctly arbitrary consequences for some 
defendants. In Quick it was said that: ̀ [t]he difficulty arises as soon the question is asked 
whether he should be detained in a mental hospital because he had a low blood sugar reaction; 
and common sense is affronted by the prospect of a diabetic being sent to such a hospital'. "' 
Therefore Lawton L. J. sought to qualify the application of the M'Naghten rules. However, 
the application of the M'Naghten rules to cases of hyperglycaemia nd the application of a 
strict test of involuntariness in driving cases has narrowed the use of the defence of 
automatism for diabetics. Similarly the wide definition given to disease of the mind has led to 
the classification of sleep disorders and epilepsy as conditions which attract an insanity defence 
once the question of automatism is raised. 
There are three problems created by these decisions. The first is that the definition given to 
195 [1991] 2 All ER 769,774 
196 [1963] AC 386,412 
197 Rv Store (1999) 134 CCC (3d) 353,395-6 
198 [1973] 3 WLR 26,31 
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disease of the mind is extremely wide. This leads to the second problem the legal definition of 
disease of the mind does not equate to medical definitions of insanity. Finally, the internal/ 
external distinction created in Quick operates in an arbitrary manner which creates injustice. 
This is particularly true of the distinction made between defendants who suffer from the two 
different types of diabetic episode: hypoglycaemia and hyperglycaemia. 
Further difficulties with the approach taken by the courts were identified at the symposium 
following Rv Sullivan. Sullivan's defence counsel saw the labelling of epileptics who claim 
their actions are involuntary as criminally insane as unfair. A similar argument might be made 
in respect of 'sleepwalkers' and those in a hyperglycaemic episode. Conversely a diabetic in a 
hypoglycaemic episode will be seen as not guilty. In terms of labelling such statements eem 
arbitrary and unfair. Furthermore, Sullivan's counsel suggested that `the practical and 
emotional consequences' of an insanity verdict as applied to an epileptic were ̀ unnecessary 
and wasteful both for that person and society as a whole. "" 
A different approach has been taken to the defence of automatism in driving cases. In driving 
cases the policy of social protection has a different result, here the emphasis is not on declaring 
those who are deemed ̀dangerous' to be insane, but rather to deny defendants the opportunity 
to claim that they were not `driving'. Thus in Attorney General's Reference (No 2 of 1992) 
Lord Lane said automatism required ̀a total destruction of voluntary control' 200 This view is 
difficult to reconcile with the view taken of automatism in Bratty or Sullivan. 201 
T1 courts have been unwilling to allow states of `stress, anxiety and depression' to be utilised 
as external factors causing loss of voluntariness, because they constitute ̀a state of mind which 
is prone to recur'; and are not `capable in law in law of causing or contributing to a state of 
199 ROYAL SOCIETY OF MEDICINE. 1985. p. 12 
200 [1993] 4 All ER 683,689 
201 Though in Bratty Viscount Kilmuir, offered the obiter suggestion that driving cases should be separated 
from other cases of automatism because `there is no requirement of proof of mens rea. ' [1963] 386, 
399 
83 
automatism They lack the feature of novelty or accident. '2°Z This is a problematic area for the 
law given the growth of defences based upon post traumatic stress disorder. These problems 
will be further discussed in the next chapter in relation to the Australian and Canadian case 
law. However, it should be noted that not all types of automatism involve novelty or accident, 
hypoglycaemia certainly does not when suffered by a diabetic. 
Thus for social policy reasons the courts have taken a restrictive view of what constitutes 
automatism The narrowest definition being given in the driving cases203 where the criminal law 
requires ̀a total destruction of voluntary control' before automatism may be established. In 
AG's Reference (No 21992) it was stated that this was what was required for a defence of 
automatism to be put to the jury. Similarly in Sullivan, social policy considerations dictated 
that Sullivan's epilepsy amounted to insane automatism because it impaired his ̀ reason, 
memory and understanding. ' It mattered not whether the ̀ impairment' was ̀organic' or 
`functional', ̀ permanent or transient' provided that it subsisted at the time of the act. 204 
There is a tension between the social policy objectives underlying the definitions given to the 
states of insanity and automatism and the criminal law requirement that there be a voluntary 
act before criminal liability may be imposed. This tension rarely surfaces because the 
presumption of capacity means that it is assumed that the defendant was acting voluntarily. 
When it does, in cases where automatism is raised, then it poses a problem for the courts. As 
Lord Diplock said in Sullivan: ̀ it is natural to feel a reluctance to attach the label of insanity to 
a sufferer from psychomotor epilepsy'. ' 
Not all of these difficulties can be addressed in a thesis of this length. However, one of the 
most pressing questions is whether the courts' preference for social protection over individual 
culpability is justified and this will be examined in chapter 5. The question of the reform of the 
202 Rv Hennessy[ 1989] 1 WLR 287,294 
203 See p. 62-66 for discussion of the automatism plea in driving cases 
204 [1983] 2 All ER 673,677 
205 [1983] 2 All ER 673,678 
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insanity defence has been discussed at length elsewhere206 and therefore will not be addressed 
in any depth. Nevertheless it is accepted that many of the leading automatism cases have 
defined the defence of insanity. This is because of the perception of the courts of the need for 
social protection. In assessing the basis of involuntariness as expressed in the defence of 
automatism it is necessary to focus on how action takes place, what levels of consciousness 
are required for action to be said to be involuntary or voluntary, and to examine these findings 
in relation to criminal responsibility. Though Moore's book Act and Crime has been the 
subject of much jurisprudential discussion, the relevance of neuroscientific constructions of 
consciousness, and how these relate via the modern philosophy of the mind to consciousness 
has largely been ignored. This thesis aims to address that deficiency. However before 
considering such matters, it is necessary to examine the case law of Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, Scotland and the United States of America to see how courts in other jurisdictions 
have addressed the problems posed by the ̀ fundamental' nature of the voluntary act 
requirement. 
206 See for example MACKAY, RD. 1995., McAULEY, F. 1993. Insanity, Psychiatry and Criminal 
Responsibility, Dublin: Roundhall Press 
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Chapter 3 
In the last chapter some of the problems with the present approach to the defence of 
automatism were chronicled. In this chapter it is proposed to examine how courts in other 
jurisdictions have reacted to similar policy pressures in deciding whether a defence of 
involuntariness should be accepted by the courts, and what form that defence should take. 
Scotland 
In Scotland the approach to the defence has varied. As previously discussed, ' in Fraser the 
courts recognised that sleepwalking could be a defence to a criminal charge. The case of HM 
Advocate v Ritchie' also supported the conclusion that there was a defence of unconsciousness 
in Scottish law3. In Ritchie, Lord Murray said: 
Turning now to the question of a man's responsibility or irresponsibility for his actions, 
irresponsibility need not be confined to what to us is the most familiar example, viz, the 
case of a person who is, in popular language, ̀out of his mind'. ... But where the 
defence is that a person, who would ordinarily be quite justified in driving a car, 
becomes - owing to a cause which he was not bound to foresee, and which was outwith 
his control - either gradually or suddenly not the master of his own action, a question as 
to his responsibility or irresponsibility for the consequences of his action arises, and may 
form the ground of a good special defence. The question, accordingly, which you have 
to determine is whether, at the time of the accident, the accused was or was not master 
of his own action. So put the question becomes a pure question of facto. 
This approach was criticised by the Scottish High Court in HMAdvocate v Cunningham which, 
when considering whether a dissociative state brought about by an epileptic fugue could 
constitute automatism, said that: 
I Chapter 2 p. 22 
2 1926 SLT 308 
3 GORDON, G. H. 1976. Automatism, Insanity and Intoxication. (1976) 21 Journal of the Law Society of 
Scotland 310-6,311. See also MACKAY, R. D. 1983. The Automatism Defence - What Price 
Rejection? (1983) 34 (2) NILQ 81-106 
4 1926 SLT 308,309 
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Any mental or pathological condition short of insanity - any question of diminished 
responsibility owing to any cause, which does not involve insanity - is relevant only to 
questions of mitigation and sentence. ' 
Interestingly the judgment makes use of the social policy argument o justify the court's 
decision: 
As I see it, the so called ̀special defence' in the present case constitutes an attempt to 
extend the categories of special defences in order to include a new one, namely, 
something short of insanity, which would lead to an acquittal. For this I can see no 
warrant in principle. On the contrary, as has been pointed out more than once in 
previous cases, such a novel type of special defence would be a startling innovation 
which could lead to serious consequences so far as the safety of the public is concerned. 
After all, that safety is one of the considerations to which we have to have regard when 
we are asked to sanction a complete acquittal, if a defence of this nature is sustained by 
the jury on the facts. 6 
This statement echoes the concerns of the English courts regarding public safety. Cunningham 
remained the law in Scotland until the High Court further considered automatic states in Ross v 
HMAdvocate, 7 a case concerned with offending behaviour following the adulteration of a can 
of lager with drugs. The defendant drank the lager without any knowledge that it contained 
drugs. The defendant hen attacked those around him with a knife and was tried on charges 
relating to seven counts of attempted murder. He claimed that his behaviour was caused by the 
drugged drink and that he should be entitled to a complete acquittal on the grounds that he 
lacked mens rea, rather than an acquittal on the basis of insanity. 
Lord Hope, was of the view that no challenge was being made to Cunningham ̀on its own 
facts'. He identified the cause of Ross's lack of control as a ̀ mental condition of a temporary 
nature which was the result of an external factor and not of some disorder of the mind which 
was liable to recur. 's He noted that the external factor was not self induced. He made the 
5 1963 SLT 345,347 (Clyde L. J. ) 
6 1963 SLT 345,346-7 
7 1991 SLT 564. Five judges sat in the court to hear Ross's appeal The number is relevant because only a High 
Court comprised of more judges than sat in Cunningham or Parliament could review the law as stated 
in Cunningham. 1991 SLT 564,566 (Lard Hope) 
9 1991 SLT 564,566 
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following comments regarding criminal liability and lack of mens rea: 
So, if a person cannot form any intention at all, because for example he is asleep or 
unconscious at the time, it would seem impossible to hold that he had mens rea and was 
guilty in the criminal sense of anything he did when he was in that state. The same result 
would seem to follow if, for example, he was able to form intention to the extent that he 
was controlling what he did in the physical sense, but had no conception whatever at the 
time that what he was doing was wrong. " 
Lord Hope makes it clear that he sees this type of acquittal from criminal liability as having a 
distinct basis in absence of mens rea. He says: 
Insanity provides the clearest example of this situation, but I do not see why there 
should be no room for the view that the lack of evil intention in cases other than 
insanity, to which special considerations apply, should not also result in an acquittal. 
Indeed, since it is for the Crown to prove mens rea as well as the actus reus of the 
offence, it would seem logical to say that in all the cases where there is an absence of 
mens rea an acquittal must result. 1° 
Lord Hope sees public policy as relevant in cases where the absence of mens rea is self 
induced. " In his view it was also relevant to Ross's case that there was no ̀ continuing disorder 
of the mind or body'. '2 He rejected the policy argument put forward in Cunningham as 
inapplicable to cases such as Ross where what was being asserted was lack of mens rea: ̀ due to 
some external factor which was outwith the accused's control and which he was not bound to 
foresee' which ̀ must have resulted in a total alienation of reason amounting to a complete 
absence of self control' Thus for Lord Hope it seems social policy issues are not totally 
determinative of the issue of involuntariness provided that there are ̀ adequate safeguards 
against abuse. 13 
As to the burden of proof in cases of automatism what needed to be considered by the jury 
9 1991 SLT 564,566 
10 1991 SLT 564,566 
11 1991 SLT 564,566 
12 1991 SLT 564,567 
13 1991 SLT 564,569. All quotations 
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was, ̀whether the Crown had established mens rea, since facts bearing on that point have been 
put in issue by the defence, and because the onus of establishing mens rea in every case rests 
throughout on the Crown. '" Lord Hope cited with approval the English courts' 
pronouncements in Hill v Baxter and Woolmington's regarding the acceptance of differing 
burdens of proof in the cases of insanity and automatism He suggested that the reason for this 
distinction between insanity and automatism, is that different legal presumptions are being 
tested by the two defences. In the case of insanity what must be displaced is ̀ the presumption of 
sanity, not that of responsibility'. He argued that in Ross the normal rules which governed 
criminal responsibility applied. Implicit in his argument for this conceptual distinction is the fact 
that sanity is presumed by the courts, whereas, responsibility for criminal circumstances is not. 
What was relevant was the temporary ̀but total loss of control over his actions'. 16 
The definition given by Lord Hope to automatism is ̀ those cases where the accused, while not 
insane, is said to have no control over his actions'. " The English approach has been somewhat 
different to this in that, it is not usually loss of control, per se, which is examined in England, 
but rather loss of consciousness or loss of control of bodily movements. '8 The English courts 
have been careful to avoid the acceptance of defences based on loss of self control In Rv 
Kingston19 the House of Lords considered whether there was a defence of involuntary 
intoxication in English law, the case was appealed from the Court of Appeal which had 
accepted that such a defence existed. Lord Mustill said ̀a loss of self control through the acts of 
a third party does not in general constitute a defence. '20 He considered Ross and concluded: 
14 1991 SLT 564,569 
15 Hill v Baxter [1957] 2 WLR 76, Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 
16 1991 SLT 564,571. Both quotations 
171991 SLT 564,571 
18 ̀ No act is punishable if it is done involuntarily: and an involuntary act in this context-some people 
nowadays prefer to speak of it as ̀ automatism'- means an act which is done by the muscles without 
any control by the mind such as a spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion; or an act done by a person 
who is not conscious of what he is doing such as an act done whilst suffering from concussion or 
whilst sleepwalking 'Bratty v Attorney General for Northern Ireland [ 1963] AC 386,409 (Lord 
Denning) 
19 [199413 WLR 519 
20 Rv Kingston [ 1994] 3 WLR 519,527 
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`the law of Scotland concerning the mental element of crime and the effect on it of a disturbance 
in the defendant's mental condition is not precisely the same as that which prevails in England'. 
However, he continued the ̀ law as stated by the Lord Justice General (Lord Hope), differs 
little, if at all, from that which prevails in England. ' In Lord Mustill's opinion what was relevant 
to the judgment in Ross was that ̀ the accused commits the acts while not conscious of what he 
was doing, and that he was in a state which had been described in some cases as non-insane 
automatism. '2' 
Whether the English and Scottish defences are similar is a moot point. It seems unlikely that an 
English court would support Lord Hope's statement, ̀[t]he same result would seem to follow if, 
for example, he was able to form intention to the extent that he was controlling what he did in 
the physical sense, but had no conception whatever at the time that what he was doing was 
wrong. ' In England lack of voluntariness relates to unconsciousness or lack of willed bodily 
movement and in Scotland, according to Lord Hope, it relates to mens rea. The English courts 
have always resisted what might be termed a defence of irresistible impulse. Lord Mustill says 
of a defence of involuntary intoxication: 
I can only say that the defence runs into difficulties at every turn. In a point of theory it 
would be necessary to reconcile a defence of irresistible impulse derived from a 
combination of innate drives and external disinhibition with the rule that irresistible 
impulse of a solely internal origin (not necessarily any more the fault of the offender) 
does not in itself excuse although it may be a symptom of disease of the mind. ' 
This would seem to explain why the English courts on the whole avoid terminology which 
relates criminal liability to the ability to control conduct. It also confirms that the higher English 
courts would be unlikely to accept a defence of non-insane automatism where the defendant 
was controlling what he did in the physical sense but did not know that it was wrong. 
The requirements of the Scottish defence of automatism, as expressed by Lord Hope, form a 
21 Rv Kingston [1994] 3 WLR 519,531. All quotations 
22 Ross v HMAdvocate 1991 SLT 564,566. In England such an assertion would possibly provide a defence of 
insanity 
23 Rv Kingston [1994] 3 WLR 519,536 
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three part test: the ̀ external factor which is alleged must not be self induced, but it must be one 
which the accused is not bound to foresee and that it must be one which resulted in a total loss 
of control of his actions in regard to the crime with which he is charged. '24 In order to found a 
defence all parts of the test must be met. In so far as it conflicted with the decision in Ross, 
Cunningham was overruled. 25 Lord McCluskey, Lord Allenbridge and Lord Weir supported 
Lord Hope's conclusions. Therefore, in Scotland as in England the existence of an external 
factor is necessary for a claim of non-insane automatism. Lord Brand concurred but takes a 
slightly different approach to the question of automatism: 
In my opinion, the defence of automatism is, in principle, the same as the defence of 
accident. In both cases the failure of the prosecution is due to the absence of mens rea. 
It follows that in neither case is a special defence necessary. It has always been accepted 
that, if the tribunal of fact was not satisfied that what was prima facie a criminal act was 
intended, the prosecution must fail and the accused be acquitted. The issue of accident, 
although sometimes coupled with a special defence of self defence, has never been 
regarded as a special defence per se. As the onus is on the Crown to prove mens rea, 
there can be no onus on the defence to prove the absence of it from whatever cause 
apart from insanity. 26 
Lord Brand is drawing attention to the fundamental nature of the plea that an act is involuntary. 
He was of the opinion that when involuntariness was proved the prosecution case fails for lack 
of mens rea. He saw involuntariness in this sense as akin to accident and not a special defence. 
This type of approach would seem to be capable of being implied in the English court's decision 
in Rv Whoolley. 2' 
In Sorley v HMAdvocate28 the three part test as outlined in Ross was considered. Lord Cowie 
stated that the test in Ross fell into three parts and that the first two parts of the test were 
fulfilled in this case. The Crown accepted that Sorley had consumed LSD tablets whose 
24 Ross v HMAdvocate 1991 SLT 564,572 
25 1991 SLT 564,572 (Lord Altenbridge) 
26 1991 SLT 564,578 
27 Unreported (Manchester 13th November 1997). See chapter 2 p. 74 
28 1991 SCCR 396 
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`presence in the can of lager the appellant was not bound to foresee. 29 But the appeal failed on 
the third part of the test, that is whether the ingestion of LSD `resulted in a total loss of 
control'. On this point there was insufficient evidence. Evidence was required ̀directed to this 
essential point. And it must provide a causative link between the external factor and a total loss 
of control' Such evidence was unlikely to be convincing unless supported by expert evidence. 3o 
Subsequent case law has determined that in Scotland self induced intoxication does not found a 
defence of automatism. " 
What was meant by ̀ total loss of control' was considered in Cardle v Mulrainey. 32 The 
respondent claimed that following the involuntary consumption of amphetamine he could not 
reason and therefore could not exercise self control. In looking at the defence of automatism the 
Sheriff had considered the definition of insanity because the Sheriff felt this would assist the jury 
in determining the meaning to be attributed to `total alienation of reason'. 
The Sheriff concluded that the jury should be instructed to look at the ̀ respondent's whole 
ability to reason'. This approach would seem to be supported by Lord Hope's statement in Ross 
`[t]he same result would seem to follow if, for example, he was able to form intention to the 
extent that he was controlling what he did in the physical sense, but had no conception whatever 
at the time that what he was doing was wrong'. 33 The Sheriff examined the test of insanity given 
in HMAdvocate v Kidd M in order to establish whether the accused's condition at the time of 
the offence could be described as total alienation of reason. In HMAdvocate v Kidd, when 
determining the test for insanity, the court had rejected the use of the M'Naghten Rules and 
said in Scotland the test was different. 
291991 SCCR 396,401 
30 1991 SCCR 396,403 
31 Ebswnrth v HMAdvocate 1992 SCCR 671. It was held that self induced automatism cannot found a defrnce 
to a criminal charge In this case the quantity of drugs taken, about 50 paracetamol and some 
diamorphine, as said by the court to have been so excessive that the defendant could not claim the 
defence. Ebsworth claimed to have been taking the medicine to relieve the pain from a broken leg. 
32 1992 SCCR 658 
33 1991 SLT 564,566 
341960 JC 61; 1960 SLT 82 
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At one time, following English law, it was held in Scotland that if an accused did not 
know the nature and quality of the act committed, or if he did know it but did not know 
he was doing wrong, it was held that he was insane. That was the test, but that test has 
not been followed in Scotland in the most recent cases. Knowledge of the nature and 
quality of the act, and the knowledge that he is doing wrong, may no doubt be an 
element, indeed are an element, in deciding whether a man is sane or insane, but they do 
not, in my view, afford a complete or perfect test of sanity. A man may know very well 
what he is doing, and may know that it is wrong, and he may none the less be insane. It 
may be that some lunatics do an act just because they know it is wrong. - 
However, the High Court rejected the Sheriffs use of Kidd to evaluate total alienation of 
reason in the context of the special defence as set out in Ross. The court said: 
Where, as in the present case, the accused knew what he was doing and was aware of 
the nature and quality of his acts and that what he was doing was wrong, he cannot be 
said to be suffering from the total alienation of reason in regard to the crime with which 
he is charged which the defence requires. The sheriff found ... that the respondent's 
ability to reason the consequences of his actions to himself was affected by his ingestion 
of the drug. The finding narrates that he was unable to take account in his actions of the 
fact that they were criminal in character and to refrain from them. But this inability to 
exert self-control, which the sheriff has described as an inability to complete the 
reasoning process, must be distinguished from the essential requirement hat there 
should be total alienation of the accused's mental faculties of reasoning and of 
understanding what he is doing. As in the case of provocation, which provides another 
example of a stimulus resulting in a loss of self-control at the time of the act, this may 
mitigate the offence but it cannot be held to justify an acquittal on the ground that there 
is an absence of mens rea. 36 
In his commentary on Cardle v Mulrainey, Gordon presents three alternative interpretations of 
this decision: 
Is the High Court saying (a) that the definition of insanity in Kidd was wrong insofar as 
it accepted that an inability to apply one's reason to control one's action was relevant, 
where that inability was due to mental illness; (b) that such an inability was irrelevant in 
the case of non-insane automatism only, or (c) that only a total inability so to control 
one's conduct was relevant in either case, and the sheriff was not entitled on the facts of 
the instant case to hold that such a total inability was present (or even that it was not 
35 1992 SCCR 658,665. Quoting from HMAdvocate v Kidd 1960 JC 60,71 (Lord Strachan). It is because of 
judgment in Kidd that Seats law has been said to recognise an insanity defence of irresistible impulse, 
rejected by the M'Naghten Rules and the courts in England 
36 1992 SCCR 658,668 
93 
proved to be absent)? " 
If (a) was accepted then in Gordon's view Scottish law had moved towards an acceptance of 
the M'Naghten rules and that, like the House of Lords, the High Court was rejecting the idea 
that the ability to exercise self control through reasoning was relevant to the defence of 
automatism 
Laurie examines Gordon's concerns regarding Cardle v Mulrainey and its treatment of the test 
of `total alienation of reason' with regard to automatism cases. Laurie considers that the 
application of Cardle v Mulrainey in the subsequent case of Carrington v HMAdvocate38 has 
affected the development of Scots law. In his view, ̀ [t]he reliance placed on the appellant's 
knowledge of events moves the concept of "total alienation of reason" one step closer to 
McNaghten. ' He sees this as a move away from the traditional meaning attributed to the 
concept. In Scotland it `has been treated more as a control-based or volitional test. ' He raises 
objection to this change of emphasis: `Moreover, the apparent move from an objective to 
subjective standard is not in keeping with Scottish tradition. '" The basic thrust of his argument 
is that this change of emphasis has occurred since the consideration of a non-insane automatism 
defence in Scotland. This is interesting, what Laurie is claiming is that the defence of insanity 
has altered because of the acceptance in Ross of a non-insane automatism defence. In England 
the approach taken to claims of automatism also changed the defence of insanity by widening 
the definition given to disease of the mind, in order to retain control over those who claimed 
automatism and who, like Kemp and Sullivan, were seen to have acted in a dangerous manner. 40 
Finally the approach taken to driving in Scotland is substantially different from that in England 
because it places an emphasis, in driving cases, on the culpability of the defendant. It considers 
whether she knew that an automatistic episode was likely to occur whilst she was driving. In 
37 1992 SCCR 669-70. Emphasis in original 
38 1994 SCCR 567 
39 LAURIE, G. T. 1995. Automatism and Insanity in the Laws of England and Scotland. (1995) 3 Juridical 
Review 253-65. All quotations p. 263 
40 See the discussion of in chapter 2 of Rv Kemp p. 45 and Rv Sullivan p. 53-8 
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MacLeod v Mathieson, 4' the criminal liability of a diabetic was considered. Mathieson had 
suffered a hypoglycaemic episode when driving causing him to crash into two cars, killing the 
driver of one of the cars. 
But the question in this case is whether a person should be held still to be ̀ driving' after 
the onset of an undetected attack, knowing that he is liable to have hypoglycaemic 
attacks, the onset of some of which he will not be able to detect. It may be a factor of 
some importance that he drove on his own. If he drives in those circumstances and if 
such an attack occurs, it is not obvious that he must be regarded as not responsible for 
the result of any ensuing accident. If the charge is one of careless driving, he will have 
been charged with driving without due care and attention and without reasonable 
consideration for other persons using the road. 42 
The Sheriff concluded that Mathieson did know that he was prone to hypoglycaemic attacks, 
and knew that they could occur without warning and therefore the defence of automatism was 
not available to him. "' The case commentary highlights two issues: firstly that the case is an 
`example of the doctrine of actio libera in causa ... The accused may not have been driving at 
the time of the incident, but his liability like that of a drunken man depends on his state of mind 
before he lost control of his actings. ' Secondly it assumes `that hypoglycaemia is a proper basis 
for a defence of automatism, although Ross suggests this is not the case. '4' Laurie takes the 
view that the automatism in this case went to actus reus. He comments: 
the sheriff acknowledged that the defence might be available to someone who suffers 
such an attack if they had previous knowledge of their condition. That is, such a person 
would not be ̀ driving' under the terms of the Act. This implies the defence can affect 
actus reus. This is to be contrasted with the decision in Ross in which it was held that 
automatism affects mens rea. as 
Thus the approach in Scotland has largely been to restrict the defence to cases where the 
existence of automatism means the prosecution fails to prove mens rea, with the exception of 
Mathieson where the defence was seen as relevant to actus reus. This differs from the approach 
41 1993 SCCR 488 hearing at Sheriffs Court Perth 
42 1993 SCCR 488,491. Emphasis in original 
43 1993 SCCR 488,492 
44 1993 SCCR 488,492 
45 LAURIE, G. T. 1995. p. 264. Emphasis in original 
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stated by the courts in England where, in the main, the court's attention focusses on the ̀ act', 
rather than mens rea in determining claims of automatism" Additionally the High Court in 
Scotland in many of the cases discussed above has been dealing with claims of automatism 
based on involuntary intoxication. In England this defence has been treated separately from 
automatism and in Kingston the defence was rejected by the House of Lords. However, in 
England and Wales there seems no reason why involuntary intoxication should not result in 
acquittal where the defendant asserts that involuntary intoxication prevented her from forming 
mens rea. 47 
It is not proposed to examine the other jurisdictions researched in the same detail as those of 
England, Wales and Scotland because of the constraints of space but rather to consider some of 
the landmark cases in which the internal/external distinction, policy considerations and the 
burden of proof issues have been dealt with by the courts in Australia, New Zealand and 
Canada. American case law will be considered separately for the contrasts it provides to the 
approaches adopted by the law in the other jurisdictions. One thing that is noticeable about the 
discussions in these jurisdictions is the lack of agreement between those sitting in judgment on 
these issues. There are frequently dissenting judgements something which is rare in the 
consideration of such cases in the courts of England and Wales, and Scotland. 
In England and Wales the policy of protecting public safety has been of paramount concern, and 
in Scotland concern that the public should be protected from those who cannot control their 
actions has also been expressed. The assimilation of automatism with insanity by the breadth of 
the definition given to disease of the mind was a response to this pressure. In England and 
Wales and in Scotland the response has been the use of the internal/external distinction in 
allocating criminal responsibility. Other jurisdictions have faced similar problems regarding the 
borderline between insanity and automatism. 
46 See for example Bratty v. Attorney General for Northern Ireland [ 1963] AC 386, at 409: 
`No act is punishable if it is done involuntarily and an involuntary ad in this context -some people 
nowadays prefer to speak of it as ̀automatism' - means an act which is done by the muscles without 
any control by the mind, such as a spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion; or an act done by a person 
who is not conscious of what he is doing, such as an act done whilst suffering from concussion or 
whilst sleep-walking. ' (Lord Denning) 
47 Rv Kingston [ 1994] 3 WLR 519,525. Such a defendant would escape liability on the first of the grounds 
detailed by Lord Mustill `that his immunity flows from general principles of the criminal law. ' For a 
discussion of the status of involuntary intoxication in English law see SMITH, J. C. 1999. p. 219 
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New Zealand case law 
Chronologically it seems appropriate to start this section with the consideration of the case of 
Rv Cottle. "' The purpose of the discussion of automatism by the court was to assist judges in 
the lower courts considering cases where automatism was raised. 
Both Gresson P. and North J. in their judgments considered the discussion of the determinants 
of criminal responsibility and irresponsibility as discussed by Sir Owen Dixon in his article, A 
Legacy of Hadfield, M'Naghten and Maclean. 49 The article had, inter alia, explored the 
difficulties posed by the automatism defence and discussed the two English cases of Kemp and 
Charlson. 
Dixon's article was critical of the M'Naghten rules in that he argued that they had pushed the 
courts in ̀ a strange direction'. One of the grounds for the attack on the M'Naghten Rules arose 
from his consideration of the case of Kemp. The report stated that: ̀ [i]t was common ground 
that at the time of the attack the prisoner did not know the nature and quality of the act and that 
all the requirements of the M'Naghten Rules for establishing a defence of insanity were present, 
save that the question whether the prisoner was suffering from a disease of the mind was in 
issue. 'I Dixon took particular issue with this view of the trial process and to the use of the 
M'Naghten Rules and the 1883 Trial of Lunatics Act in this way. His view was that the purpose 
of a criminal trial had been subverted, in that the court's focus of attention had become whether 
the defendant's plea was one of insane or non-insane automatism. He saw the argument in the 
case as centred upon the meaning of `disease of the mind' as defined by the rules. In his opinion 
the Crown case was not that the defendant was guilty but that he was not guilty by reason of 
insanity within the M'Naghten Rules. Dixon disapproved of this focus: 
In other words, what in the terminology once in use, appeared to be a criminal inquest 
was not in truth held to determine the guilt of the prisoner but was an inquiry into the 
question whether he should be held as a criminal lunatic. Is that to be a purpose of 
48 [1958] NZLR 999 NZ (CA). Considered by the House of Lords in Bratty v AG for Northern Ireland [ 1963] 
AC 386,398 and 401 
49 (1957) 31 ALJ255-66 
50 DIXON, O. cites (1956) 40 Cr App R 121,122 
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indicting or presenting a man? Perhaps the form of verdict prescribed by the Trial of 
Lunatics Act 1883 has brought about this peculiar result. For I think that in an 
Australian Court it would sound odd if a Prosecutor for the Queen opened to the jury 
that he did not say the prisoner was guilty of the crime for which he had been placed in 
charge, and that it was common ground that by reason of his defect of understanding at 
the time he was incapable of committing it, but the question for the jury was whether the 
acquittal should be outright or on the ground of the prisoner's insanity. " 
Dixon goes on to consider the question underlying the decisions in Charlson and Kemp: 
But there is a deeper question. Did the common law give room for the exculpation of a 
man on the ground that through his mental condition at the time of the commission of 
the overt acts he was incapable of the requisite state of mind unless he made out what 
we now call a plea of insanity? " 
If this question was answered in the affirmative the result was the creation of a new and 
separate head of incapacity. ̀Stated in another form, it is whether, in defiance of basal legal 
principle, a ground of exculpation has not been divided into two categories, separated quite 
arbitrarily and against principle, by nothing more than the misuse of the formula. '" The formula 
being the M'Naghten Rules. Dixon preferred a return to the pre 1843 law which he saw as a 
more principled approach to the question of criminal responsibility. The English Court of 
Appeal in Sullivan took a similar approach seeing advantages in the ̀ pre-1800 common law 
concept of insanity' which ̀ took in acts brought about through the absence of relevant brain 
fimction. 'I However, the House of Lords in Sullivan held that it was not necessary to 
investigate ̀the pre 1843 position'. The M'Naghten Rules applied "in all cases" in which it is 
sought "to establish a defence on the grounds of insanity"'. " 
Gresson P. echoed Dixon's concerns. In his opinion it was the nature of the M'Naghten rules 
which caused the problem. He made a sustained attack on the suitability of the rules for 
application to cases where lack of consciousness is claimed. it is commonplace that the 
51 DIXON, O. 1957. p. 259 
52 DIXON, O. 1957. p. 259 
53 DIXON, O. 1957. p. 261 
54 [1983] 1 All ER 577,581 
55 [1983] 2 All ER 673,676 
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M'Naghten Rules have never provided an adequate or satisfactory test in cases where the 
mentality of the accused shows some departure from the normal. " 
With the passage of years, their application has become increasingly difficult in the light 
of modern knowledge and understanding, and because of the variety of forms of mental 
alienation, sometimes transient, which can occur negativing volition. The law in making 
it essential to a finding of insanity that the mental condition of the accused should be 
such as not to understand the nature and quality of his act, or not to know that it was 
wrong has imposed positive tests which are difficult to apply where the mind of the doer 
of the act did not function in control of the action. It is almost impossible, and certainly 
highly unsatisfactory, to apply the principles which were formulated, to cases where 
there has been no consciousness of the act at all as in ̀ blackout', which is usually of 
short duration, or in cases in which there is some behaviour of which the doer is not 
conscious, commonly called ̀automatism', which may extend over hours. ... 
We must 
accept the position as it is, but we cannot escape the difficulty that the M'Naghten Rules 
were never intended to apply to a case where the act was done without volition or 
consciousness of doing it. 
Furthermore in his view there was no need to invoke the M'Naghten rules in such a case ̀since 
the absence of knowledge of doing an act is itself sufficient to negative intent. '57 This is similar 
to the argument put forward by Sullivan's counsel, rejected by the House of Lords, that 
functional impairment should not merit an insanity verdict, though counsel's argument was 
based upon lack of an ̀ act' rather than lack of intent. 
In considering what might constitute a ̀ disease of the mind', Cresson P. saw the length of the 
period of automatism suffered by an accused as relevant to whether the disability which causes 
the automatism should be classified as a disease of the mind. ̀ The adverse effect upon the mind 
of something happening, e. g, a blow, hypnotism, absorption of a narcotic, or extreme 
intoxication all producing an effect more or less transitory cannot fairly be regarded as 
amounting to or as producing "disease of the mind"'. Sg Cresson P. does not draw attention to 
the fact that all of these effects might be regarded as a cause external to the accused. 
For him the M'Naghten Rules applied in such cases if the conduct of the accused arose from a 
56 [1958] NZLR 999,1008 
57 [1958] N. Z. L. R 999. Both quotations 1009 
58 [1958] NZLR 999,1011 
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disease of the mind - `a term which defies precise definition and which can comprehend a mental 
derangement in the widest sense whether due to some condition of the brain itself and so to 
have its origin in the brain, or whether due to the effect on the brain of something outside the 
brain e. g. arteriosclerosis. ' Where automatism was put forward as a defence then the court had 
to decide whether a finding of insanity based upon whether ̀mental disease in some form or 
other is present. 'S9 Therefore, Gresson P. saw medical evidence as playing an important role in 
the court's deliberations, where intent was part of the offence and the accused claimed it was 
absent: 
because the accused had no consciousness of his action, there must be an acquittal 
unless the Crown in discharge of its onus of proof, satisfies the jury that the accused did 
act consciously and with volition. Mental dissociation from action can arise from various 
causes. If it `appears on the evidence' that it arises from disease of the mind, a finding of 
insanity would be permissible. ' 
North J. also considered Dixon's article and expressed his concern at the idea of a ̀ new and 
separate head of incapacity': 
Now, however, it is asserted that it is competent for counsel for the prisoner to seek ̀a 
complete and unqualified acquittal notwithstanding the fact that the prisoner relies on his 
mental incapacity to know the nature of his act', to quote the words of Sir Owen 
Dixon. This, it is said, can be achieved by the simple expedient of not pleading 
temporary insanity and relying on the statement of the law laid down in Woolmington 'c 
case, that it is the duty of the Crown to prove the existence of a criminal intent on the 
part of the accused. This is a rather startling proposition, and it seems to me to threaten 
the very foundation of the criminal law. " 
The approach in England has been to accept that there is an automatism defence but to regulate 
that defence by subsuming it in large part into the insanity defence. Similarly, North J. saw 
epilepsy, the alleged cause of the criminal behaviour in the case which was the subject of appeal, 
as a disease of the mind. Referring to the detention of the insane he made the following 
comment concerning public safety: 
59 [1958] NZLR 999,1011. All quotations 
60 [1958] NZLR 999,1012-1013 
61 [1958] NZLR 999,1027 
100 
The object of s. 31 is not to punish the prisoner. In this country the verdict is still one of 
not guilty. The purpose of the section is to ensure that persons who commit crimes are 
not set free for what such a person has done he may do again if he is left at large. The 
public interest therefore requires that he should be detained. 62 
In North J. 's judgment the question of whether evidence of automatism raised issues of insanity 
was a ̀ question of law for the Judge. '63 As to the matter of intent it might be possible for a 
defendant o demonstrate that he had not formed the specific intent necessary for a particular 
criminal offence. North J. considers the burden of proof in automatism cases and concludes that 
following Woolmington the defence might lead evidence regarding the defendant's state of mind 
at the time of the criminal act, ̀ without relieving the prosecution from the obligation to prove in 
the end all the facts necessary to establish guilt. "' However, the public interest required the 
question of whether the accused was insane to be considered where the nature of the evidence 
in the case required that it should be. Thus following Cottle the New Zealand courts accepted 
the possibility of a defence of automatism The defence was seen as relying very much on the 
medical evidence presented. The New Zealand and English approaches are similar in viewing 
the public interest as requiring the issue of insanity to be taken into consideration when the 
defence of automatism is raised. This may be contrasted with the approach adopted by Lord 
Hope in Ross. 
In Rv Burr-65 the New Zealand Court of Appeal further considered the borderline between 
insanity and automatism. In looking at the cases where intent is a necessary ingredient for 
criminal liability North P. considered what must be established for a defence of automatism to 
succeed: 
It is not sufficient that the medical evidence suggests that the appellant's mind was not 
fully functioning and that he had an imperfect appreciation of the nature and quality of 
his act. To allow such a plea to be submitted to a jury in a case like this would be 
dangerous in the highest degree. It would be quite contrary to the view the law has 
always adopted in the case of an insane person for he is liable unless he is able to meet 
62 [1958] NZLR 999,1029 
63 [1958] NZLR 999,1028 
64 [1958] NZLR 999,1026 
65 [1969] NZLR 736 
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the tests laid down in the McNaghten rules, which ... are now enshrined 
in our Crimes 
Act. I think it should be made plain that when Lord Denning speaks of `an act which is 
done by the muscles without any control by the mind', he does not mean that the 
accused person must be absolutely unconscious because you cannot move a muscle 
without a direction given by the mind. What his Lordship in my opinion was saying is 
that all the deliberative functions of the mind must be absent so that the accused person 
acts automatically. 66 
By way of contrast in England it is not the presence of deliberative functions which has been 
considered but rather lack of consciousness. It is this stress on the deliberative capabilities of a 
defendant claiming automatism which has led to a distinctly different approach to the defence of 
automatism in New Zealand than that adopted in the other jurisdictions which have been 
researched for this thesis. 
Further Developments in New Zealand case law. 
The issue of automatism was again considered this time by the High Court in the case of Police 
v Bannin. 67 The defendant was tried and convicted of three charges of `unlawfully entering a 
building with intent to commit crime therein and one of assault upon a fenmale. ' The defence 
case was that the accused lacked intent and thus he was a non-insane automaton. The basis of 
the claim was that Bannin committed the offences with which he was charged whilst suffering 
from Kleine-Levin Syndrome. ". The trial judge had ruled that neither automatism or insanity 
were available to the defendant. 
The judge in the High Court, Fisher J., was critical of the traditional approach to automatism. 
He concluded that the cause of the appellant's behaviour was internal, therefore if Bannirr had 
an automatism plea it would be insane automatism Having considered the English case of Rv 
66 [19691 NZLR 736,745 
67 [1991] 2 NZLR 237 
68 [1991] 2 NZLR 237,241 
`The accused suffered from a neurological disorder known as "Kleine-Levin Syndrome". Several 
times a year the accused would have periodic episodes of prolonged sleep and sleepiness. Each 
such period would be followed by a period of several days during which his behaviour would 
initially be abnormal but would progressively return to normal. The incidents in question 
occurred during one of these periods of abnormal behaviour. '
The disorder was one which Bannin would grow out of and therefore the risk of recurrence would 
reduce as he grew older 
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T, ' where the plea was based on a dissociative episode following rape, he said: ̀ I think that 
while "unconscious involuntary action" will suffice as the test for obvious automatism cases, 
something more sophisticated will be needed for marginal ones. ' Referring to Rv Burr he 
commented that in New Zealand it was accepted that "`total unconsciousness" is not necessary 
for the defence. It is sufficient if "all deliberative functions of the mind are absent"'. Fisher J. 
looked at the basis of the automatism defence in New Zealand and said: 
In my view, the true foundation for automatism lies in the mental elements of the 
particular crime with which the accused is charged. The physical ingredients of the crime 
must be voluntarily performed (traditionally the ̀ actus reus') and there must also be 
those additional mental requirements of knowledge, belief, purpose, intention and/or 
recklessness necessary to complete the crime (traditionally the ̀ mens rea'). If the 
accused lacks the capacity to form any one of the mental elements necessary to the 
crime charged, the prosecution must fail, whether or not other definitions of automatism 
apply. Equally, if the accused displays those mental elements, then in my view 
qualification for `automatism' in any other sense will avail him naught. 
For this purpose I think it immaterial whether the mental deficiency relates to the actus 
reus or the mens rea or both. 70 
He does not at this point seem to be proposing a test such as that employed in Scotland, of 
`total alienation of reason', or Gresson P. 's test that `all the functions of the mind must be 
absent. ' What seems to be relevant in Fisher J. 's test is lack of capacity to form any one of the 
mental elements of the crime charged. This would seem to include states where there is some 
deliberative function. It is not clear what such an approach adds to the normal requirement that 
the Crown must prove its case. Unless Fisher J. is suggesting that voluntariness must be 
included within each of the mens rea categories. However his later reasoning suggests that this 
is not the case. He does stress that his test should only be used in marginal cases. The test he 
proposes links the concept of automatism in marginal cases to a test of three different types of 
capacity which Fisher J. examined in some detail: 
First, he must have been capable of perceiving, bringing into his conscious mind, and 
considering, those aspects of reality which set the scene before and during the crime and 
which were essential to it. This is not awareness in the abstract. It is awareness of the 
particular facts essential to the crime charged.... The mental capacity required for a 
69 [1990] Crim LR 256 
70 [1991] 2 NZLR 237,250. All quotations 
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more complicated crime - eg uttering a forged document - would have been more 
n taxing. 
From this it appears that Fisher J. is rejecting the approach of Lord Denning in Bratty, ̀ [n]or is 
an act to be regarded as involuntary simply because it is unintentional or its consequences 
unforeseen. 'n This raises a problem with regard to `actions' which occur through habit without 
conscious information processing but which have unintentional and unforeseen results. Fisher J. 
continued his description of automatism stating that the more complex the crime the more 
mental processes are involved. That is one of the reasons why the defence of automatism must 
be strongly anchored in the mental elements of the particular crime charged. ' No justification is 
given for this reasoning. His second test is that: 
... each of the actions constituting the crime 
had to be voluntary in the sense that it was 
preceded by a decision to take that action. Theoretically, a decision to act implies that 
the accused had the capacity to exercise several decision making functions. He must 
have been able to appreciate in advance - however momentarily - the possibility that he 
could act in the way which in fact followed. To decide to do something necessarily 
involves contemplation of the future. He must have had the capacity - not necessarily 
exercised - to contemplate the possibility of innocent alternatives. In the present case, he 
had to have the mental capacity to consider staying away from the complainant had that 
idea occurred to him. Only then could it be said that he had had the capacity to exercise 
a choice. He must have had the capacity to then convert the contemplated course of 
action into the mental commitment to proceed with it. Finally, he must have had the 
capacity to then issue the appropriate motor commands. ' 
This description is someway removed from automatic acts being performed in an unconscious 
or partially conscious state. It seems to be an attempt to assess whether acts were purposeful. 
Describing what makes action purposeful is something to which philosophers have given much 
thought and leads back to the somewhat vexed question of free will, Fisher J. talks of the 
capacity to take decisions rather than the capacity to act. There is much debate concerning 
whether individual decisions to act are taken in the manner he described. "
71 [ 1991 ]2 NZLR 237,252 
72 Bratty v Attorney General for Northern Ir+ela d[ 1963] AC 386,409 
73 [1991] 2 NZLR 237. All quotations 252 
74 For a discussion of what it means to `act' see chapter 4 and more generally MOORE, M. 1993 
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He argues that a decision to act implies ̀several decision making functions' and that the accused 
`must have been able to appreciate in advance - however momentarily - the possibility that he 
could act in the way which in fact followed' This may be an intuitive view of what it is to act. 
However, not every action involves a decision prior to acting. Habitual actions such as carrying 
out routine tasks may not involve conscious appreciation. However, they should be 
distinguished from the actions of the automaton. This is because the habitual actor if halted in 
the middle of the task would not find her action inappropriate. The capacity to control action 
still remains. Choice in this sense is more limited than that expressed by Fisher J.. He must have 
been able to appreciate in advance - however momentarily - the possibility that he could act in 
the way which in fact followed. ' This description could permit the habitual actor, who did not 
consciously consider his action in advance, to claim automatism. 
Thirdly and finally, before an accused could be found guilty he would have to have had 
the capacity to satisfy any other elements of the particular mens rea involved in the 
charge. In some cases, of which this assault charge is an example, that would add 
nothing to the awareness and decision-making capacities to which I have already 
referred. In others there will be additional requirements of intention, belief, purpose, 
recklessness or carelessness before the charge would be sustained. In the present case, 
the unlawful entry charge required the capacity to appreciate that the house belonged to 
someone else and also the capacity to form at the time of entry the ulterior intent of 
locating and assaulting the complainant. 75 
The elements talked of here seem to be the mental elements required by the offence. According 
to Fisher J. the raising of evidence of automatism will not of itself be sufficient to avoid criminal 
liability in borderline cases. Fisher J. would apply his three tests in order to gauge whether the 
accused had sufficient capacity. Automatism is not being assessed in the abstract. In effect what 
is being asserted here is that the prosecution must prove all the mental elements of the crime, 
when the defence of automatism is raised. In this sense in borderline cases of automatism the 
definition is wider than the English test in that the court will proceed to examine whether 
automatism prevented the defendant from having mens rea in cases where the English court 
might reject the defence altogether. 
However, the traditional automatism defence is fundamental precisely because there is no 
awareness of surroundings, circumstances or knowledge of bodily movements at the time of the 
75 [ 1991 ]2 NZLR 237,252-3 
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offence. The idea that Fisher J. 's third test is dependent upon the variety of mens rea required 
for the offence which was committed, removes the core notion that voluntariness is fundamental 
to criminal liability. It requires that the test of automatism will vary according to the complexity 
of the mens rea requirement for the crime charged. 
Fisher J. sees this as the strength of his approach: 
A common way of approaching automatism is to define automatism itself, and then to 
see whether the accused falls within that preconceived definition, rather than to start 
with the mental elements of the crime charged and then to see whether the accused lacks 
the capacity to satisfy those elements in the instant case. In the finish, there should be no 
difference in the result. But I cannot help thinking that the debate over differing levels of 
consciousness, and the possibility of consciousness without voluntariness, has not been 
assisted by the tendency to concentrate upon automatism as though it had a life of its 
own. The ultimate question is not whether the case falls within a preconceived definition 
of automatism or is mentally incapacitated to some preconceived extent. There is little 
point in addressing mental states in the abstract. Automatism as a concept is no better 
than a negative and indirect route to the question that really matters. The question is 
whether the accused has retained sufficient mental capacity to reach the threshold 
required for the particular crime with which he is charged. That threshold will vary from 
one type of crime to another. It will be affected by the reasons for which a particular 
class of conduct was proscribed by the law, the implied statutory intention as to the level 
at which citizens should be held responsible for their conduct, and the way in which the 
law has defined the crime. In short, the focus should lie upon the elements of the 
charge. 76 
On this view automatism ceases to play its traditional role in determining criminal liability and 
becomes a defence tied to diminished capacity. This could be contrasted with the approach in 
Scotland which requires ̀total alienation of reason'. Therefore, in Scotland, the standard 
required of the defendant remains constant irrespective of the mess rea requirements of the 
offence with which she is charged. In Scotland the mens rea requirement of a crime only 
become relevant if the plea of automatism fails. 
In terms of what might constitute a sufficient standard to fulfill the three tests of capacity 
Fisher J. says: 
So long as the accused had the capacity to exercise those three functions in some 
76 [1991] 2 NZLR 237,251 
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degree, I do not think any particular standard had to be achievable. " 
Fisher J. rejected any general diminished responsibility defence, and concluded that the defence 
of automatism is not available to Bannire His decision revolved around the issue of intent. He 
narrowed the focus of the defence by excluding compulsive urges ̀[f]reedom of choice in the 
special sense that the mind is free from compulsive urges is not an essential element of intent. 
Its absence will not support the defence of automatism. ' He concluded: 
To summarise, the defence of automatism can be reduced to the question whether at the 
material time the accused had the mental capacity to form the particular mental 
ingredients of the crime with which he is charged. For this purpose, no distinction is to 
be drawn between sane and insane automatism. That distinction affects only the onus of 
proof and the ultimate disposition of the case. The mental ingredients of the crime will 
vary from one case to another but in every case the accused must have (i) some 
appreciation of each of the key facts relevant to the crime, (ii) some capacity to make a 
decision to act with respect to those facts and (iii) some capacity to form each of the 
residual mental elements of the particular mens rea involved. It will be no defence that 
those capacities might be severely impaired, that normal inhibitions might be absent or 
that there might be a compulsive urge to act in that way. ' 
His discussion of automatism and intention is interesting in that it raises many of the issues 
which need to be considered, for example how should apparently purposeful acts be judged? 
But it also points to an underlying tension within the law as he expresses it. How is it possible, 
even hypothetically, that automatism may be relevant to unlawful entry and not to assault? If 
automatism excuses a defendant how can it be of a varying standard with regard to different 
offences committed at the same time? If automatism relates to absence of voluntariness this is 
not sustainable, either voluntariness is absent or it is not; the decision cannot be dependent on 
the offence committed. The New Zealand courts have referred to and employed the three part 
test in subsequent cases. " However, the third test as proposed by the New Zealand High Court 
seems to alter the basis of the automatism defence to the point that it is questionable whether in 
the cases which Fisher J. refers to as ̀ marginal' voluntariness remains fundamental to criminal 
liability- 
77 [199112 NZLR 237. All quotations 254-5 
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The Australian and Canadian courts have had similar difficulties with cases where defendants 
have claimed an automatism defence, particularly when the defence is based upon automatism 
due to a dissociative state. The argument advanced here is that a psychological shock caused 
the defendant o dissociate. The claim is then made that such a shock is an external factor 
causing the accused to enter a state akin to automatism. It will be recalled that in England and 
Wales an automatism defence based on a severe shock was accepted by the trial judge but on 
the facts was rejected by the jury in RvT; and in Hennessy ̀stress anxiety and depression' were 
not in themselves either separately or together ̀capable in law of causing or contributing to a 
state of automatism. ' 
Canadian case law 
In Rabey the Canadian Supreme Court considered psychological shock when hearing a claim of 
automatism by a student who had attacked a girl with whom he was said to be infatuated. 80 The 
court confirmed that the distinction in Canada was based upon whether the automatic episode 
had an external or internal cause. The defendant claimed that he was in a dissociative state due 
to the stress and disappointment occasioned by the manner of his rejection by the girl. Ritchie J. 
rejected this as an external cause of automatism and stated: 
In my view, the ordinary stresses and disappointments of life which are the common lot 
of mankind do not constitute an external cause constituting an explanation for a 
malfunctioning of the mind which takes it out of the category of a ̀ disease of the mind'. 
To hold otherwise would deprive the concept of an external factor of any real meaning. 
In my view, the emotional stress suffered by the respondent as a result of his 
disappointment with respect to Miss X cannot be said to be an external factor producing 
the automatism within the authorities, and the dissociative state must be considered as 
having its source primarily in the respondent's psychological or emotional make-up. I 
conclude, therefore, that, in the circumstances of this case, the dissociative state in 
which the respondent was said to be constituted a ̀ disease of the mind'. '' 
In his dissenting judgment, Dickson J. expresses the sane concern as that expressed by the 
English Court of Appeal in Quick, and states Canadian law requires as a matter of principle that 
80 Rabey v The Queen [1980] 2 SCR 513 
81 [ 1980] 2 SCR 513,520 reiteraffig the words of Martin J. A. on hearing Rabey's case in the Ontario Court 
of Appeal 
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`no person should be committed to a hospital for the criminally insane unless he suffers from 
disease of the mind in need of treatment or likely to recur. '82 In his view there was no indication 
that Rabey required such treatment. Dickson J. acknowledges that there are policy 
considerations when dealing with a defence based upon dissociation. 
Automatism as a defence is easily feigned. It is said the credibility of our criminal justice 
system will be severely strained if a person who has committed a violent act is allowed 
an absolute acquittal on a plea of automatism arising from a psychological blow. The 
argument is made that the success of the defence depends upon the semantic ability of 
psychiatrists, tracing a narrow path between the twin shoals of criminal responsibility 
and an insanity verdict. Added to these concerns is the in terrorem argument hat the 
floodgates will be raised if psychological blow automatism is recognized in law. 
There are competing policy interests. Where the condition is transient rather than 
persistent, unlikely to recur, not in need of treatment and not the result of self-induced 
intoxication, the policy objectives in finding such a person insane are not served. Such a 
person is not a danger to himself or to society generally' 
In Dickson J. 's opinion there was nothing to support the view that Rabey's dissociation had an 
internal cause. Also, as sanity was to be presumed, it was for the Crown to displace that 
presumption in the presentation of its evidence. ̀[I]t lay upon the Crown to establish that the 
appellant suffered from a disease of the mind at the time of the attack. The existence of the 
mental disease must be demonstrated in evidence. Here there is no such evidence from any of 
the expert or other witnesses with reference to the crucial period of the assault. '` He argued 
that the question as to whether a psychological blow was sufficient to cause a state of 
automatism was a question of fact to be left to the jury. 
Dickson J. objects to the internal/external distinction made by Martin J. A. in the Ontario Court 
of Appeal when hearing the appeal against Rabey's acquittal by the court of first instance. 
It is not clear to me why, as a matter of law, an emotional blow, which can be 
devastating, should be regarded as an external cause of automatism in some 
circumstances and an internal cause in others, as ... [Martin J. A. ] would seem to 
82 [1980] 2 SCR 513,546 
83 [1980) 2 SCR 513,546-7 
84 (198012 SCR 513 
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propose in this passage: 
`... I leave aside until it becomes necessary to decide them, cases where a 
dissociative state has resulted from emotional shock without physical injury, 
resulting from such causes, for example, as being involved in a serious accident 
although no physical injury has resulted; being the victim of a murderous attack 
with an uplifted knife, notwithstanding the victim has managed to escape 
physical injury; seeing a loved one murdered or seriously assaulted, and the like 
situations. Such extraordinary external events might reasonably be presumed to 
affect the average normal person without reference to the subjective make-up of 
the person exposed to such experience. ' 
I cannot accept the notion that an extraordinary external event, i. e. an intense emotional 
shock, can cause a state of dissociation or automatism, if and only if all normal persons 
subjected to that sort of shock would react in that way. If I understand the quoted 
passage correctly, an objective standard is contemplated for one of the possible causes 
of automatism, namely, psychological blow, leaving intact the subjective standard for 
other causes of automatism, such as physical blow, or reaction to drugs. "
The essence of Dickson's argument seems to be that if automatism is raised in evidence, then 
what is in question is whether the defendant was an automaton and not some objective standard 
at which automatism might normally be said to occur. There are problems for the courts 
however, not only in framing a legal definition of automatism but also because of the policy 
difficulties which surround the defence. This is a question which has been faced by the courts in 
Australia as well as Canada. Additionally there is the question of what should be done with a 
defendant whose dissociation is separated from the event that caused the dissociation or if the 
dissociation and behaviour associated with it recurs. If someone with a potential to dissociate 
does so frequently then should the defence of automatism be available to them with the ensuing 
acquittal? " 
Australian case law 
In the Australian case of Falconers' the defendant was a woman who had kMed her husband. 
She claimed that these events happened whilst she was in a dissociative state. There was 
85 [198012 SCR 513,548 
86 For discussion of the problems urrounding psychological blow automatism see MACKAY, R. D. 1995. 
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evidence presented at trial that her husband had abused her and their children, and that he had 
sexually assaulted her on the day on which she killed hirn. 
The relevant law was contained in the Western Australian Criminal Code. Section 23 stated ̀a 
person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission which occurs independently of the 
exercise of his will'. Section 26 provided ̀Every person is presumed to be of sound mind, and 
to have been of sound mind at any time which comes in question, until the contrary is proved'. 
And s 27 stated that `A person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission if at the time 
of doing the act or making the omission he is in such a state of mental disease or natural mental 
infirmity as to deprive him of capacity to understand what he is doing, or of capacity to control 
his actions, or of capacity to know that he ought not to do the act or make the omission'. The 
question before the Australian High Court was whether evidence relating to the voluntariness of 
her actions should have been considered by the court of first instance as supporting the 
assertion that the shooting had ̀ occurred independently of her will' and thus satisfied s 23 of the 
Criminal Code. The High Court was asked to determine how the common law related to the 
Western Australian Criminal Code. " The Crown argued that in Falconer's case s 23 related to 
s 27 via the medium of s 26. Thus in effect the presumption of sanity expressed ins 26 could 
only be displaced by evidence of unsoundness of mind. On the basis of Rabey the Crown argued 
that where the blow was external, as in concussion, a defence of automatism was available, but 
where the cause of the blow was internal to the accused the only defence was disease of the 
mind. " 
The decision of the court was unanimous as to the ordering of a retrial of Falconer. They were 
also in agreement as to the existence of a defence of sane automatism90 under s 23 of the 
88 Before this Court, those questions were formulated by the Crown in the following way: `(a) whether 
involuntary acts performed in a state of dissociation resulting from emotional tension are excused by 
virtue of the operation of s. 23 of the Criminal Code (W. A. ); (b) the relationship between ss. 23,26 
and 27 of the Criminal Code where the normal functioning of the mind is disturbed by emotional 
tension; and (c) the application to the Criminal Code of common law decisions dealing with 
automatism and insanity as they affect criminal responsibility. ' Queen v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 
31,65 (Toohey J. ) For a case commentary see ELLARD, J. 1995. Some Notes on Non-insane 
Automatism and the Will. (1995) 69 ALJ 833-41 
89 (1990) 171 CLR 31,33 
90 In Falconer automatism is referred to both as sane or insane automatism (1990) 171 CLR 31,55 and as 
non-insane and insane automatism (1990) 171 CLR 31,77 depending upon which of the judges was 
giving judgment 
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Western Australian Criminal Code. But, three of the judges, a minority, favoured the 
introduction of an objective test based on soundness of mind in cases of psychological blow 
automatism. These judges, " having considered Lord Lane's comments in Hennessy' stated: 
`there seems to be no reason in principle why psychological trauma which produces a transient 
non-recurrent malfunction of an otherwise sound mind should be distinguished from a physical 
trauma which produces a like effect. That was the view of the minority in Rabey. i93 However, 
this acceptance of a psychological blow as a trigger to automatism was strictly limited, in their 
view, to cases where the mental malfunction was ̀ transient', the defendant's mind ̀ otherwise 
sound', the cause ̀trauma' and the ̀ malfunction is not likely to recur'. " The problem of 
distinguishing between an unsound and sound mind was discussed and the internal/external test 
was not utilised. The same three judges wanted to place a restriction on the availability of the 
defence by applying a reasonable man test to the tendency of the defendant o dissociate. 
The problem of classification in a case of a transient malfunction of the mind 
precipitated by psychological trauma lies in the difficulty in choosing between the 
reciprocal factors - the trauma and the natural susceptibility of the mind to affection by 
psychological trauma - as the cause of the malfunction. Is one factor or the other the 
cause or are both to be treated as causes? To answer this problem, the law must 
postulate a standard of mental strength which, in the face of a given level of 
psychological trauma, is capable of protecting the mind from malfunction to the extent 
prescribed i the respective definitions of insanity. That standard must be the standard of 
the ordinary person: if the mind's strength is below that standard, the mind is infirm; if it 
is of or above that standard, the mind is sound or sane. This is an objective standard 
which corresponds with the objective standard imported for the purpose of determining 
provocation. 
It was the idea of this type of test that Dickson J. found so problematic in Rabey. Particularly as 
no such objective test was applied to other types of automatism. 
Deane and Dawson JJ. agreed with Toohey J. that there was sufficient evidence to raise the 
91 Mason C. J., Brennan and McHugh JJ. 
92 Rv Hennessy [ 1989] 1 WLR 287,294 
93 Queen v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 31,54 
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question of voluntariness under the Western Australian Criminal Code. Toohey J. in his separate 
judgment addressed the issue raised by the Crown that the cause of Falconer's behaviour was 
primarily internal and thus a malfunction of the mind and concluded that there was no evidence 
which would bring her within the ambit of section 27 of the Western Australian code. ̀ [U]nless 
it be open to argument hat to be deprived of capacity to control one's actions through a 
dissociative state is itself evidence of a state of mental disease. " Later in his judgment he said, 
`there is no reason why shock cannot be the product of an emotional blow as much as the result 
of some external physical force. " 
In his judgment Toohey J., expressed strong doubts about the use of external and internal 
factors as a test of insanity: ̀[t]he application of the "external factor" test is artificial and pays 
insufficient regard to the subtleties surrounding the notion of mental disease. As well, there is 
confusion in the idea of an external factor. A physical blow will readily answer that 
description. '" For Toohey J. this did not explain why an externally caused shock could not 
precipitate automatism He adopted the argument made by King C. J. in Radford who stated 
that: 
There is no reason in principle for making a distinction between disturbance of the 
mental faculties by reason of stress caused by external factors and disturbance of the 
mental faculties caused by the effects of physical trauma or somnambulism. The 
significant distinction is between the reaction of an unsound mind to its own delusions 
or to external stimuli on the one hand and the reaction of a sound mind to external 
stimuli, including stress producing factors, on the other hand. I appreciate that if it is 
true that a state of depersonalization or dissociation is not itself a disease of the mind, 
although it may result from mental illness, the result may be that certain cases of 
unwilled acts which would formerly have been treated as the result of temporary insanity 
and would have founded verdicts of not guilty on the ground of insanity, will now result 
in outright acquittals. I do not see any reason to shrink from that consequence. The 
consequence of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is detention during the 
Governor's pleasure. If a person was not morally responsible for the action which is the 
subject of the charge because that action was an unwilled automatic act, he should not 
suffer conviction or punishment. If he is not mentally ill and there is therefore no reason 
to suppose that the act will be repeated, detention for the protection of others is 
96 (1990) 171 CLR 31,71 
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pointless and an embarrassment to the mental health authorities. " 
Toohey J. saw this as ̀the approach dictated by the relevant provisions of the Code"'. Thus 
`[d]issociation may warrant a conclusion that the act or omission in respect of which an accused 
is charged occurred independently of his or her will. "01 Such a conclusion in the case of 
Falconer led to her acquittal under section 23 of the Western Australian Criminal Code. 
However, if a jury were to accept that the Crown ̀ had disproved, beyond reasonable doubt 
non insane automatism', it may be because the acts ̀were the involuntary product of an 
unsound mind' in which case then the issue of soundness of mind must be considered. When a 
jury reached this conclusion then consideration should be given to whether ̀the accused had 
proved on, the balance of probabilities, insanity within the meaning of s. 27'. 1°2 
Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and Toohey, JJ. were agreed that under s 23 of the code the onus of 
disproving the defendant's case rested with the Crown once evidence of involuntariness had 
been raised. The minority took the view that the onus of proof of voluntariness only rested with 
the prosecution where the ̀ malfunction of the mind' was ̀ (I) transient (2) caused by trauma ... 
(3) not prone to recur' otherwise the malfunction was due to `mental infirmity'. Mental infirmity 
must be proved by the defendant on ̀ the balance of probabilities at the outset. ' Once proved the 
burden of proof should then revert to the prosecution. Otherwise the only defence available to 
the defendant would be insane automatism. In the minority's view this did not concern 
principles of criminal liability because the issue ̀is not one of criminal liability but the cause of 
the condition which deprived the accused of criminal responsibility. "' 
This last claim seems disingenuous to say the least, as Fairall points out: 
to suggest the issue ̀is not one of criminal responsibility' is untenable. Certainly the 
issue relates to a stage in the inquiry which requires classification of the cause of 
99 (1990) 171 CLR 31,76-77. Quoting from Rv Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266,276 
100 (1990) 171 CLR 31,76 
101 (1990)171 CLR 31,77 
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automatism (as sane or insane). But the classification may well determine the 
admissibility of evidence bearing upon the issues of intention and voluntariness. It is 
therefore directly relevant to criminal responsibility. 1°' 
Whilst Mason C. J., Brennan and McHugh JJ. favoured an objective test of soundness of mind 
the majority of the judges favoured a test based on soundness of mind. McSherry argues that 
this is ̀ rather more sophisticated than the internal/external distinction. ' She later admits ̀the 
main problem ... lies in distinguishing between the reaction of an unsound mind and that of a 
sound mind. "" This would seem to be an echo of the problems in English law in determining 
what might constitute disease of the mind. Gaudron J. also seems to favour a test to distinguish 
abnormal behaviour in normal persons from abnormal behaviour in persons of unsound mind: 
In general terms, a recurring state which involves some abnormality will indicate a mind 
that is diseased or infirm, but the fundamental distinction is necessarily between those 
mental states which, although resulting in abnormal behaviour, are or may be 
experienced by normal persons (as, for example and relevant to the issue of 
involuntariness, a state of mind resulting from a blow to the head) and those which are 
never experienced by or encountered in normal persons. 106 
The validity of the defendant's claim of involuntariness seems, in his view, to be based on 
whether such mental states as the accused may claim are experienced by normal persons. In 
Australia the test as to soundness of mind, in dissociative states is objective. 107 Therefore the 
Australian test has to answer the further problem raised by Dickson J. ̀ I cannot accept the 
notion that an extraordinary external event, i. e. an intense emotional shock, can cause a state of 
dissociation or automatism, if and only if all normal persons subjected to that sort of shock 
would react in that way"". 
One argument which has been put forward to justify the soundness of mind test is that in fact 
104 FAIRALL, P. A. 1993. Voluntariness, Automatism and Insanity. (1993) 17 Crim LJ 81-96 p. 91 
105 McSHERRY, B. 1998. Getting Away with Murder? (1998) 21 International Journal of Law and 
Psychiatry, 163-176. Both quotations p. 173 
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the objective test of soundness of mind is only relevant once it is decided that the defendant is 
not criminally responsible for his actions. Yeo argues that in Australia the test is utilised to 
determine `whether the accused should be acquitted or receive a special verdict and thereby be 
subject to compulsory medical treatment. "09 In this sense, Yeo sees the objective test as a 
measure of self control similar in form to the objective test used to assess the validity of a 
provocation defence. He feels the `invocation' of the `ordinary person test' in cases of 
automatism provides a `material advantage'. `The test imposes a rather formidable obstacle to a 
successful plea of sane automatism since the accused is measured against a person of ordinary 
self-control or temperament. ' "o 
This may in Yeo's view be a `material advantage', but it does not answer Dickson's argument. 
Additionally it does not sufficiently recognise the distinction between the two defences a point 
taken up by Fairall. He argues that ̀ [p]rovocation and automatism are quite distinct defences 
relating to quite different impairments of the will. ... A loss of self-control (as in provocation) 
does not imply a loss of the capacity for self-control (as in automatism). ' Fa call expresses an 
additional concern about the difficulties of applying such a test in a courtroom: ̀ the introduction 
of an objective standard must lead to the greater complication of jury trials. It requires a 
distinction to be drawn between evidence relevant to whether automatism occurred, and 
evidence relevant to whether an ordinary person would have experienced such a state. Some of 
the factors relevant to the ordinary person test would be relevant to the question of 
automatism'. "' 
It is argued that the test of invohmtariness does not need further and ever more complicated 
layers added to determining the guilt or innocence of the accused; but rather a simply expressed 
test which allows a determination of whether the accused is criminally responsible. Whilst 
soundness of mind may be a more sustainable concept than disease of the mind it will not 
remain so if the means of assessing soundness of mind become ever more complicated. Again 
the fundamental problem is that the courts seek to control the defence because of policy factors. 
109 YEO, S. M. H. 1992. Power of Self Control in Provocation and Automatism. (1992 ) 14 (3) Sydney Law 
Review 3-22, p. 4 
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The most obvious example of the influence of policy on definitions of mental disorder is the 
recent Supreme Court of Canada decision concerning automatism. 
Subsequent developments in the case law of Canada 
In Rv Stone"2 the Canadian courts reviewed the operation of the automatism defence. The 
appeal to the Canadian Supreme Court was against the trial judge's ruling that the only defence 
open to the defendant was insane automatism The accused had killed his wife. Stone claimed 
that his wife had verbally abused him for most of the day prior to the killing. His defence was 
threefold. Firstly that he was suffering from non-mental disorder automatism or secondly he was 
suffering from mental disorder automatism or thirdly that he should be allowed to plead 
provocation. The jury accepted the plea of provocation and Stone was convicted of 
manslaughter. He appealed to the Canadian Supreme Court on the grounds, inter alia, that the 
defence of non-mental disorder automatism should have been left to the jury. 
Of the nine judges sitting in judgment four concurred with the majority judgment given by 
Bastatrache J.. 13 He concluded that the defence of automatism described ̀a state of impaired 
consciousness, rather than unconsciousness, in which an individual though capable of action, 
has no voluntary control over that action. ""' 
Bastarache J. investigated the possibility of a single approach to all claims of automatism. He 
rejected differing standards for different types of automatism, ̀because there may be cases 
where the facts are simply not conducive to such strict categorization. " II He adopted La Forest 
J. 's two tasks for trial judges from Rv Parks. "' `First, he or she must assess whether a proper 
foundation for a defence of automatism has been established. ' Then ̀ if a proper evidentiary 
foundation has been established, the trial judge must next determine whether the condition 
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alleged by the accused is mental disorder or non mental disorder automatism"" 
He continued: ̀voluntariness, rather than consciousness, is the key legal element of automatistic 
behaviour'. "' This led him to review the burden of proof with relation to the assertion that the 
accused's act was involuntary. Bastarache J., with the support of the concurring judges then 
proceeded to change the burden of proof required to be met by the defence to establish that an 
accused's action was voluntary. The burden henceforth would be removed from the prosecution 
and placed on the defence to prove involuntariness on the balance of probabilities. This was the 
view of the minority in Falconer. In his judgment this reflected ̀the policy concerns which 
surround claims of automatism. "" He continued with his argument: 
The law presumes that people act voluntarily in order to avoid placing the onerous 
burden of proving voluntariness beyond reasonable doubt on the Crown. Like extreme 
drunkenness akin to automatism, genuine cases of automatism will be extremely rare. 
However, because automatism is easily feigned and all knowledge of its occurrence rests 
with the accused, putting a legal burden on the accused to prove involuntariness on a 
balance of probabilities is necessary to further the objective behind the presumption of 
voluntariness. In contrast, saddling the Crown with the legal burden of proving 
voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt actually defeats the purpose of the presumption 
of voluntariness. 120 
The tenor of the judgment is that because automatism is `easily feigned', policy reasons require 
the imposition of the change in the burden of proof. There is a strong dissenting judgment 
which will be considered, but this statement by Bastarache J. moves voluntariness in the 
Canadian defence away from having a fundamental role in determining criminal liability and 
treats it as a matter to be pleaded by the accused as a defence in the same manner as mental 
disorder. He said that this was because there was no justification for relegating policy 
considerations to the ̀ second stage of the automatism analysis to determine whether the 
condition alleged by the accused was mental disorder or non-mental disorder automatism' It 
seems that Bastarache J. was less concerned with the underlying determinants of criminal 
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responsibility than with the possibility that an automatism claim might be feigned. He seems to 
view the presumption of voluntariness as existing solely to assist the prosecution with their 
case. If he is right it seems odd that it is normally viewed as a rebuttable presumption. The 
Canadian Supreme Court in Parks took precisely the opposite view stating: ̀ [o]ur system of 
justice is predicated on the notion that only those who act voluntarily should be punished under 
the criminal law. "" This seems the more correct view and is supported by Fairall's comments, 
regarding the minority judgment in Falconer, ̀ to suggest he issue is not one of criminal 
responsibility is untenable. "' 
Bastarache J. provides his own framework for the assessment by the jury of expert evidence: 
In particular, when determining whether the evidentiary burden for automatism has been 
satisfied, trial judges must be careful to recognize that the weight to be given to expert 
evidence may vary from case to case. If the expert testimony establishes a documented 
history of automatistic-like dissociative states, it must be given more weight than if the 
expert is simply confirming that the claim of automatism is plausible. In the former case, 
the expert is actually providing a medical opinion about the accused. In the latter case, 
however, the expert is simply providing an opinion about the circumstances surrounding 
the allegation of automatism as they have been told to him or her by the accused. Trial 
judges must keep in mind that an expert opinion of this latter type is entirely dependent 
on the accuracy and truthfulness of the account of events given to the expert by the 
accused. 123 
This framework considerably increases the burden of proof on the accused. A defendant must 
prove a negative, that is on the balance of probabilities her actions were involuntary, in the 
sense of not voluntary. Expert evidence given to support her case must be given less weight 
when it is simply confirming that a claim ̀ of automatism is plausible. ' The defendant who claims 
automatism as a defence to a crime which is unwitnessed and who has no medical history to 
support the defence should in the view of the majority of the court find it more difficult to gain 
an acquittal. Yet there have been documented cases where people who have not previously 
suffered from automatism lapse into an automatic state. Mansfield v Weetabir`4 is one such 
121 Rv Parks [1992] 2 SCR 871,874 
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case. Indeed in MacLeod v Mathieson125 the success of an automatism defence in a driving case 
was dependent upon the fact that the accused was not aware that he was likely to lapse into an 
unconscious state. This seems the exact opposite of Bastarache J. 's argument. 
However Bastarache J. continued: 
The defence must make an assertion of involuntariness and call expert psychiatric or 
psychological evidence confirming that assertion. However, it is an error of law to 
conclude that this defence burden has been satisfied simply because the defence has met 
these two requirements. " 
The trial judge needs to be satisfied that there is evidence on which a jury could conclude on the 
balance of probabilities that ̀ the accused acted involuntarily'. "' Proving involuntariness on the 
balance of probabilities will not of itself be sufficient to found an defence. Bastarache J. 
observes that ̀ [p]olicy considerations are important in determining the sufficiency of evidence 
that is required to satisfy [evidential burdens] in both criminal and civil proceedings'. 128 Thus 
Bastarache J. introduces a further consideration before the defence can be considered ̀the 
nature of the alleged automatism trigger'. This leads Bastarache J. to make further comments as 
to the type of evidence which should be required by the trial judge to support an automatism 
claim: 
The burden will only be met where the trial judge concludes that there is evidence upon 
which a properly instructed jury could find that the accused acted involuntarily on a 
balance of probabilities. In reaching this conclusion, the trial judge will first examine the 
psychiatric or psychological evidence and inquire into the foundation and nature of the 
expert opinion. The trial judge will also examine all other available evidence, if any. 
Relevant factors are not a closed category and may, by way of example, include: the 
severity of the triggering stimulus, corroborating evidence of bystanders, corroborating 
medical history of automatistic-like dissociative states, whether there is evidence of a 
motive for the crime, and whether the alleged trigger of the automatism is also the 
victim of the automatistic violence. '29 
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A further hurdle for the potential defendant is introduced here in that any motive will also be 
examined in determining his involuntariness. If there is a clear motive for a crime any defence 
may well be more difficult to establish. It is not clear why Bastatrache J. chooses to stress 
motive in relation to automatism in determining involuntariness. Particularly as, if an automaton 
is acting without in Fairall's words ̀ the capacity for self control', then motive cannot be 
relevant to an assessment of her actions. The requirement for motive to be assessed in this way 
seems to stem from the majority of the court's distrust of the automatism defence, ̀automatism 
is easily feigned. "0 Though this has been stated in a number of judgments it is questionable 
whether this is true. The number of acquittals on the basis of the defence is not known because 
of lack of records. It would be equally as true to say of any defence where the accused was the 
only witness to the crime and his defence rested on his testimony that the defence might be 
feigned. Duress and self defence would often fall within this category as might evidence of 
provocation. 
Bastarache J. then considered how the distinction between mental disorder and non mental 
disorder automatism should be made. He did this to assist rial judges in determining which type 
of automatism should be put to the jury once the first two tests have been fulfilled. Bastarache 
J. started from a presumption that mental disorder would be the cause of most automatisms. He 
did not wish to go so far as to `eliminate the defence of non-mental disorder automatism'. He 
took `judicial notice that it will only be in rare cases that automatism is not caused by mental 
disorder. "" This reasoning ̀lends itself to a rule that trial judges start from the proposition that 
the condition the accused claims to have suffered from is a disease of the mind. ' 132 Bastarache J. 
then considered factors which might remove a defendant from this category. The arguments 
relating to determinations of mental disorder in his view fell under three headings. 
The first being internal cause theory, for this he adopted the majority's argument in Rabey 
regarding dissociative states caused by severe shock. He concluded, ̀[i]n effect the trial judge 
must consider the nature of the trigger and determine whether the normal person in the same 
circumstances might have reacted to it by entering an automatistic state, as the accused claims 
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to have done. "33 Bastarache J. does not recommend this approach for all cases but he does not 
limit it to cases which concern dissociative states. Here he is imposing in Canada a wider 
objective test of soundness of mind than that imposed by the court in the Australian case of 
Falconer. In utilising a soundness of mind test Bastarache J. saw context as important and 
adopted the reasoning of the majority of the Australian court in Falconer. " Thus according to 
Bastarache J. the test of soundness of mind was relevant to establishing what type of 
automatism must be put by the trial judge to the jury. However, he does not see the internal 
cause theory as finally determinative and says that `it is only an analytical tool "35 
His second argument fell under the heading, ̀The Continuing Danger Theory'. `This theory 
holds that any condition that is likely to present a recurring danger to the public should be 
treated as disease of the mind. ' This theory was linked to a risk of recurrence of violence but, 
`a finding of no continuing danger does not preclude a finding of a disease of the mind. "" Both 
of these two theories were relevant to determinations by the trial judge as to whether disease of 
the mind existed. Therefore they should both be considered as factors when considering which 
type of automatism should be put to the jury. 
In assessing the continuing danger factor two issues were relevant: ̀the psychiatric history of 
the accused and the likelihood that the trigger alleged to have caused the automatistic episode 
will recur. ' Risk of recurrence of violence was ̀ heightened by the fact that at least one of the 
accused's automatistic episodes involved violence. ' In these cases the accused's condition is 
`likely to be classified as disease of the mind. ' Again an absence of a history of dissociative 
states was not to be taken as indicating ̀there will be no recurrence of violence. "37 There is no 
suggestion that either the severity of the violence, or the length of time since it occurred, or the 
actual risk of recurrence is relevant to the trial judge's decision once some evidence is produced 
133 ̀In cases involving claims of psychological blow automatism, evidence of an extremely shocking trigger 
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that violence has occurred. In assessing the risk of the violence, the frequency of the recurrence 
of the trigger which caused the automatism, ̀or of a similar one of at least equal severity' is 
relevant. The greater the risk of recurrence the more likely it was that the automatism should be 
considered disease of the mind. Finally as a third category of factors to be considered a trial 
judge might consider any policy factor relevant to `whether society requires protection from the 
accused'. 138 This approach seems to widen the categories of policy which may be relevant so as 
potentially to include issues other than public safety. 
According to the majority in Stone, the burden of proving involuntariness rested on the accused. 
In giving instructions to the jury the trial judge `should begin by reviewing the serious policy 
factors which surround automatism, including claims about feignability and the repute of the 
administration of justice. ' He should also refer to the `severity of the triggering stimulus', 
witness or medical evidence supporting the accused's case, ̀ whether there is evidence of a 
motive for the crime, and whether the alleged trigger of the automatism is also the victim of the 
automatistic violence. "39 
Thus in Canadian law the burden on the prosecution of proving their case has been considerably 
lightened in cases of non mental disorder automatism This has been achieved by requiring the 
defence to prove that the accused's actions were involuntary on the balance of probabilities. 
This was necessary, according to the majority in Stone, for policy reasons because the 
protection of the public required that criminal liability be altered in such a manner and because 
automatism was a defence which according to Bastarache J. was easily feigned. To support this 
argument Bastarache J. gives weight to the views of the Canadian Psychiatric Association that 
`automatism necessarily stems from mental disorder'. The Association recommended that ̀ non 
mental disorder automatism be eliminated'. Whilst not totally accepting the proposal he took 
note that ̀ it will only be in rare cases that automatism is not caused by mental disorder. "' 
The four dissenting judges were strongly against the approach of the five judges who formed 
the majority in the Supreme Court. Binnie J. giving judgment on their behalf comments, ̀the 
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elastic concept of "mental disorder" can be expanded to the point where it ceases to have any 
utility for classification. ' Therefore a legal perspective needed to give the term ̀ some 
substantive Content'. 14' Binnie J. adopted the approach suggested by Williams: 
The courts should eschew any effort to discourage the defence of dissociation by 
interpreting it as evidence of insanity, or by withholding psychiatric evidence from the 
jury. The defence, if supported by medical evidence, should be adjudicated upon by the 
triers of fact, and if successful should result in an ordinary acquittal. But what is urgently 
needed is that the psychiatrist who deposes to dissociation in improbable circumstances 
should be subjected to skilled and deeply sceptical cross-examination, and that the 
Crown should where possible, call counter-evidence. 142 
This approach varies considerably from that adopted by the majority of the court. Yet it very 
nearly prevailed, four judges, including the Canadian Chief Justice, disagreed with the approach 
taken by the majority. 143 Binnie J. begins the minority judgment by pointing out that: ̀ A 
fundamental principle of the criminal law is that no act can be a criminal offence unless it is 
performed or omitted voluntarily. "" 
The dissenting judges feel that one of the difficulties is that some judges are concerned ̀that 
juries may be too quick to accept the story of an accused that he or she doesn't remember what 
happened, or that the conduct was ̀uncontrollable', or some other feigned version of events. ""' 
Binnie J. then makes an extremely pertinent point `[a] concern that a jury may fall into error is 
no basis for taking away its jurisdiction. "46 What was essential to prevent fabrication was expert 
medical evidence. The trial judge accepted the defence evidence that Stone was unconscious 
`throughout the commission of the crime' was supported by medical evidence which stated that 
, the appellant suffered from no underlying pathological condition which pointed to a disease 
requiring detention and treatment. ' Where there was no evidence from bystanders in support of 
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the accused's case Binnie J. preferred an approach which dealt with the evidence as it was 
presented ̀warts and all. ' `[T]he assessment of the credibility of the defence is up to the jury. ' 47 
The dissenting judgment expresses the view that the issue of burden of proof was not raised by 
the appeal, non-mental disorder automatism not having been considered at the trial, its 
consideration having been excluded by the trial judge. 148 Additionally the alteration of the 
burden of proof from an evidential to a persuasive burden ran contrary to previous Canadian 
case law. " 'It was a response to a policy initiative put forward by the Minister ofJustice'. 150 
The dissenting judgment is extremely critical of the court's decision to alter the burden on the 
following grounds: 
Parliament has not seen fit to act on this recommendation I do not believe, with respect, 
that the court ought to take it upon itself to reverse the persuasive burden to the 
disadvantage of the accused simply because the Court may find an unenacted policy 
initiative more attractive than the established law. ... neither the respondent nor any of 
the Attorneys General who intervened in the appeal (Canada, Ontario, and Alberta) 
suggested that such a change of onus was either desirable or necessary. 'S' 
Binnie J. supports the decisions in the authorities on automatism prior to Stone, in particular the 
judgments of La Forest J. in Parks1S2 and Lamer C. J. C., La Forest J. and Cory J. in Daviault. 113 
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spoken of as a `defaice', it is conceptually a sub-set of the voluntariness requirement, which is in turn 
part of the actus news component of criminal liability. ' (La Forest). Emphasis added in Stone (1999) 
134 CCC (3d) 353,376 
153 Rv Daviaul! [ 1994] 3 SCR 63 
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In Daviault the fundamental nature of the voluntary act was confirmed: ̀[t]he term mens rea, 
properly understood, does not encompass all of the mental elements of a crime. The actus reus 
has its own mental element; the act must be the voluntary act of the accused for the actus reus 
to exist''' It was accepted that in some cases automatism could relate to mens rea. '" In 
explaining the legal use of the term unconscious Binnie J. says that: ̀ unconsciousness i  used in 
the sense that the accused like the sleepwalker, is shown "not to have known what he is doing". 
This excludes the person who is provoked and says, "I couldn't help myself', or who simply 
professes to be at a loss to explain uncharacteristic onduct'. ' In Binnie J. 's view therefore 
consciousness is relevant to voluntariness. Partial consciousness may be relevant where the 
`semi consciousness' was ̀a state of diminished awareness that negated control. "" 
On this basis, the minority believed that there was no reason why a court should not consider a 
defence of non-mental disorder automatism when the triggering event caused a dissociative 
state. In Parks the court's use of the external/internal distinction was not seen as determinative 
of which category of automatism was to be put to the jury. However, the concept was stated to 
be useful as an analytical tool. '38 Binnie J. argued that this was the correct approach. Mental 
disorder was a legal not a medical category. He explained that the interns /external distinction 
was limited in its application in that it could not provide a definitive test of whether a defendant 
was mentally disordered at the time of the crime. 1S9 His view was that once a judge had 
`exercised his gatekeeper functions to screen frivolous or feigned claims, it was for the jury to 
make its mind up on the credibility of the plea of automatism. This jurisdiction should not be 
154 (1999) 134 CCC (3d) 353,377 (Binnie J. ). Quoting from Rv Daviault [1994] 3 SCR 63,74. Emphasis in 
Rv Stone 
155 (1999) 134 CCC (3d) 353,377 reference was made to Rv Chaulk [1990] 3 SCR 1303 
156 (1999) 134 CCC (3d) 353,378 Binnie J. adopts the following definition of automatism ̀... an act which is 
done without any control by the mind, such as a spasm a reflex action or a convulsion; or an ad done 
by a person who is not conscious of what he is doing, such as an act done while suffering concussion 
or sleepwalking. ' (Lord Denning in Bratty v AG for Northernheland [1963] AC 386,409). 
Emphasis added per Binnie J. 
157 (1999) 134 CCC (3d) 353,379 
158 [1992] 2 SCR 871,902 (La Forest J. ) 
159 (1999) 134 CCC (3d) 353,390-2 
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removed by 'judicially created policy"'. 160 Binnie J. was impatient of the idea that juries will not 
be sceptical when hearing evidence of automatism. "" He said of Stone's case: ̀He was either 
unconscious at the time of the killing or he was not telling the truth at the time of the trial. This 
was a question for the jury. "62 
The case of Stone is illustrative of both sides of the judicial debate surrounding involuntariness 
in cases where automatism is claimed. Brudner describes the decision as follows: `[i]n their 
concern for controlling dangerous persons, the courts applying the common law have produced 
a law of automatism that massively violates constitutional rights. "63 The majority of the judges 
in the Canadian Supreme Court simply did not trust the jury to make the correct decision 
regarding a non-mental disorder automatism plea. Therefore the court sought to construct an 
elaborate legal framework to ensure that the decision was removed from the jury. Issues of 
culpability were not considered by the majority to be as relevant as issues of policy. Following 
the decision in Stone, it seems that in order to gain an acquittal on the basis of non-mental 
disorder automatism in Canada the defendant must: firstly provide evidence including expert 
medical or psychological opinion to satisfy a trial judge that the defence should be put to the 
jury and secondly satisfy the jury that on the balance of probabilities she acted involuntarily. 
Therfore the burden of proof is shifted from the prosecution to the defence, furthermore, ̀[t]he 
trial judge should start from the proposition, that the condition is mental disorder 
automatism"" and should consider any relevant policy restriction before he puts the defence to 
the jury. The problem here is this moves the conduct of a trial away from two basic ideals of 
criminal responsibility. The first being that the accused is innocent until proven guilty and the 
160 (1999) 134 CCC (3d) 353,394 
161 ̀The jury in this case, for example, had before it the testimony of the Crown psychiatrist that the 
appellant's violent response to his wife's verbal attack was entirely too purposeful and the loss of 
memory entirely too convenient to be considered "involuntary". The members of the jury could, I 
think, have been counted on to exhibit powerful scepticism about such evidence. Anyone who thinks a 
jury of bus drivers, office workers and other practical people will be less sceptical than members of the 
bench or professors of law has perhaps spent insufficient time in buses or around office coffee 
machines. ' (Binnie J. ) (1999) 134 CCC (3d) 353,400 
162 (1999) 134 CCC (3d) 353,401 
163 BRUDNER, A. 2000. Insane Automatism. (2000) 45 McGill L165-85, p. 84 
164 Download from Canadian Justice Department we bsite on 12/3/2000. 
http: //www. courts. gov. bc. ca/legalCompendium/Chaptl2. htm 
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second being that the prosecution must prove its case. 
It should be noted that Canada has a Charter of Rights and limitations on the rights of a 
defendant have to be justified under s. I of the Charter. The majority of the court found no 
violation of the Charter. "" Unsurprisingly the minority strongly disagreed. Binnie J. expressed 
their disagreement with the majority: 
Firstly, I do not accept the Crown's argument hat a judge-made classification of 
situations into mental disorder automatism and non-mental disorder automatism can 
relieve the Crown of the obligation to prove all of the elements of the offence, including 
voluntariness. As stated, such an interpretation encounters strong objections under s. 7 
and s. 11 (d) of the Charter, and there has been no attempt in this case to provide a s. 1 
justification. 
Secondly, imposition of a persuasive burden of proof on the appellant to establish 
`involuntariness' on a balance of probabilities, in substitution for the present evidential 
burden, runs into the same Charter problems, and no attempt has been made in the 
record to justify it. 166 
American Case law. 
In reaching his decision in Stone, Bastarache J. used, inter alia, two American cases to support 
the argument that the burden of proof should be altered in non mental disorder cases. These 
cases, State V CaddelP67 and Fulcher v State, '" do confirm that unconsciousness is an 
affirmative defence'" in the states of North Carolina and Wyoming, though not without strong 
dissent from two of the judges, one of whom was the Chief Justice of North Carolina. 10 In his 
165 (1999) 134 CCC (3d) 353,425 
166 (1999) 134 CCC (3d) 353,401. Emphasis in original 
167 215 SE 2d 348 (NC 1975) 
168 633 P 2d 142 (Wyo 1981) 
169 ̀An affirmative defence is one in which the defendant says, ̀I did the act charged in the indictment, but I 
should not be found guilty of the crime charged because' (hake J. ) in State v Caddell (NC 1975) 215 
SE 2d 348,363 
170 State v Caddell 215 SE 2d 349 (NC 1975) 
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partially dissenting judgement, Sharpe C. J. disagreed with the proposition that automatism 
should be an affirmative defence. In his view the defence of automatism/unconsciousness went 
to the voluntariness of action. ̀Similarly, proof of a voluntary act negates unconsciousness; 
voluntary action and unconsciousness cannot co-exist. "7' 
Neither case seeks to narrow the defence of unconsciousness in the manner in which the 
majority of the Canadian Supreme Court did in Stone. In Fulcher the following definition is 
given to automatism: 
The defense of unconsciousness perhaps should be more precisely denominated as the 
defense of automatism Automatism is the state of a person who, though capable of 
action, is not conscious of what he is doing. While in an automatistic state an individual 
performs complex actions without an exercise of will. Because these actions are 
performed in a state of unconsciousness, they are involuntary. Automatistic behavior 
may be followed by complete or partial inability to recall the actions performed while 
unconscious. Thus, a person who acts automatically does so without intent, exercise of 
free will, or knowledge of the act. 'n 
In Fulcher it was accepted that the cause of automatism might be an ̀ abnormal condition of the 
mind', but the following statement of the court in State v Caddell was cited with approval: 
The defenses of insanity and unconsciousness are not the same in nature, for 
unconsciousness at the time of the alleged criminal act need not be the result of a disease 
or defect of the mind. As a consequence, the two defenses are not the same in effect, for 
a defendant found not guilty by reason of unconsciousness, as distinct from insanity, is 
not subject to commitment to a hospital for the mentally ill. I' 
This is a long way from the presumption that most automatism is mental disorder automatism 
by the majority of the Canadian Supreme Court in Stone. The two American cases amount to a 
strong argument in support of the minority judgment in Stone. 
It is impossible to review the whole of American case law with regard to unconsciousness or 
1712 15 SE 2d 348,367 (NC 1975) 
172 Fulcher v. State 633 P 2d 142,145 (Wyo 1981) 
173 State v Caddell 215 SE 2d 348,360 (NC 1975) cited in Fulcher v State 633 P 2d 142,145 (Wyo 1981) 
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automatism within this thesis. A good review of the subject area is contained in American Law 
Review, 14 and in La Fave and Scott. "' 
Automatism has been recognised as a possible defence where the accused was in a semi- 
conscious state, between waking and sleeping. '76 It has also been recognised where the accused 
was driving and suffered a loss of consciousness. In the Government of the Virgin Islands v 
Smith, ' there was sufficient evidence that the defendant who had killed a pedestrian whilst 
driving his car was in a state of unconsciousness at the time, there were no skid marks on the 
road where the accident occurred and he had no reason to expect an epileptic seizure. This can 
be contrasted with the approach adopted in the case of Smith v The Commonwealth" where 
the defendant had been suffering from seizures and was therefore prevented from claiming the 
defence, because he had failed to act as a prudent individual would behave. This reasoning is 
similar to the reasoning of the Scottish Sheriffs court in MacLeod v Mathieson. ' La Fave and 
Scott comment1° that in such cases ̀his conduct in driving may amount to criminal 
negligence'. "' This approach was confirmed in State v Hinkle. '82 They also note the individual 
States' courts have accepted defences in cases where the underlying cause has been ̀epilepsy, "
174 For a detailed examination of the case law to 1997 see EICHELBERGER, E. A. 27th ALR 4th Annotation 
and supplement. Rochester, New York: Lawyers Cooperative publishing 
175 LA FAVE, W. R. & SCOTT, A. W. Jr. 1986. Criminal Law (20° edit. ). St. Paul, Minnesota: West 
Publishing Co. See also LA FAVE, W. R. 2000. Criminal Law (3'a edit. ). St Paul, Minnesota: West 
Group 
176 Fain v Commonwealth 78 Ky 183 (1879) 
177 278 F 2d 169 (3d Cir 1960), epilepsy, People v Freeman Cal App 2d 110,142 P 2d 435 (1943), epilepsy 
178 268 SW 2d 937 (Ky 1954) 
179 1993 SCCR 488 
180 LA FAVE, W. R. AND SCOTT, AM, Jr. 1986. p. 383 
181 Ti#t v State 17 Ga App 663,88 SE 41 (1916) 
182 489 SE 2d 257 (WVa 1996) 
183 Footnoted to People v Higgins 5 NY 2d 607 (1959), and State v Welsch 8 Wash App 719,508 P 2d 1041 
(1973) 
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somnambulism, ' hypnotism, "' a concussion or some other physical trauma, ' or even an 
emotional trauma. '' 87 
The American Law Review reveals that the defence has not yet been recognised in all states, 
and its status varies both as to whether it is an affirmative defence or as to whether it is part of 
the insanity defence. La Fave and Scott summarise the manner in which the defence is employed 
by the courts as follows: 
The basis of the automatism defense is seldom made clear in the cases. One may, of 
course, note some similarities between the insanity defense and the automatism defense, 
although it is clear that the latter is not merely a facet of the former; the automatism 
defense may be present notwithstanding the defendant's lack of the ̀ mental disease or 
defect' which insanity requires. Another explanation is that the automaton defendant is 
not criminally liable because he lacks the mental state which the crime requires, and this 
appears to be the rationale most commonly hinted at in the cases. However, it is 
undoubtedly more correct to say that such a person is not guilty of a crime because he 
has not engaged in an ̀ act' (defined as a voluntary bodily movement), and without an 
act there can be no crime. This rationale, which is employed in the Model Penal Code 
§2.01 goes well beyond the no-mental-state reasoning, for it would support an 
automatism defense to a charge of a strict-liability offense. But under either of the latter 
two theories the defense, if successful, results in outright acquittal. ' '' 
184 Fain v Commonwealth 78 Ky 183 (1879), Bradley v State 102 Tex Crim R 41,277 SW 147 (1926). In 
Bradley somnambulism was recognised as a type of insanity defence 
185 Footnoted to People v Marsh 170 Cal App 3d 338, P 2d 495 (1959) and People v Worthington 105 Cal 
166,38 P 689 (1894). It should be noted that in both cases the court ruled that evidence as to the 
effect of hypnosis was admissible but on the facts both defendants were convicted. The only English 
reported case to consider a claim based upon hypnotism is Gates v McKenna (1999) 46 BMLR 9. This 
is a civil case where the idea that hypnotism had caused automatism was rejected on the fads of the 
case 
186 Footnoted to People v Newton 8 Cal App 3d 359,87 Cal Rptr 394 (1970), Read v People 119 Colo 506, 
205 P 233 (1949), Carter v State 376 P 2d 351 (Okl Crim App 1962) 
187 Footnoted to People v Wilson 66 Cal 2d 749,427 P 2d 820 (1967), People v Lb-now 88 Cal App 3d Supp 
21,151 Cal Rptr 621 (1978) 
188 LA FAVE, W. R. & SCOTT, A. W. Jr. 1986. p. 384 
189 The Model Penal Code 'requiring a voluntary act (or omission) for every offense and defining voluntary 
acts as excluding a reflex or convulsion; a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep; conduct 
during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion; or a bodily movement that otherwise is not a 
product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual. ' LA FAVE, W. R. 
2000. p. 408 
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There is therefore no doubt that there is a defence of unconsciousness/automatism in American 
Law. 190 
Given the variety of opinions expressed in the case law what is of greatest interest is novel 
approaches taken to cases and the attitudes of various judges to the problems posed by the 
defence, as previously discussed. Interestingly American judgments make reference to English 
case law. 19' For example in Fulcher reference was made to M'Naghten, Hill v Baxter, Bratty, 
Charlson and Kemp. ' 
Two recent cases are interesting with regard to the boundaries of the automatism defence in the 
state of Indiana. In McClain v State'93 the defendant was charged with `battery against police 
officers, and resisting law enforcement. ' The trial judge ruled that expert testimony on sleep 
disorder and dissociative states could not be heard as McClain had ̀withdrawn the insanity 
defence. ' The Supreme Court of Indiana had to consider an appeal from the Court of Appeal 
concerning whether sleep deprivation was relevant to voluntariness. The Court of Appeal had 
held that McClain's defence was only relevant to insanity. The defendant's case was based upon 
sleep deprivation. He had flown from Japan to Indianapolis and as a result claimed that he had 
only slept for `three hours in the forty eight hours prior to his arrest. " McClain withdrew the 
insanity defence he had originally intended to use because it was argued that `evidence of 
"automatism" did not need to be presented as an insanity defence. ' 1' 
It was the first time the Indiana Supreme Court had considered automatism, the trial court had 
felt bound by an earlier appeal court decision" and therefore found that automatism was part of 
190 LA FAVE, W. R. & SCOTT, A. W. Jr. 1986. p. 382 
191 See LA FAVE, W. R 2000. Reviews English case law p. 409-11- almost half of the discussion relating to 
automatism is a discussion of the English case law. 
192 Fulcher v State 633 P 2d 142,165 (Wyo 1981) 
193 678 NE 2d 104 (Ind 1997) 
194 Both quotations 678 NE 2d 104,105 (Ind 1997). 
195 678 NE 2d 104,107 (Ind 1997) 
196 Hollander v State 156 Ind App 329,296 NE 2d 449 (1973) 
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the insanity defence. The Supreme Court had to address the question: 
Did the trial court err in ... excluding evidence of expert testimony about the capacity of 
the defendant o form criminal intent on the night in question and expert testimony 
regarding sleep disorders and/or dissociative states, because the defendant, David M. 
McClain, withdrew his insanity defense? 
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decisions and ordered a retrial. The court 
accepted that within America states were split as to whether the defence of automatism was a 
species of the insanity defence. However McClain's defence was based on evidence that he had 
not acted voluntarily. 
McClain claims that he was unable to form criminal intent on the night in question due to 
an automatistic state of mind that precluded voluntary behaviour. Although the jury is 
obviously not required to accept this explanation, permitting McClain to make the 
argument is consistent with the statute's general purpose that criminal conduct be an ̀act 
of choice' by a person in a `conscious state of mind. "' 
In court the effect of the Voluntary Act Statute 1976198 was said to be that it codified ̀ the 
axiom that voluntariness is a "general element of criminal behaviour" and reflected the premise 
that criminal responsibility "postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between doing 
right and doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong. "' In court the reasoning underlying the 
section was considered and the views of the commission considering the revision to the Indiana 
Code are stated to be ̀ the term voluntary is used in this Code as meaning behaviour that is 
produced by an act of choice and is capable of being controlled by a human being who is in a 
conscious state of mind. ' '" 
The court did not recognise an ̀ automatism defense per se, only that McClain is entitled to 
present evidence tending to show whether he acted voluntarily. ' The State had to prove that 
McClain acted voluntarily and McClain had the right to call medical evidence to support his 
197 678 NE 2d 104,107 (Ind 1997) 
198 Indiana State legislation codified as Indiana Code § 35-41-2-2 (1993) 
199 678 NE 2d 104,107 (Ind 1997) 
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claim. If the State did not prove its case ̀the law requires an acquittal. ' The court considered 
Fulcher v State and State v Caddell and decided that `automatism was not a species of the 
insanity defense. ' The court concluded that automatism in McClain's case was ̀manifested in a 
person of sound mind. '200 
The policy consideration of the court was not public safety but, the waste of public resources in 
holding that an automaton was subject to the court procedures governing insanity. 
One important policy underlying the insanity defense is ensuring that mentally-ill criminal 
defendants receive treatment for their condition. This raises a second and equally 
important consideration why automatism should not be regarded by the courts as a species 
of insanity. Although automatism could be the product of a diseased mind in need of 
treatment and rehabilitation, nothing in the record indicates that McClain presents such a 
case and McClain does not assert hat he does. A `successful' defense resulting in a ̀ not 
responsible by reason of insanity' verdict would leave the automatistic defendant in 
custody pending a commitment hearing. ... Consequently, merging the automatism and 
insanity defenses could result in confinement, at least temporarily, not of the insane but of 
the sane. This is a significant deprivation of liberty for an automatistic defendant where the 
outcome of the commitment hearing is a foregone conclusion. Even apart from the 
defendant's interest, in absence of grounds for believing an automatistic defendant suffers 
from a recurring mental disorder, it is reasonable to infer that legislators did not intend to 
occupy the courts with commitment hearings for defendants whose sanity is not in 
question. 201 
In Reed v State' the Court of Appeals in Indiana heard an appeal from a defendant who 
suffered from transient ischemic attack (TSI). These attacks were caused by a series of small 
strokes. The defendant was accused of theft but claimed the thefts occurred during a TSI attack 
which caused her to become confused and to walk out of a store without paying for goods. The 
Court of Appeals applied one of the definitions considered by the Indiana Supreme Court in 
McClain and stated that Reed fell within this definition and was therefore not subject to the 
insanity provisions of the Indiana Code. The definition was ̀ connoting the state of a person 
200 678 NE 2d 104,108 (Ind 1997). All quotations 
201 678 NE 2d 104,109 (Ind 1997) 
202 693 NE 2d 988 (Ind 1998) 
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who, though not capable of action, is not conscious of what he was doing. '203 The quotation is 
from Viscount Kilmuir's opinion in Bratty. ' The defence in Indiana is broader than the House 
of Lords' view of the defence and includes, ̀somnambulism, hypnotic states, fugues, metabolic 
disorders and epilepsy and other convulsions and reflexes. '20S Whether a defendant should be 
treated as insane rests upon whether she is of sound mind. No objective test of soundness of 
mind was proposed by the court. 
Normally it is not possible to assess the attitude of the jury to a claim of automatism but in 
America jurors may speak to the press after the trial. On 25th June 1999 in Arizona Falater was 
convicted of the murder of his wife. He claimed that the criminal acts were committed when he 
was sleepwalking. Expert evidence was presented at the trial by both prosecution and defence. 
The defence argued that Falater had a history of sleepwalking and was suffering from stress at 
the time of the attack upon his wife. ' The prosecution expert witnesses argued otherwise. The 
jurors who heard the case ̀did not find his sleepwalking defense absurd at all. ' However his 
defence failed because although some jurors believed he was sleepwalking they did not believe 
he was sleepwalking ̀through the entire attack. M7 
`We didn't think that a sleepwalker could perform the sequence of detailed events the way 
[previous prosecution witness and Falater's neighbor] Greg Koons was able to observe 
them, ' said jury foreperson Mike Riley in a post-verdict press conference. `The deciding 
factor for us was that it seemed improbable that a person could be unconscious during that 
whole time. 92M 
203 678 NE 2d 104,106 (Ind 1997), 693 N. E. 2d 988,992 (Ind. 1998). Once again this is Lord Denning's 
definition of automatism in Bratty v AG for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386,409 
204 [1963] AC 386,390, (Viscount Kilmuir) 
205 678 NE 2d 104,106 (Ind 1997) 
206 Not Under the Influence - Sleepwalking Rejected as Defense in Murder Case 
http: //204.202.137.110/sections/us/DailyNews/sleepwalk990625. html (22/11199) 
207 Jurors in sleepwalking murder trial say they believed the defense to an extent 
httpJ/www. courtty. com/trialsfalater/062599jur+ors ctv. html (17/08/99). Both quotations 
208 Jurors in sleepwalking murder trial say they believed the defense to an extent 
http. //www. courttv. com/trialsfalater/062599 jurors ctv. html (17/08/99) 
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Thus in the Falater case the jury seem to have been sceptical with regard to the evidence of 
automatism. Obviously it is not possible to assess whether juries in other cases have been 
similarly sceptical because of lack of information regarding proceedings in the jury room. It is 
possble to suggest however that juries are not as gullible as Bastarache J. suggested in Rv 
Stone. It is also interesting that the jury's decision relied upon the apparent purposefulness of 
Falater's actions. 
An interesting approach to driving and sleep 
One of the areas in which the English courts have been unprepared to accept that apparently 
purposeful action could found a defence of automatism is in the driving cases. In Attorney 
General's Reference (No 2 of 1992)' Lord Taylor C. J. said ̀the defence of automatism 
requires that there was a total destruction of voluntary control on the defendant's part. 
Impaired, reduced or partial control is not enough. '21° The driver in this case was described by 
the defence expert witness as ̀ driving without awareness', a condition in which very little 
`intrudes into the driver's consciousness when he was in that state'i The argument made by 
the defence was that the defendant's lack of control of the vehicle was caused by an external 
factor - the lack of stimulus from driving on a motorway. 212 According to Lord Taylor the 
driver retained sufficient control over his actions to be responsible for them even though he was 
only aware of the risk of collision when it was too late to take action to avoid it. 
In Jiminez v The Queen'; the Australian High Court considered a claim that driving 
asleep could not be a voluntary act. The offence with which Jiminez was charged was culpable 
driving. Jiminez seems to have fallen asleep at the wheel of the car he was driving, the car 
209 [1993] 4 All ER 683 
210 [1993] 4 All ER 683,689 
211 [1993] 4 All ER 683,686-7 
212 This may have been to avoid an insane automatism verdict. In Attorney General's Reference (No 2 of 
1992) reference is made to sleepwalking as having an internal cause [1993] 4 All ER 683,669 
213 (1992) 173 CLR 572. For a review of the case see McCUTCHEON, J. P. 1997. Involuntary conduct and the 
Case of the Unconscious ̀Driver': Reflections on Timinez. (1997) 21 Crim Li 71-9 and LANHAK D. 
1993. Involuntary Acts and the Actus Reus. (1992)17 Crim L197-101 
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crashed causing the death of one of the passengers. It seems that Jiminez was awake for a short 
period before the impact but was unable to `regain control' of the car. 214 The court said that 
culpable driving was ̀ no different to any other offence and requires the driving, ... to be a 
conscious and voluntary act. '215 The court also said that the offence required ̀a motor vehicle to 
have been driven in a manner dangerous to the public at the time of the impact which 
occasioned the death. '216 The High Court decided that the judge's summing up to the jury did 
not make this clear. Thus it was ̀ left open to the jury to convict the applicant in respect of an 
act for which he was not legally responsible. 217 The Crown did not dispute that Jiminez was 
asleep when the vehicle left the road. Jiminez's conviction was quashed because a retrial would 
be inappropriate. 218 
The main argument of the court was that once it was proved that the defendant was asleep his 
actions ̀were not voluntary and could not amount to driving in a dangerous manner. '219 The 
factors which were relevant to criminal liability were questions relating to prior fault. `There 
was no evidence before the jury that he had consumed any alcohol or drugs. ' There was 
insufficient evidence that he had not had enough sleep prior to driving. ̀ In these circumstances, 
the inference that the applicant believed that, in all the circumstances, it was safe to drive might 
have been drawn by the jury from the very fact of his driving. " Other issues that were relevant 
214 (1992) 173 CLR 572,577 
215 (1992) 173 CLR 572,577 
216 (1992) 173 CLR 572,578 
217 (1992) 173 CLR 572,589 
218 `We have given careful consideration to the question whether a new trial should be ordered. It is 
now more than three and a half years since the accident occurred. The applicant has already been 
subjected to the expense, strain and inconvenience of a trial. The case against him was not a 
compelling one. There was no evidence that the applicant was affected by alcohol or drugs. There 
was evidence to the effect that he had had adequate sleep before commencing to drive and that he 
had had no prior warning, or otherwise ought to have known, that he was about to fall asleep. 
The sentence imposed, upon the applicant's conviction, was one of periodic detention which, if it 
had been served, would by now have expired. In all these circumstances, we have reached the 
conclusion that it would be inappropriate to order a retrial. ' 
(1992) 173 CLR 572,585 
219 (1992) 173 CLR 572,584 
220 (1992) 173 CLR 572,583. Both quotations 
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to prior fault were ̀ the period of the driving, the lighting conditions (including whether it was 
night or day) and the heating or ventilation of the vehicle' and whether there was any ̀ warning 
of the onset of sleep'' or whether the car was in a ̀ seriously defective condition'. " 
The Australian High Court took the view that the defence of involuntariness here was akin to 
the defence of honest and reasonable mistake. ̀Driving in a manner dangerous to the public is at 
once the offence and, if it is relevant the fault, but it will be a defence to establish an honest and 
reasonable mistake as to the facts which if true would exculpate the driver. ' Thus driving a 
defective vehicle when the accused had no reason to believe it was defective might excuse. ̀And 
the same issue is raised when, in a case like the present where the dangerous manner of the 
driving is said to consist in the likelihood of going to sleep, a driver claims that he had no 
warning of the onset of sleep. "' By this means the majority in the Australian court was able to 
view Attorney General's Reference (No 2 of 1992) as less relevant than Rv Gosney, where the 
English Court of Appeal had held that dangerous driving was ̀not an absolute offence. " It is 
questionable whether the English court took the same wide view of fault as the Australian 
because Megaw I. J. continues: 
`Fault' certainly does not necessarily involve deliberate misconduct or recklessness or 
intention to drive in a manner inconsistent with proper standards of driving. Nor does fault 
necessarily involve moral blame. Thus there is fault if an inexperienced or a naturally poor 
driver, while straining every nerve to do the right thing, falls below the standard of a 
competent and careful driver. Fault involves a failure; a falling below the care or skill of a 
competent and experienced driver, in relation to the manner of the driving and to the 
relevant circumstances of the case. A fault in that sense, even though it might be slight, 
even though it be a momentary lapse, even though normally no danger would have arisen 
from it, is sufficient. The fault need not be the sole cause of the dangerous situation. It is 
enough if it is, looked at sensibly, a cause. Such a fault will often be sufficiently proved as 
an inference from the very facts of the situation. ' 
221 (1992) 173 CLR 572,580. Both quotations 
222 (1992) 173 CLR 572,579 
223 (1992) 173 CLR 572,583. Both quotations 
224 Rv Gosney (1971) 55 Cr App R 502,508 
225 Rv Gosney (1971) 55 Cr App R 502,508. Emphasis in original 
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On this narrower view of fault it seems that Jiminez's appeal might not have been successful. 
The Australian court seems also to take a more robust approach to somnambulism in that the 
statement regarding voluntary acts committed whilst asleep is very clear ̀ his actions while he 
was asleep were not voluntary and could not amount to driving in a dangerous manner. '226 
Summary 
This chapter has examined a number of different approaches adopted to claims of 
involuntariness in different jurisdictions. In Scotland and New Zealand the approach has been to 
concentrate on the mental elements of the defence to a greater extent than in the other 
jurisdictions. This is most marked in the approach adopted by the High Court in New Zealand in 
Bannin. What is problematic about the decision is the difficulty of reconciling notions of 
involuntariness as fundamental to criminal responsibility with Fisher J. 's third test of capacity 
according to which ̀ the threshold will vary from one crime to another. '' 
In some jurisdictions when claims of dissociation have been considered a soundness of mind test 
has been proposed by the courts. In Australia and Canada the test used to distinguish borderline 
cases of insanity from automatism is an objective test. The introduction of an objective test in 
one area of automatism is problematic as was pointed out by Dickson J., who also highlighted 
another problem created by the objective test ̀ I cannot accept the notion that an extraordinary 
external event, i. e. an intense emotional shock, can cause a state of dissociation or automatism, 
if and only if all normal persons subjected to that sort of shock would react in that way. ' 
The adoption of the stance in Canada that courts should assume that when automatism is raised 
the defence is mental disorder automatism is worrying. The difficulties with this decision are 
linked to the weight being given to social policy issues and the distortion which Sir Owen Dixon 
detected in Kemp. The problem is well expressed by Fairall who was writing about the 
226 (1992) 173 CLR 572,584 
227 [1991] 2 NZLR 237,251 
228 Rv Rabey [1980] 2 SCR 513,548 
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Australian High Court's decision in Falconer: 
Some of the difficulties encountered in this field undoubtedly arise because of our 
incomplete knowledge about the psycho-dynamics of human behaviour. Other difficulties 
arise because of a set of rules which produces conflict and possible injustice. Little can be 
done about the former, but something can be done about the latter. The divergent rules 
governing onus and burden of proof create enormous practical difficulties for the judge 
and the jury. They impact upon the manner in which the jury is required to deliberate on 
the fundamental question of guilt. The artificiality of the fact-finding process resulting 
from the presumptions of mental capacity and mental soundness may work substantial 
injustice. When the jury is told that it must ignore evidence which may suggest a complete 
absence of fault unless such evidence is accepted as more likely than not (that is, on the 
balance of probabilities), the potential for injustice is obvious. The problem is compounded 
by the vagueness of the criteria which define irresponsibility under the various insanity 
tests. 2" 
Judges have to weigh against this the policy reasons for ensuring that the courts retain control 
over a defendant who has committed a dangerous act which may recur. However, in Parks, the 
majority of the Canadian Supreme Court were of the view that: ̀ [o]ur system of justice is 
predicated on the notion that only those who act voluntarily should be punished under the 
criminal law. ' ° This can only be achieved in terms of claims of involuntariness if the courts 
have a clear idea undistorted by policy considerations of what it means for `action' to be 
involuntary, and are prepared to give effect to their statements of support for the fundamental 
nature of the voluntary act requirement. Despite the statement in Parks, when it came to the 
subsequent Canadian Supreme Court decision in Stone it was the minority, rather than the 
majority, who strongly supported the assertion of the requirement of voluntariness by Cory J. in 
Daviault: ̀ [t]he term mens rea, properly understood, does not encompass all of the mental 
elements of a crime. The actus reus has its own mental element; the act must be the voluntary 
act of the accused for the actus reus to exist'. " 
Lord Hope in Ross v HMAdvocate did not see policy issues as determinative where there were 
sufficient safeguards in the framing of the defence to prevent it being abused. In Lord Hope's 
229 FAIRALL, P. A. 1993. p. 95-6 
230RvArks [1992]2SCR871,874 
231 Rv Daviault [ 1994] 3 SCR 63,74 
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view what was required to support the defence was ̀ total alienation of reason amounting to a 
complete absence of self control' and this must be due to `some external factor which was 
outwith the accused's control and which he was not bound to foresee. '2 Policy consideration 
have led to different concerns being expressed in Scotland with regard to driving offences 
where the view is taken that what is relevant is the defendant's knowledge of the risk of an 
automatic episode. This approach has also been adopted in various states in America. 
Policy considerations have led to the adoption of various tests in borderline cases of automatism 
where the behaviour of the defendant is dangerous. In England and Wales in Quick the 
internal/external distinction was canvassed as an attempt to escape from the confines of the 
decision in Bratty. This test was seen by Toohey J. in Falconer as not paying sufficient 'regard 
to the subtleties surrounding the notion of mental disease. "; 
Policy considerations do not all lie in one direction as Cresson P. pointed out in Cottle: 
Two major considerations will have to be balanced: (1) fairness to the accused, who 
should not have imposed upon him a defence which he does not himself advance ... (2) the 
public interest which requires that a person prosecuted by the Crown on behalf of the 
State should not be permitted to seek an unqualified acquittal through absence of intent if 
his mental condition really amounts to insanity. I 
Courts in Australia, England and America have argued that there are additional policy 
considerations in the inappropriateness of subjecting those who do not suffer from a mental 
disorder to treatment. In McClain the wasteful use of state resources, and the ̀ significant 
deprivation of liberty'23S for the accused were included within the equation. 
Though the ̀ psycho-dynamics of human behaviour' are not fully discoverable it might be argued 
that they could usefully be further discussed in achieving a better knowledge of how 
232 1991 SLT 564,569. Both quotations 
233 (1990) 171 CLR 31,76 
234 Rv Cottle [1958] NZLR 999,1013 
235 678 NE 2d 104,109 (Ind 1997) 
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involuntariness relates to the voluntary act requirement. ' Additionally the framework of 
criminal liability needs to be further discussed, to assess whether the draconian changes in the 
burden of proof and presumptions with regard to automatism advanced in Rv Stone could ever 
be justified. In the next chapter it is proposed to examine, philosophical and neuroscientific 
constructions of `action' to see whether they can offer an improved understanding of the 
`psycho-dynamics of human behaviour. ' 
A final point needs to be made, some of the American case law makes the point that automatism 
or lack of consciousness does not necessarily lead to a defence based on insanity. It would seem 
preferable for the courts to acknowledge that this is so by abandoning the terms ̀non-insane 
automatism' or `non-mental disorder automatism'. Where a defendant is not to be labelled an 
insane automaton an acquittal on the basis of automatism would seem a preferable and more 
fairly expressed verdict. 
236 For a discussion of the psycho-dynamics of human behaviour in relation to automatism and insanity see 
SCHOPP, RF., 1991. Automatism, Insanity and the Psychology of Criminal Responsibility. 
Cambridge University Press 
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Chapter 4 
Criminal case law definitions of `involuntariness' and ̀ act' tend to see both as a part of the 
voluntary act requirement. Involuntariness itself is rarely defined, where it is a number of 
definitions emerge. In DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch, Lord Simon saw criminal 
responsibility as based upon the ̀ free human will' and the ̀ power of choice' which it provided. 
He continued ̀[v]olition I take to be synonymous with "will' (i. e. the power of directing 
conscious choice); so an act is a voluntary physical movement, and an involuntary physical 
movement is not an act. ' This approach to criminal responsibility means that involuntariness 
becomes a way of describing unwilled physical movement as something which is not an act 
and does not therefore attract criminal liability. Lord Simon states that the criminal law's 
description of action, is a ̀ term of art used by the law to denote a person's physical movement 
actuated by his will. " In this sense ̀involuntary action' cannot exist because once a physical 
movement is described as involuntary it ceases to be an ̀ act', or at the least an ̀ act' for which 
criminal liability may be imposed. 2 It is noticeable that this definition is less reductionist than 
the traditional jurisprudential definition of involuntary action. 
As was seen in the last chapter, in defining automatism courts have used the terms 
`unconscious' ̀not conscious' and ̀ involuntary'. In Bratty Y Attorney General for Northern 
Ireland, Lord Denning said: 
No act is punishable if it is done involuntarily: and an involuntary act in this context - 
some people nowadays prefer to speak of it as ̀ automatism' - means an act which is 
done by the muscles without any control by the mind such as a spasm, a reflex action 
or convulsion; or an act done by one who is not conscious of what he is doing such as 
an act done while suffering from concussion or while sleepwalking? 
1 [1975] AC 653,689. Both quotations 
2 For a discussion of the case law surrounding action see MACKAY, R. D. 1995. p. 11-12 
3 [1963] AC 386,409. Lord Denning's definition of automatism in Bratty has been widely referred to in the 
case law researched for this thesis. For example Rv Burr [1969] NZLR 736; State v Caddell 215 SE 
2d 348 (NC 1975); Rabey v The Queen [1980] 2 SCR 513; Fulcher v State 633 P 2d 142 (Wyo 
1981); Queen v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30; Ross v HMAdvocate 1991 SLT 564; Rv Parris [1992] 
2 SCR 871; McClain v State 678 NE 2d 104 (Ind 1997); Rv Stone (1999) 134 CCC (3d) 353 
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Some neuroscientific and medical explanations of movement. 
How does this definition of action coincide with a neurological definition of movement? In her 
book, The Human Brain, Greenfield gives a very straightforward account of movement and 
how it is achieved. 
How is movement of any sort actually achieved? The contraction of the appropriate 
muscle occurs following a signal sent down from the brain, along the spinal cord. 
Nerves controlling all the different muscles leave the spinal cord in an ordered fashion, 
according to the location of the muscle in the body. People with injuries to their spine 
are unable to move to varying extents according to the level at which the spinal cord is 
damaged. 
Sometimes the spinal cord can function more or less autonomously, without 
descending instructions or control from the brain. Such movements are reflexes. A 
reflex can be defined as a fixed response to a particular trigger - the most obvious 
example is the knee jerk. The knee jerk reflex is triggered when the knee is tapped and 
in response the lower leg shoots out. Neuroscientists refer to this familiar sequence of 
events as the ̀ stretch reflex' because the tap at the critical point on the knee in effect 
compresses atendon by which the muscle in the lower leg is suspended, thereby 
exerting extra pressure on the muscle and stretching it. In order to compensate for this 
lengthening, the muscle contracts, so that the leg shoots forward. " 
This would seem to support Lord Denning's assertion that movements done by the muscles 
without any control by the mind are involuntary. ' It would also seem that on Lord Simon's 
definition reflexes are not acts. However, reflexes which are stimulated in response to a tap on 
the knee may be distinguished from spasms or convulsions, in that the knee reflex is induced by 
the tap, spasms or convulsions are likely to have more complex causes. Greenfield continues: 
Our normal repertoire of movement is not one of fixed responses to rather artificial 
triggers like the neurologist's delicate hammer. We do not wait for someone to tap our 
knee so that we might jerk our leg. Many of the movements we make - such as 
walking, swimming, and running - involve a more complex coordination of muscle 
4 GREENFIELD, S. 1997. The Human Brain -A Guided Tour. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. p. 35 
5 It is notable that the use of the word ̀ reflex' refers only to artificially triggered movement in this example, 
this definition is narrower than the reflex act considered in the Australian case of Ryan YR (1967) 
121 CLR 205, where a defence based around the alleged reflex of inadvertently pulling a trigger 
whilst actually doing something else was considered and rejected. On the neuroscientific definition 
such movement would not fit the description ̀reflex'. See father discussion of this point in chapter 5 
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groups. But even these movements are in a sense, semi automatic. These kind of 
rhythmic, subconscious movements are caused by signals coming down from the brain 
stem. ' 
On this explanation much movement will take place as a result of subconscious brain activity. 
Two parts of the brain which are important in subconscious movement are the cerebellum and 
the basal ganglia. The cerebellum, responds to feedback from the body's sense mechanisms. 
According to Greenfield, the cerebellum is `of vital importance since the sensory motor 
coordination it generates underpins skilled movements that are also the type of movement not 
requiring conscious thought. These movements improve with practice and become almost 
subconscious. For this reason the cerebellum has been dubbed the "autopilot" of the brain. '' 
Greenfield discusses other subconscious movements, ̀ ballistic movements' which are 
controlled by the basal ganglia. Damage to different parts of this area of the brain results in 
`wild involuntary movements' typified by those suffering from Huntingdon's chorea or `muscle 
rigidity and tremor' as in Parkinson's disease. " Neuroscience, as explained by Greenfield, 
suggests no centre for the control of movement in the brain. Rather it seems that different 
types of movements are controlled by different areas of the brain. 
A more precise neuroscientific explanation of conscious motor control of movement becomes 
difficult to construct, because it is not possible to locate a specific area within the brain which 
is responsible for the control of all bodily movements. Greenfield speculates that at the level of 
the subconscious, movement is controlled by another region of the brain, the cortex. This 
region would control `movement which does not require conscious thought'. The example she 
gives of this type of movement is ̀ pressing the brake when the traffic lights are red seems to be 
an automatic movement, which is in fact associated with the cerebellum. ' Her other example is 
of standing up, a movement requiring no ̀ immediate sensory trigger', controlled by the basal 
ganglia. 9 Her explanation of movement allows for conscious motor control of movement, but 
only of some movements. She says that ̀ [t]he generation of movement is the net result of 
6 GREENFIELD, S. 1997. p. 35 
7 GREENFIELD, S. 1997. p. 39 
8 GREENFIELD, S. 1997. p. 40 
9 GREENFIELD, S. 1997. p. 41-2. All quotations 
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many brain regions acting together as individual instruments do in a symphony. The type of 
movements being made, and whether it requires conscious control, determines which brain 
regions are involved. "' 
Thus on the Greenfield explanation of movement only some movements are consciously 
initiated. The question arises, applying Lord Denning's definition, whether only consciously 
initiated movements are voluntary? Lord Denning specifically cites an action done by one who 
is ̀ not conscious of what he is doing' as an involuntary act and gives as an example ̀an act 
done while suffering from concussion or while sleepwalking. ' Two problems arise here. The 
first is that on the Greenfield definition of movement more actions than Lord Denning would 
envisage could be included as being done by someone who is not conscious, at least initially, of 
what she is doing. It is unlikely that the courts would envisage either standing up or applying 
the brake at traffic lights as examples of unconscious action. Indeed in Hill v Baxter it was said 
that `once it is proved that the accused was in the driving seat of a moving car there, is, prima 
facie, an obvious and irresistible inference that he was driving it. '" 
The second problem arises from the first, if the neuroscientific construction of movement is 
accurate physical movement will always have its roots in the unconscious. However, this is 
only a problem, legally, if an explanation of voluntary action requires that actions should be 
consciously initiated. It is however a problem for the traditional law doctrine which sees all 
voluntary action as being initiated by volition. An alternative approach, to the attribution of 
responsibility and agency is to argue that it will be sufficient that movement may be inhibited 
before the process of `acting' is completed. It seems likely that the criminal law will wish to 
impose responsibility on those who continue to `act' after they have become aware that they 
are ̀acting'. 
What should be relevant, on Lord Denning's definition, is whether a defendant could be said to 
10 GREENFIELD, S. 1997. p. 42. For hither discussion of medical, philosophical, and neuroscientific 
explanations of movement see CARTER, R. 1998. Mapping the Mind. London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson; GREENFIELD, S. (Ed. ). 1996. The Human Mind Explained - the Control of the Living 
Machine. London: Cassell; COHEN, D. 1997. The Secret Language of the Mind. London: Duncan 
Baird 
11 [ 1957] 2 WLR 76,83 
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be ̀conscious' of what they were doing. Neuroscientific evidence suggests that this 
consciousness occurs at a point later than the initiation of action. What Lord Denning appears 
to be talking about is conscious awareness of `acting' rather than whether the mental 
mechanisms leading to `acting' are conscious mental processes. This is a subtly different use of 
the word `consciousness' from that utilised by Greenfield when describing whether movement 
is accompanied by consciousness. " 
In neuroscience and the philosophy of the mind there is agreement hat the basic ̀building 
blocks' of consciousness are neurons. 13 Neurons communicate with each other by means of 
synapses which use chemicals to stimulate or depress reactions in other neurons. Thus far the 
explanation is uncontentious. It becomes philosophically contentious when an attempt is made 
to solve the ̀ binding problem' that is how neuronal activity translates itself into a unified 
conscious experience. " Here the philosophy of the mind becomes involved in a debate as to 
the nature of conscious experience. 's But there are still some basic areas of agreement, namely 
that conscious experience is based on neuronal activity and some actions do not require full 
conscious awareness. Thus given the scientific account of action the legal explanation of 
action is unlikely because it assumes that most action is consciously initiated. 
12 For a discussion of different types of consciousness, and a sustained critique of what focus of attention 
accounts leave out from consideration, see ARVIDSON, S. 2000. Transformations in Consciousness, 
Continuity the Self and Marginal Consciousness. Journal of Consckm sness Studies, 2000, vol. 7, no. 
3,3-26. For a discussion of the confusion which may arise from conflating different types of 
consciousness ee BLOCK, N. 1"5. On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. 
Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 1995, vol. 18,227-87 
13 For a full discussion of how consciousness might be constructed see SEARLE, J. 1997; DENNETT, D. 
1991; CHURCHLAND, P. 1995; GREENFIELD, S. 1995. Journey to the Centres of the Mind. New 
York: Freeman; CHALMERS, D. 1996; VELMANS, M. (Ed. ). 1996. The Science of Consciousness. 
London: Routledge; DAMASCIO, A. 2000. The Feeling of What Happens. London: Heinemann. For 
a discussion of whether scientific evaluations of consciousness are possible see GOLDMAN, A. I. 
2000. Can Science Know When You're Conscious? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2000, vol. 7, 
no. 5,3-22 
14 For a discussion of this see SEARLE, 11997. Chapters 2&3 
15 For example Dennett argues that conscious experience is a function of the brain. He believes that conscious 
experience is discontinuous, but he still believes that behaviour falls into two types: the first 
`controlled by conscious thought' and the second by `blind mechanical processes'. According to 
Dennett, therefore, despite human experience being one of continuous consciousness this is an 
illusion, and in this sense our sense of self is also an illusion, there being no centre of consciousness 
within the brain. DENNETT, D. 1991. p. 329. This approach could be contrasted with the approach 
taken either by CHALMERS, D. 1996. or DAMASCIO, A. 2000 
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This traditional legal view of what an action might be is explained by Hart: 
The theory is simply this: a human action is strictly speaking merely a muscular 
contraction. The usual terminology of ordinary speech - the verbs of action like 
`shooting', ̀killing', `hitting', - are inaccurate and misleading, because they 
misrepresent as single actions what in fact are combinations of muscular movements 
and later consequences. We should, therefore, confine the word ̀ act', if we are to think 
and speak scientifically and clearly, to the mere muscular contraction. This is the first 
element of the theory. The second that an ̀act' is not just a muscular contraction but 
one which has a special psychological cause. It is caused by a pre-existing desire, which 
Austin called a ̀ volition' or `act of will', for the muscular contraction. Here is the 
dividing line between mere involuntary movements, like tumbling downstairs, and 
voluntary actions, like walking downstairs. In the one case the muscular contractions 
are desired, and caused by the desire for them, and in the other they are not. This is the 
minimum, indispensable connexion between mind and body if there is to be an ̀ act' and 
responsibility. Of course in a full blown action (according to ordinary speech) like 
`killing' there is, if it is done intentionally, besides the desire or `volition' for the 
muscular movement, knowledge of circumstances and foresight or desire of 
consequences, and in criminal cases these elements may also be necessary for 
responsibility as part of mens rea. But these are to be distinguished from the ̀ volition' 
or `act of will' which is solely a desire for the muscular movements. "' 
The problem with this explanation of involuntary movement, and indeed with Austin's 
explanation of human action from which it is taken, " is that thinking ̀ scientifically and clearly' 
they do not make sense. Twenty first century scientific constructions of movement suggests 
that on the whole information processing regarding individual movement takes place at a 
subconscious level. This is not fatal to the law's conception of voluntariness provided that 
individuals may be shown to have the ability to act other than they did. But on a modern 
scientific description of movement it is questionable whether a volition would have the role 
ascribed to it of `a special psychological cause. ' This is because volition is isolated in the 
traditional description to a desire for a muscular contraction. 
Hart disagrees with the traditional explanation of action. In his view the role of voluntariness 
in the criminal law `is the minimum indispensable connection between mind and body if there is 
16 HART, H. L. A. 1968. p. 97-8 
17 See Introduction p. 22-5 & 28-30 for a discussion of Austin's explanation 
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to be an ̀act' and responsibility. "8 He viewed the traditional legal explanation of action as 
deficient on two counts. Firstly he felt it unnatural to speak of omissions, as being criminal acts 
involving ̀muscular contractions or movements'. 19 Secondly in Hart's opinion the division of 
action into three constituents, ̀a desire for muscle contractions, followed by the contractions, 
followed by foreseen consequences' was faulty. In his view it was ̀quite at variance with the 
ordinary man's experience and the way in which his own actions appear to him. '20 
One modern scientific version of the initiation of action has the advantage of answering both of 
Hart's criticisms of the voluntary act requirement. There is scientific evidence which suggests 
that the element of control of action comes at a later stage than envisaged by the willed bodily 
movement model this will be examined later in this chapter in the discussion of the work of 
Libet. On the Libet thesis control over action is more in the nature of a veto than a volition. It 
may be that Libet's account of how action is controlled is a more sustainable account of action 
than the traditional legal account. It provides a credible explanation of what it means to omit 
to act as the decision not to act is taken once the possibility of acting has entered the potential 
actor's conscious awareness. 
How much reliance should be placed upon the ability of neuroscientists and biologists to 
interpret behaviour through brain scanning? Churchland speculates that neuroscientific imaging 
techniques may in due course assist courts in evaluating the causes of criminal behaviour. 2' He 
conjectures that such techniques may permit the courts to `distinguish between the truly 
problematic people and others - those who have merely stumbled into an encounter with the 
18 Several writers have suggested that one of the problems with action definitions within the criminal law is 
that they try to define action in a particular way to assist with attributions of criminal responsibility. 
`Although many answers may be given it is noteworthy that the ad requirement is frequently invoked 
in attempts to differentiate the conditions of moral and criminal responsibility. ' HUSAK, D. 1998. 
Does Criminal Liability Require an Act? in DUFF, R. A. (Ed. ). 1998. Philosophy and the Criminal 
Law. Cambridge University Press. p. 62. See also FITZGERALD, P. J. 1961. p. l 
19 HART, H. L. A. 1968. p. 100 Hart is not alone in this view we FLETCHER, G. P. 1994. On the Moral 
Irrelevance of Bodily Movements. (1994) 142 UPLR 1443-1561 
20 HART, H. L. A. 1968. p. 101. Both quotations 
21 CHURCHLAND, P. 1995. Chapter 10 
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law'. 22 However, he does not suggest such techniques are available at present. ̀None of this is 
imminent. Decades of exploration, both neurological and legal, he before us still. "' He does 
however suggest that the legal profession needs to update its knowledge of neuroscience and 
to `get a reliable fix on these matters if it is to make useful decisions based upon them. '24 
It may indeed be decades before such focussed brain scanning techniques are available and 
some might argue that, in the meantime, there is no need to reconsider the willed bodily 
movement legal model or the other descriptions of involuntariness utilised by the courts. 
However, if the law adheres to outdated scientific explanations it will become completely out 
of step with medical and scientific conceptions of how movement occurs. This has led some 
commentators to view the stance adopted by medicine and the law as rooted in different 
philosophies. 
On the more general point as to whether medicine or indeed any other factual evidence 
could invalidate the legal reasoning, it is contended not only that it did not in this 
case, " but that such evidence never could. The Law starts from some basic 
assumptions which are accepted a priori, and no amount of science or medicine could 
invalidate those assumptions or anything logically constructed upon them. It is the 
writers' belief that in fact medicine, particularly where it is scientific, starts from a 
basically different philosophical position, which is in fact contradictory to the law's 
philosophical position. The Law starts out with the assumption that every individual 
has ̀ free will', and is therefore responsible for his actions (the only exception is where 
there is something wrong with his ̀ mind' - note particularly not ̀ brain' but `mind' - 
which prevents him from exercising that free will). An individual is to be punished for 
the greater good of society if he exercises that free will in a forbidden manner. The 
main field of enquiry and analysis is to categorize those situations where blame is to be 
attached, i. e. wrongful exercise of free will has taken place. ' 
On this view the criminal law is committed to a distinction between mind and brain which is 
not recognised by many scientists. The additional point inherent in the discussion is the role of 
22 CHURCHLAND, P. 1995. p. 311-12 
23 CHURCHLAND, P. 1995. p. 314 
24 CHURCHLAND, P. 1995. p. 311 
25 Rv Hardie [ 1984] 3 All ER 848 
26 WELLER, M. & SOMERS, W. A. 1991. Differences in the Medical and Legal viewpoint illustrated by Rv 
Hardie. (1991) 31(2) Med Sci Law 152-6, p. 156. Emphasis in original. See discussion of free will and 
the distinction between medical and scientific explanations of behaviour in chapter 5 
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determinism. The ̀ free will versus determinism' debate is one that Blackburn sees as 
`commonly identified as a source of tension between law and psychology'. 27 
How the law defines an involuntary action? 
Some commentators ee legal descriptions of action as having their roots in Aristotle's 
descriptions of human behaviour. 28 Indeed, Aristotle does discuss what makes action 
involuntary. Aristotle wrote in Nicomachean Ethics at some length about involuntary and 
voluntary action. ̀Virtue, then, is about feelings and actions. These receive praise or blame 
when they are voluntary but pardon when they are involuntary. "' For Aristotle involuntary 
action was that which ̀ is forced or is caused by ignorance. ' 30 Though ̀action done in 
ignorance but not caused by ignorance is not necessarily involuntary', an example of this type 
of action is the action of a drunken man. 3' Forced action is described by Aristotle ̀ as where 
wind or human beings who control him were to carry him off. 32 Thus this type of action lacks 
authorship, forced action is brought about in this definition either by the power of the elements 
or by human beings who have physical control over another's actions. 
Aristotle distinguishes involuntary action from that action which results from duress. What 
distinguishes involuntary action from action under duress in his explanation is whether it is 
`choiceworthy'. 33 In other words even under duress, ̀ a mixture of voluntary and involuntary' 
there is an element of choice which makes actions voluntary. `Now in fact he does it willingly; 
for in these sorts of actions he has within him the origin of the movement of the limbs that are 
the instruments [of the action] and when the action is in him, it is also up to him to do them or 
27 BLACKBURN, R. 1995. p. 25 
28 For a discussion of this see ZAILBERT, L. A. 1998. Intentionality, Voluntariness, and Culpability: A 
Historical-Philosophical Analysis. (1998) 1 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 459-99 
29 Book iii, 3.11. trans. IRWIN, T. 1985 Indianapolis: Hackett. p. 53, There is a debate as to whether Aristotle 
employed modern notions of moral responsibility - see FISCHER, J. M. & RAVIZZA, M. 1998. 
Responsibility and Control. Cambridge University Press. p. 12 
30 ARISTOTLE. Book iii, 3.18, p. 58 
31 ARISTOTLE. Book iii, 3.16, p. 56 
32 ARISTOTLE. Book iii, 3.12, p. 53 
33 ARISTOTLE. Book iii, 3.13, p. 54 
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not to do them. ' This is substantially the distinction the criminal law makes in distinguishing 
between cases of duress and involuntariness. 
Similarly, Aristotle distinguishes involuntary action from voluntary action by the knowledge of 
certain `particulars' and the ability to make choices. Knowledge of all the `particulars' means 
that action is voluntary. The `particulars' are `(1) who is doing it; (2) what is he doing; (3) 
about what or to what is he doing it; (4) sometimes also what is he doing it with, e. g. the 
instrument; (5) for what result e. g. safety; (6) in what way e. g. gently or hard. ' "Aristotle 
argued that ignorance of some of these particulars made action involuntary especially when he 
was ignorant of the most important of them; these seem to be `(2) what he is doing, ' and `(5) 
the result for which he does it. ' The paradigm case of involuntary action for Aristotle 
therefore appears to be when someone is unaware of what she is doing or why she is doing it. 
Another distinguishing feature of action for Aristotle is the ability to take decisions. Some 
voluntary actions might occur without deliberation, that is ̀ spur of the moment'. 37 Voluntary 
actions, which are not spur of the moment could however be distinguished: ̀not everything 
voluntary is decided what is decided is the result of prior deliberation. For decision involves 
reason and thought'. 38 Thus, Aristotle develops a concept of virtue in relation to action which 
is split into two parts that which is ̀ spur of the moment' and that which is the product of 
deliberation, involving reason and thought. According to Aristotle it is for these voluntary 
actions that an individual should receive praise or blame. This splitting of action into two types 
is useful because it suggests that action which is habitual or spur of the moment should not be 
viewed as involuntary. 
Smith, uses the following quotation from Hart to exemplify why lack of voluntariness should 
excuse a defendant from criminal liability: 
34 ARISTOTLE. Book iii, 3.13, p. 54 
35 ARISTOTLE. Book iii, 3.17, p. 57 
36 ARISTOTLE. Book iii, 3.17, p. 57 
37 ARISTOTLE. Book iii, 3.2, p. 59 
38 ARISTOTLE. Book iii, 3.22, p. 61 
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What is missing in these cases appears to most people as a vital link between 
mind and body; and both the ordinary man and the lawyer might well insist on 
this by saying that in these cases there is not `really' a human action at all and 
certainly nothing for which anyone should be made criminally responsible 
however `strict' legal responsibility might be. 39 
Aristotle's definition may refine distinctions between voluntariness and involuntariness but it 
does not address the problem that White identifies as to what is the cause of movement. 
Traditionally the link between mind and body has been said by lawyers to be based on the 
voluntary act, expressed in terms of willed bodily movement. White writes: 
There is a difficulty in characterizing the relation between the volition and the body 
movement which follows it, for it seems to be at the same time both logical and causal. 
It is logical in that the volition which is alleged, to cause for example, a movement of 
the index finger is necessarily the volition to do exactly that and it is causal in that it is 
the cause of the movement. But the cause of something ought to be logically 
independent of it. 40 
According to Shapira his search for causation using the model of voluntary action being tied to 
a volition which causes bodily movement is fatally flawed. 
The core of the WBM [willed bodily movement] approach is the belief that action is a 
`real' event, namely, a bodily movement caused or induced by another ̀real' event 
named ̀volition. ' In order for this definition not to collapse into the reduction of 
actions to bare volitions on the one hand, or into the inclusion of complex actions like 
`waging a war' on the other hand, its supporters have typically endeavored to identify 
one particular link in the supposed causal chain leading from volition to remote conse- 
quences as a ̀ basic act. ' The distinction between these and other links in the same 
chain is alleged to have ontological significance. The flaws in this scheme concern each 
and every one of its components: volitions, bodily movements and basic actions. " 
A further problem exists for the traditional approach to voluntary action in that reductionist 
explanations of action arguably cannot assist in defining what it means to act in the sense of 
attributing agency. 
39 HART, H. L. A. quoted in SMITH, J. C. 1999. p. 38 
40 WHITE, A. R. 1985. Grounds of Liability. Oxford: Clarendon. p. 31 
41 SHAPIRA, R. 1998. Stnutural Flaws of The "Willed Bodily Movement" Theory of Action. (1998) 1 
Buffalo Criminal Law Review 349-403, p. 353 
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The difficulties for the criminal law in defining action so that it allows for the evaluation 
of agency 
Fletcher suggests that the problem of defining agency through the action requirement lies in 
the adoption of a ̀ mechanistic and abstract' test. Fletcher describes the traditional legal 
definition of action as, ̀ [t]he will is the mechanical cause and the action is the effect. The will 
is the lever that moves the body into action. ' 42 He suggests that the traditional jurisprudential 
legal test is mechanistic and cannot in reality define human action. There are philosophical 
explanations of why this is the case. 
Like Fletcher, Nagel considers the subjective viewpoint to be central to any construction of 
human behaviour. He notes that the only unusual thing about human bodies is their ̀ chemical 
and physiological structure. '43 This gives human beings a ̀ mind, a point of view, a wide range 
of subjective experiences and mental capacities - none of which can be accommodated by the 
physical conception of objective reality'. He then considers reductionist explanations of the 
mind and concludes that they leave something out. What is left out according to Nagel is the 
`bearer of mental properties, the subject of mental states, processes and events. '" If it is 
accepted that in some way the concept of agency links responsibility with action" then 
presumably Nagel's ̀ bearer of mental properties, the subject of mental states, processes and 
events' will be relevant to assessments of agency. In Nagel's opinion any method of evaluating 
agency will necessarily include the assessment of subjective experience. 
Hornsby highlights the distinction between two types of agency 
SOME philosophical problems about agency can be put in terms of two points of view. 
From the personal point of view, an action is a person's doing something for a reason, 
and her doing it is found intelligible when we know the reason that led her to it. From 
the impersonal point of view, an action would be a link in a causal chain that could be 
42 FLETCHER, G. P. 1998. Basic Concepts of Criminal Law Oxford University Press. p. 51 
43 NAGEL, T. 1986. The View from Nowhere. Oxford University Press. p. 28 
44 NAGEL, T. 1986. p. 29 
45 Precisely how this link might be formed will be discussed in the next chapter 
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viewed without paying any attention to people, the links being understood by reference 
to the world's causal workings. We might take it for granted that there are truths 
available to be discovered from each of these points of view. The problems about 
agency surface when we start to wonder whether the impersonal point of view does 
not threaten the personal one ' 
Hornsby is highlighting a major difficulty for the criminal law. In determining voluntary action 
or involuntariness the law utilises a reductionist test of willed bodily movement. Does this 
conception of action, impose an objective point of view which threatens the very meaning of 
agency itself? Hornsby's continued evaluation of agency clarifies this point: 
We might think that a full understanding of everything that happens when there is an 
action could be had without anyone's knowing who did what thing for what reasons. 
But then, if the whole truth about an action and its causal past and future can be given 
in viewing it as a manifestation of the world's causal workings, the impersonal point of 
view can seem to displace the personal one. Of course the personal point of view might 
still be adopted, even if it seemed redundant from another point of view. But two lines 
of thought may be used to make it seem redundant tout court. First, there is the 
thought, which Thomas Nagel has made especially vivid, that it is essential to our 
conceiving of our ourselves as agents that we take our actions to be completely 
accounted for in the terms that we use as agents; the possibility of treating actions from 
the impersonal point of view would then subvert our ordinary conception of 
ourselves. "' 
Hornsby concludes that ̀ actions are not in fact accessible from the impersonal point of view. '' 
The willed bodily movement test of voluntary action seems close to an attempt to evaluate 
action impersonally. Is this possible? May agency be evaluated from an objective viewpoint? 
The answer to this question for the purposes of this thesis will depend entirely on the type of 
agency required by the criminal law. 
In The View from Nowhere, Nagel examines the quality of subjective experience and evaluates 
the limits of objectivity: 
46 HORNSBY, J. 1993a. Agency and Causal Explanation, in HEIL, J. & MELE, A. (Eds. ). Mental Causation. 
Oxford University Press. p. 161. Emphasis in original 
47 HORNSBY, J. 1993a. p. 161. Emphasis in the original. Hornsby also sees a further philosophical problem 
posed by the two approaches to agency regarding the need if the objective point of view is to succeed 
for the subsumption of the subjective view within the objective view. Something she doubts is 
metaphysically possible 
48 HORNSBY, J. 1993a. p. 162 
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The limit of objectivity with which I shall be most concerned is one that follows 
directly from the process of gradual detachment by which objectivity is achieved. An 
objective standpoint is created by leaving a more subjective, individual, or even just 
human perspective behind; but there are things about the world and life and ourselves 
that cannot be adequately understood from a maximally objective standpoint, however 
much it may extend our understanding beyond the point from which we started. A 
great deal is essentially connected to a particular point of view, or type of point of 
view, and the attempt to give a complete account of the world in objective terms 
detached from these perspectives inevitably leads to false reductions or to outright 
denial that certain patently real phenomena exist at all. 
This form of objective blindness is most conspicuous in the philosophy of mind, where 
one or another external theory of the mental, from physicalism to functionalism, is 
widely held. What motivates these views is the assumption that what there really is 
must be understandable in a certain way - that reality is in a narrow sense objective 
reality. For many philosophers the exemplary case of reality is the world described by 
physics, the science in which we have achieved our greatest detachment from a 
specifically human perspective on the world. But for precisely that reason physics is 
bound to leave undescribed the irreducibly subjective character of conscious mental 
processes, whatever may be their intimate relation to the physical operation of the 
brain. The subjectivity of consciousness is an irreducible feature of reality - without 
which we couldn't do physics or anything else - and it must occupy as fundamental a 
place in any credible world view as matter, energy, space, time, and numbers. "" 
If Nagel is right then the criminal law faces real problems in constructing a meaningful 
definition of involuntary action. Hornsby suggests that the problem lies in locating the agent 
within the ̀ causal scene'. In determining agency Hornsby suggests that ̀ responsibility consists 
in the action's being ours, and not in its having been caused, or done, by us. sSO She also 
suggests that a value neutral definition of action in relation to agency may be impossible. 
`Those who seek and give "action explanations" do not regard the matter impersonally or 
externally, any more than the agent herself does when she deliberates about what to do. ' From 
this she concludes that there is a ̀ barrier between the external and internal explanatory 
schemes', and that where the ̀ ideal of rationality' is used in explanation of an event it is 
`delivered from the contents of her [the agent's] thoughts and wants. '5' 
One of the problems with impersonal conceptions of action for the purposes of defining agency 
49 NAGEL, T. 1986. p. 7 
50 HORNSBY, J. 1993a. Both quotations p. 178 
51 HORNSBY, J. 1993a. p. 180 
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in Hornsby's view is the use of the word action itself She considers the simple event of 
someone switching on a kettle, this entails ̀neuronal firings, signals going out to the nerves, 
muscles contracting. ' But in Hornsby's opinion this more reductionist view will not be all there 
is to action. Action may also include ̀a whole collection of events leading from some 
happening in the depth of Peter's [the kettle operative's] brain all the way to an event beyond 
his body in which his desire's being satisfied consists. ' Whilst reductionist views encompass 
and may identify the commencement of an action, they cannot define the finishing point of an 
action. Hornsby argues that it is this distinction which is relevant to agency. The finishing point 
of an action draws the line between the ̀ action and its effect'. Here she suggests the 
philosophical debate over the meaning of words which define when an action begins. The 
common sense notion that ̀ people do things (for reasons), ' is the subject of debate. Hornsby 
herself argues that ̀ bodily movements are effects of actions', not the action itselfss 53 
In defining involuntary action it seems the law is concerned with defining a part of the 
constituents of responsibility which establish agency, ' or on another view with imposing a 
rational explanation for the defendant's actions. Once the voluntary act requirement is met the 
law considers a broader personal account of action, but in determining voluntary action it 
52 HORNSBY, J. 1993a. p. 174-5. All quotations 
53 Hornsby concludes: 
So there are questions about how nervous systems can subserve the phenomena of mentality and 
agency. But these questions are not made easier by the assumption that, to everything we speak of 
from the personal point of view, there attaches a piece of vocabulary apt for describing things 
impersonally. This assumption after all is the source of the thought that actions are swallowed up 
from an external perspective, and of the thought that the mental is epiphenomenal. And it is not 
as if the assumption on its own could do anything to integrate the personal with an impersonal 
point of view. Davidson himself has made this clear: in the sphere of reason-explanations, 
causality is ̀ connected with the normative demands of rationality' (Davidson 1985, p. 246). 
There is then no new problem about integration when the assumption is abandoned, and actions 
are thought neither to be swallowed up nor deprived of genuinely causal explanations, but absent 
simply, from the impersonal point of view. When we see an action as a person's initiating a 
series of events, we recognize a type of event whose causal ancestry is understood from a 
personal, rational point of view, and whose causal successors come to be understood from an 
impersonal, perhaps scientific one. And we appreciate that causality is a concept that we may 
operate with from both points of view: people make a difference, and do so because their actions 
are events which make a difference. 
HORNSBY, J. 1993a. p. 184-5 
54 See discussion of this in chapter 5 
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seeks to establish whether the bodily movement was willed. It is questionable whether such an 
action requirement can establish voluntariness or agency. Hornsby suggests that what is 
relevant to responsibility is ̀ the actions being ours'. She also suggests that `where the ideal of 
rationality is used' the answer to whether an actor is responsible lies in the ̀ agent's thoughts 
and wants. ' She concludes that it is possible to view actions both impersonally and personally 
but in reality the evaluation of action is a mix of the two, `the causal ancestry', the rational 
explanation for an action is only accessible from the personal viewpoint, either of the observer 
or the actor. What follows is observable scientifically. On this view the problem for the law in 
defining responsibility by means of willed bodily movement becomes clearer. It is not possible 
to capture the causal, rational part of action from a totally impersonal point of view. 
In making evaluations of responsibility the courts have to consider whether the act of the 
accused was voluntary or involuntary. " This assessment is based not only on the test of willed 
bodily movement, but on whether the actor was conscious. The willed bodily movement 
requirement is a reductionist test in that, theoretically, it excludes from the evaluation of 
responsibility the reasons an individual has for acting. One of the most difficult areas of 
evaluation in relation to automatic states lies in states of partial consciousness where the 
defendant has carried out a series of apparently purposeful acts of which she claims she was 
not consciously aware, that her behaviour lacked voluntariness. It is difficult for juries to 
determine this on a purely mechanistic account of action. In Lord Denning's words to decide 
whether an act has been done by the muscles without any control by the mind. ' 
Partial consciousness and involuntary action 
Does Lord Denning's view of automatism encompass tates of partial consciousness? Lord 
Denning defined involuntary acts as ̀not conscious', his examples were an ̀ act done while 
suffering from concussion or sleepwalking. ' Did Lord Denning mean such people were 
unconscious of their ̀ actions' or not consciously aware of their actions? It may be intuitive 
but, human experience leads to the belief that `acts' are carried out with varying degrees of 
consciousness and there is neuroscientific evidence to support the idea that the conscious 
55 If this distinction is raised in her defence 
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awareness of `acts' varies. Greenfield explains the experience of consciousness as a potential 
property of groups of neurons, and the varying degrees of consciousness in terms of neuronal 
gestalts. A gestalt of neurons occurs, in her view, when `certain groups of brain cells are linked 
and become active at the expense of others. ' The larger the neuronal gestalt, the more 
neurons excited by some stimulus, the deeper the conscious experience. ' Thus, Greenfield 
provides an explanation of conscious experience that is not located in any particular area of the 
brain and which varies according to the degree of stimulus and arousal within the brain. In this 
manner neuroscientific research can provide support for arguments that ̀ acts' are carried out 
with varying levels of consciousness. Lord Denning in his consideration of states where the 
defendant was not conscious of what he was doing, gave as examples, sleepwalking and 
concussion. 
But are the actions of those who are asleep or concussed, unconscious according to medical or 
neuroscientific explanations? Blair, " a consultant psychiatrist, sees automatism as a `syndrome 
of symptoms which occurs in various conditions that involve a disturbance of consciousness. "' 
A state of clouded consciousness where the individual's normal ability to control his behaviour 
is impaired. He reviews the two causes of automatism described by Lord Denning: concussion 
and somnambulism. According to Blair these may result in illegal behaviour as a result of the 
disturbance ̀of the delicate and coherent relationship between the various components of the 
individual's body and mind to ensure his harmonious awareness of himself as an entity, of the 
realities of his environment and of his abilities to control his behaviour. '" Of the concussed 
actor Blair writes: 
A concussed person may indulge in threatening, insulting or aggressive acts of a silly 
type or if concussed while driving an automobile continue on his way dangerously. On 
the other hand, it is seldom that such cases indulge in seriously aggressive crimes 
unless they develop a state of frenzy or proceed to drink alcohol. (McCaldon, 1964). In 
the latter category recovery may entail a passage through stupor, delirium and clouding 
before consciousness is fully regained. During the stages of delirium or cloudiness the 
56 GREENFIELD, S. 1995. p. 161 
57 BLAIR, D. 1977. The Mediological Aspects of Automatism, (1977) 17 (3) Med Sci Law, 167-82 
58 BLAIR, D. 1977. p. 167 
59 BLAIR, D. 1977. p. 167 
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patient, if at large, may commit a really serious criminal act such as assault, violence or 
homicide. 
To summarize, post-concussional automatism is a real entity which may give rise to 
stupid, irresponsible and illegal behaviour but seldom to major sexual or violent 
crimes. 60 
Similarly with regard to sleepwallcing or somnambulism Blair describes the state of automatism 
as follows: 
Whilst somnambulism persists, the subject's consciousness is in sleepy abeyance and he 
is unaware of his actions and on waking remembers nothing of them. He is, therefore, 
in a state of automatism. It is almost unknown for somnambulists to injure themselves 
and whereas they may in that state of mind behave in an odd and sometimes illegal way 
they do not often indulge in serious crimes. Nevertheless, violent and even homicidal 
crimes have been committed by a person in a state of somnambulism (automatism) 
(Podolsky, 1960; Morce, 1968) 61 
Similarly, Nunn, a consultant psychologist, would dispute that sleep is an unconscious state: 
People tend to think of themselves as habitually losing consciousness for eight hours, 
or whatever, out of every twenty-four. This is not in fact the case. What happens is that 
we lose immediate awareness of events in the external world, we lose the sensation of 
being able to direct our attention at will and we have few clear memories of what we 
experienced while we were asleep. However, people woken up from so-called rapid 
eye movement (REM) sleep always report awareness of vivid mental activity (dreams), 
and even those woken from slow wave sleep often recall awareness of having been 
engaged in cogitation or the like. Moreover, unusual percepts do tend to get through 
and are often woven into the material of dreams most people, when a blanket has 
slipped off their feet in cold weather, will have had the experience of dreaming that 
they were wading through snow or something of that sort62 
On this view then Lord Denning's definition of involuntariness cannot be based on an equation 
of involuntariness with unconsciousness. North P. in Rv Burr acknowledged this when he says 
of Lord Denning's comments that: 
60 BLAIR, D. 1977. p. 173-4 
61 BLAIR, D. 1977. p. 181-2 
62 NUNN, C. 1996. Awareness, What it is, What it does. London: Routledge. p. 19 
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I think it should be made plain that when Lord Denning speaks of `an act which is done 
by the muscles without any control by the mind', he does not mean that the accused 
person must be absolutely unconscious because you cannot move a muscle without a 
direction given by the mind. What his Lordship in my opinion was saying is that all the 
deliberative functions of the mind must be absent so that the accused person acts 
automatically. "' 
It is questionable whether Lord Denning meant that all deliberative functions of the mind 
should be absent, but he seems to have had in mind a state where conscious appreciation of 
what the defendant was doing was substantially impaired. North P. puts forward a concept of 
human action where each act is deliberated. Neuroscientific evidence, philosophical argument 
and intuitive experience suggests that this is not how most `action' occurs. Lord Denning 
actually says ̀ one who is not conscious of what he is doing', and then uses concussion and 
sleepwalking as examples of states in which such a lack of consciousness might occur. 
Sleepwalking and concussion are not seemingly states of unconsciousness but states of 
clouded consciousness. Lord Lane, in the Court of Appeal in AG's Reference (No 2 of 1992), 
reviewing Lord Denning's comments, said that the defence of automatism required `a total 
destruction of voluntary control on the defendant's part. Impaired reduced or partial control is 
not enough' Yet it is clear that both sleepwalking and concussion are conditions of clouded 
consciousness or partial control. " As was argued previously a different approach has been 
taken to automatism in driving cases, and AG's reference (No 2 of 1992) is a driving case. In 
Quick' a differently constituted Court of Appeal had taken the view that a defendant in a 
semi-conscious state, resulting from hypoglycaemia, might have a defence of automatism 
What the law seems to be searching for here is a definition of when a person is the author of 
his actions or as was said in HMAdvocate v Ritchie 67 ̀[t]he question accordingly which you 
have to determine is whether, at the time of the accident, the accused was or was not the 
63 [1969] NZLR 736,745 
64 [1993] 4 All ER 683,687 
65 Sleepwalking has been accepted, by the courts as founding a defence of automatism, albeit insane 
automatism 
66 Rv Quick [1973] 3 WLR 26 
671926 SLT 308 
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master of his own action. So put the question becomes a pure question of fact. ' Or as was said 
by Lord Hope in Ross v HM Advocate, 68 automatism occurs when ̀the accused, while not 
insane is said to have no control over his actions. ' Involuntary action on this description is a 
lack of sufficient consciousness to control movement. 
Fenwick, a neuropsychiatrist, raises an interesting question regarding consciousness and the 
length of time of any episode of involuntariness. " Speculating that it is possible for an `act' 
which would attract criminal liability to be caused by a very transitory mental event, for 
example an epileptic spike that could occur in the space of a 100 milliseconds (ms or msec. ), 
he asks whether in fact the perpetrator of such an act could in any meaningful way be 
consciously aware of what she was doing. He concludes, on the basis of the decision in 
Kemp, 7° that automatism caused by an epileptic aura which might last for seconds would be 
sufficient for a finding by the courts of insane automatism. In these short time scales he argues 
that `the act would have taken place before it reached consciousness. "He bases this comment 
on the work of Libet which suggests that consciousness of acting only arises after some 400- 
500ms, and concludes that: `[j]udges have long rejected the concept of irresistible impulse; the 
time may be approaching, however, when a defence of insanity due to an `unconscious' (and 
therefore irresistible) impulse is again respectable. 'n 
Libet has revised his estimate of how long it is before human beings become ̀aware of 
intention to act' this is now stated as being 350-400ms after ̀ readiness potential' (RP) is noted 
in the brain, but only `200ms before the motor act. ' 73 But the basis of his argument is still very 
much as Fenwick has expressed it. What is questionable is whether Libet's research could be 
68 1991 SLT 564,571 
69 FENWICK, P. 1993. Brain, Mind and Behaviour. British Jounwi of Psychiatry. 1993, vol. 163,565-73 
70 [1956] 3 All E. R 249,253 Devlin J. stated that the M'Naghten Rules applied to arteriosclerosis which was 
a `disease of the mind'. Devlin J. stated that once the defendant was said to be suffering from a 
`disease of the mind' under the M'Naghten Rules it mattered not ̀ whether the disease is curable or 
incurable, or whether it is temporary or permanent' 
71 FENWICK, P. 1993. p. 568 
72 FENWICK, P. 1993. p. 568 
73 LIBET, B. 1999. Do We have Free Will? Journal of Consciowness Studies, 1999, vol. 6, no. 9-9,47-57 
162 
put to the purposes proposed by Fenwick at the present. " It is also questionable whether such 
proof would make irresistible impulse respectable, or simply prove that in Hornsby's words 
ownership of the act was absent. If ownership is absent there is no actor available to resist the 
impulse. According to Libet: 
The initiation of the freely voluntary act appears to begin in the brain unconsciously, 
well before the person consciously knows he wants to act! Is there, then, any role for 
conscious will in the performance of a voluntary act?.... To answer this it must be 
recognized that conscious will (W) does appear about 150 msec. before the muscle is 
activated, even though it follows onset of the RP. An interval of 150 msec. would 
allow enough time in which the conscious function might affect the final outcome of 
the volitional process. (Actually, only 100 msec. is available for any such effect. The 
final 50 msec. before the muscle is activated is the time for the primary motor cortex to 
activate the spinal motor nerve cells. During this time the act goes to completion with 
no possibility of stopping it by the rest of the cerebral cortex. ) 
Potentially available to the conscious function is the possibility of stopping or vetoing 
the final progress of the volitional process, so that no actual muscle action ensues. 
Conscious-will could thus affect the outcome of the volitional process even though the 
latter was initiated by unconscious cerebral processes. Conscious will might block or 
veto the process, so that no act occurs. 'S 
Thus Libet provides an explanation of how consciousness may control movement. This view 
of consciousness is clearly relevant to the basis of legal responsibility. As a construction of 
bodily movement it challenges the legal conception of willed bodily movement as expressed by 
Austin and Moore, where volition perform an executory function in initiating muscular 
contractions. It is also relevant to questions of responsibility which will be further discussed in 
the next chapter. 
Confining the discussion for the moment to what an action might be from this perspective a 
description may be obtained of the commencement of movement as being unconscious and 
emerging to a level where conscious appreciation of the potentiality to act occurs immediately 
prior to the movement itself occurring. On the Libet formulation this gives sufficient time for 
movement to be vetoed by the brain. A note of caution needs to be sounded here. This is a 
74 See Churchland's comments regarding the possibility of neuroscience being this accurate earlier in this 
chapter p. 150 
75 LIBET, B. 1999. p. 51-2. Emphasis in the original 
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persuasive xplanation of movement and fits with basic intuitions as to what movement might 
be, but all neuroscientific explanations of the brain are hypotheses. Hypotheses which are more 
or less convincing and certainly lead to more informed judgements as to what may be 
occurring when movement akes place. As Richard Dawkins points out scepticism about some 
of the conclusions drawn from scientific experiments may be valid, but that does not invalidate 
the cumulative knowledge of scientific experiment. 
Let's keep a sense of proportion about this! Yes, there's much that we still don't know. 
But surely our belief that the earth is round and not flflat, and that it orbits the sun, will 
never be superseded. That alone is enough to confound those, endowed with a little 
philosophical learning, who deny the very possibility of objective truth: those so-called 
relativists who see no reason to prefer scientific views over aboriginal myths about the 
world. 76 
What it seems science is able to do, is to provide evidence that the initiation of movement is 
largely a subconscious process. However, there is evidence that actors become aware of the 
potentiality for movement in time to prevent an ̀ act' occurring if it is perceived to be an 
inappropriate response. Libet sees his thesis" as limited to proof that there is normally a 
potential to inhibit ̀ action', immediately prior to that action occurring: 
We should also distinguish between deliberations about what choice of action to adopt 
(including pre-planning of when to act on such a choice) and the final intention actually 
`to act now'. One may, after all, deliberate all day about a choice but never act; there is 
no voluntary act in that case. In our experimental studies we found that in some trials 
subjects engaged in some conscious pre-planning of roughly when to act (in the next 
second or so). But even in those cases, the subjects reported times of the conscious 
wish to actually act to be about - 200 msec.; this value was very close to the values 
reported for fully spontaneous voluntary acts with no pre-planning. The onset of the 
unconscious brain process (RP) for preparing to act was well before the final conscious 
intention ̀ to act now' in all cases. These findings indicated that the sequence of the 
volitional processes `to act now' may apply to all volitional acts, regardless of their 
76 DAWIUNS, R. Science Delusion and the Appetite for Wonder, Richard Dimbleby Lecture, 12"' November 
1996, BBC1. Transcript available at http: /www. edge. org/3rd culture/dawkins/lec ureL_pl. html 
(7.10.2000) 
77 LIBET, B. 1985. Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. ? fie 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1985, vol. 8,529 -539. For a peer group discussion of Libet's thesis 
see The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1985, no. 8, p. 539-66 and the Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 1999, vol. 6. no 8-9 
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spontaneity or prior history of conscious deliberations. " 
In this manner science may inform our judgements about what involuntary action might be but 
its finding should not be treated as certainties, but neither as Dawkins points out should the 
evidence it provides be ignored. Scientific conjecture may provide a better explanation of 
events than blind ignorance. The real danger lies injuries assessing expert evidence as if it 
were absolutely incontrovertible. Thus the law needs to achieve a framework for defining 
involuntary action which permits juries adequately to assess evidence of involuntariness and 
action. Collins and Pinch, in their discussion of the use of scientific evidence in court, argue 
that this may entail the use of more scientific evidence and not less. They also stress the need 
for an equality of expert opinion examining both sides of the argument so that the jury obtains 
a clear idea of the debate. 79 
Libet's thesis satisfactorily answers some of the problems raised by legal commentators 
regarding the lack of reality in the willed bodily movement concept. This is particularly true in 
cases of spontaneous action, which philosophers also have problems explaining when they base 
their definitions of acting upon a concept of intentional planning. This problem was well 
expressed by Bratman during the symposium discussion following the publication of Moore's 
book, Act and Crime. 80 Bratman subscribes to the idea that a key feature of action which 
identifies it as separable from other human behaviours is intentionality, but he has problems in 
relating this belief to cases of spontaneous action. 
Consider, first the cases of spontaneous voluntary action. Suppose you unexpectedly 
throw a ball to me and I spontaneously reach up and catch it. My catching it is under 
my control and voluntary ... But my action 
is relatively automatic and unreflective, so it 
may be strained to suppose its etiology must involve a distinct attitude of intending 
78 LIBET, B. 1999. p. 54 
79 The problems of scientific theories and the use of expert evidence in cant are entertainingly discussed by 
COLLINS, FL & PINCH, T. 1993. The Golem. Cambridge University Press. Particularly p. 141 to 151 
80 MOORE, M. 1993 p. 4. For a full discussion of Moore's thesis see the following articles in (1994) 142 
UPLR FLETCHER, G. P. 1994; CORRADO, M. 1994. Is there an Act Requirement in the Criminal 
Law? 1529-61; GOLDMAN, A. I. 1994. Action and Crime: A Fine Grained Approach. 1563-86; 
MORSE, S. J. 1994. Culpability and Control. 1587-1660; WILLIAMS, B. 1994. The Actus Reus of Dr 
Caligari. 1661-1673; AUDI, R. 1994. Volition, Intention, and Responsibility. 1675-1704; 
BRATMAN, M. E. 1994. Moore at Intention and Volition. 1705-1718; HORNSBY, J. 1994. Action 
and Aberration. 1719-1747 
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given that we are understanding intending largely in terms of its role in planning. But 
we still have a voluntary act requirement. If instead of catching a ball, I were to punch 
you in the nose, I would be subject to punishment. 
I am unsure exactly what to say about such cases. Perhaps such spontaneous 
actions are best characterised as voluntary and goal directed, but not intentional 
(though not unintentional either). Making room in this way for actions that are 
voluntary but neither intentional nor unintentional would allow us to hold onto 
the idea that intentional action is always grounded in some intention. It would 
still entail that actions that satisfy the voluntary act requirement may involve no 
intention, and that is a conclusion that Moore could not accept. "' 
On the Libet definition of voluntary action this problem ceases to exist. The initiation of the 
action is unconscious, but once it has entered conscious awareness, although spontaneous, it is 
a voluntary act assuming that the actor is able to veto the action which follows. On the Libet 
explanation what would make action involuntary would be the inability to form the minimal 
intention required to restrain action in this way. ' It should be noted that Libet provides a more 
reductionist explanation of behaviour than that favoured by Nagel and Hornsby. The Libet 
formulation does not focus on all the reasons that an actor had for acting but simply on the 
question of whether the actor had the ability to veto or approve the plan of action already 
formed in his unconscious. It is measure of the ability to exercise control but it is not 
dependant on physical or mental divisions of the body and is the more convincing as an 
explanation because of this fact. Put simply Libet's experiments uggest that the question 
regarding whether an action is involuntary may be best expressed as whether there was an 
ability to veto action. It is suggested that such a suggestion captures the criminal law 
requirement of involuntariness. An action is involuntary when there is a total inability to act 
otherwise. ' 
Philosophy and neuroscience 
This scientific explanation of action is closer to the manner in which the ordinary man would 
explain action It seems intuitively more acceptable to explain consciousness in relation to 
81 BRATMAN, M. E. 1994. p. 1712 
82 For the problems of assessing apparently purposeful behaviour see WILUAMS B. 1994. p. 1661-73 
83 For further discussion of this see SIMESTER, A. P. 1999. On the So-called Requirement for Voluntary 
Action. (1998)1 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 403-30 
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movement'' as the ability to stop the movement once the individual is aware that it will take 
place, rather than consciousness in relation to a volition for the muscular contractions which 
commence each movement. The problem of consciousness which is being considered is what 
Searle calls the fourth problem of consciousness: that is the explanation of `how mental events 
can cause physical events. How, for example, could anything as "weightless" and "ethereal" as 
a thought give rise to action? '85 
Searle examines the structure of human action in his fourth Reith Lecture, and expresses 
reservations about adopting a purely scientific account of action. ' He begins by establishing 
that `types of actions or behaviour' cannot be identified with `types of bodily movements. ' His 
justification for this is that `one and the same set of bodily movements might constitute a 
dance, or signalling, or exercising, or testing one's muscles, or none of the above. '87 He then 
sets out to analyse other features of action. He notes that `actions seem to have preferred 
descriptions. ' He ties his construction of action to an imaginary walk in Hyde Park. 
If I am going for a walk to Hyde Park, there are any number of other things that are 
happening in the course of my walk, but their descriptions do not describe my inten- 
tional actions, because in acting, what I am doing depends in large part on what I think 
I am doing. So for example, I am also moving in the general direction of Patagonia, 
shaking the hair on my head up and down, wearing out my shoes, and moving a lot of 
air molecules. However, none of these other descriptions seems to get at what is 
essential about this action, as the action it is. 
A third related feature of actions is that a person is in a special position to know what 
he is doing. He doesn't have to observe himself or conduct an investigation to see 
which action he is performing, or at least is trying to perform. So, if you say to me: 
`Are you trying to walk to Hyde Park or trying to get closer to Patagonia? ' I have no 
hesitation in giving an answer even though the physical movements that I make might 
be appropriate for either answer. 
It is also a remarkable fact about human beings that quite effortlessly we are able to 
identify and explain the behaviour of ourselves and of other people. I believe that this 
84 It could be said that it might be easier not to talk of consciousness in relation to bodily movements at all. 
However, the willed bodily movement model in talking of a volition preceding bodily movement 
appears to be envisaging some sort of consciousness of the commencement of each movement 
85 SEARLE, J. 1984. p. 25 
86 SEARLE, 11984. p. 57-70 
87 SEARLE, J. 1984. p. 57 
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ability rests on our unconscious mastery of a certain set of principles, just as our ability 
to recognise something as a sentence of English rests on our having an unconscious 
mastery of the principles of English grammar. I believe there is a set of principles that 
we presuppose when we say such ordinary commonsense things as that, for example, 
Basil voted for the Tories because he thought that they would cure the problem of 
inflation, or Sally moved from Birmingham to London because she thought the job 
opportunities were better there, or even such simple things as that the man over there 
making such strange movements is in fact sharpening an axe, or polishing his shoes. 
It is common for people who recognise the existence of these theoretical principles to 
sneer at them by saying that they are just a folk theory and that they should be 
supplanted by some more scientific account of human behaviour. I am suspicious of 
this claim just as I would be suspicious of a claim that said we should supplant our 
implicit theory of English grammar, the one we acquire by learning the language. The 
reason for my suspicion in each case is the same: using the implicit theory is part of 
performing the action in the same way that using the rules of grammar is part of 
speaking. So though we might add to it or discover all sorts of interesting additional 
things about language or about behaviour, it is very unlikely that we could replace that 
theory which is implicit and partly constitutive of the phenomenon by some external 
`scientific' account of that very phenomenon. " 
Thus for Searle there is ̀ more to types of action than physical movements' actions have 
`preferred descriptions'. In his view `people know what they are doing without observation 
and the principles by which we identify and explain action are themselves part of the action, 
that is they are partly constitutive of actions. '89 To Searle in explaining human behaviour the 
key feature is intentionality. However, whether his description of intentionality is the same as 
other philosophical descriptions of intentionality is a moot point and one that cannot be 
discussed by this thesis. Before considering Searle's explanation of behaviour it is necessary 
briefly to consider the constructions of action by philosophers generally. It is within this 
philosophical framework that Searle's explanation has its roots. 
The philosophy of human action and the criminal law 
Searle argues that by explaining human behaviour in terms of the ̀ mental' and the ̀ physical', 
`two mutually exclusive territories' philosophers have ̀a hopeless map' and they will `never 
88 SEARLE, J. 1984. p. 58-59 
89 SEARLE, J. 1984. p. 59. All quotations. Emphasis in original 
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find' their `way about'. 90 Whilst he might agree with White that `[t]he important philosophical 
questions about action concern its nature, its description and its explanation', " Searle would 
not agree with many legal theorists or philosophers of action about the route that they take to 
achieve this. Philosophers acknowledge that conceptions of action are directly linked to 
concepts such as responsibility, blame, good and evil, ' though the precise nature of this link is 
the subject of debate. 3 For Moya the questions regarding the philosophy of action concern 
consistency. 
Those who doubt the existence of actions are not questioning what everyone can 
perceive. They are rather wondering whether concepts we ordinarily use to describe 
and interpret those observations are appropriate and ultimately consistent ... if action is 
an inconsistent concept, there cannot be actions just as there cannot be squared circles. 
So, analysis of the concept of action itself is a main topic of the philosophy of action. 4 
In order to make evaluations of responsibility philosophers traditionally have sought to identify 
a mental cause of events which could result in action. In doing this one of the major problems 
for action theorists is the philosophical problem of infinite regress, which in terms of action is 
the need to identify one act ̀ not a chain of causes extending further and further into the past', 
which makes it seem that there is nothing that `we, as agents initiate, no action at all only 
further happenings. '" Some philosophers have tried to avoid this problem by identifying basic 
acts. Basic acts, aim to distinguish actions from happenings and attribute agency to action. " 
90 SEARLE, J. R. 1997. p. xiv 
91 WHITE, A. R. 1968. The Philosophy of Action. Oxford University Press p. 1 
92 MOYA, C. I. 1990. The Philosophy ofAction. Cambridge: Polity Press. p. 2 
93 See FEINBERG, J. 1965. Action and Responsibility in BLACK, M. (Ed. ). 1965. Philosophy in America. 
London: Allen & Unwin, 134-60 
94 MOYA, C. J. 1990. p. 2 
95 MOYA, C. J. 1990. p. 2. The problem of infinite regress was first posited by RYLE, G. 1963. The Concept of 
the Mind. Harmondsworth: Peregrine. p. 65-6 ̀ if my volition ... is voluntary, ... then it must issue 
from 
a prior volition and that from another ad infinitum. ' Emphasis in original 
96 See MOYA, C. J. 1990. Chapter 1 
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Danto summarises the problem of defining agency, 97 and seeks to resolve the problem by the 
use of the conception of basic action. Moya analyses this proposal of Danto's by applying the 
statement to the example of someone firing a gun. Moya suggests that by Danto's analogy 
moving a finger could be the basic action in the firing of the gun. 98 Danto describes a basic 
action as, 
a is a basic action of m only if a is an action and there is no action distinct from and 
performed by m, which stands to a as a cause to effect. If the effect of an action 
distinct from itself, and b is performed by m, then b is a nonbasic action of m. Raising 
his arm is a basic action of m, if m does not cause his arm to rise; if he does cause it to 
rise, then it is a nonbasic action. ' 
Moya argues this definition of action cannot distinguish between ̀ (s)omeone moved his finger, 
and ... Someone's 
finger moved', 1°° such as when someone moves their finger as a result of a 
spasm. 'o1 
Danto would not have accepted this argument, he wrote, `[s]ome of the chief difficulties 
philosophers have encountered in the theory of action are due to their having approached it 
from the point of view of the negatively abnormal. From that point of view, basic action is 
hopelessly mysterious. "02 For Danto actions could be caused to happen by either the body or 
the mind, but basic actions were not caused in this sense ̀I sometimes just act ... directly, as 
when I perform basic actions' 103 
97 DANTO, A. C. 1968. Basic Actions. in WHITE, A. R. (Ed. ). 1968.43-58, p. 51 ̀ for suppose every action 
were a case of the agent causing something to happen. This means, each time he does a, he must 
independently do b, which causes b to happen ... This quickly entails that the agent cold perform no 
action at all. If accordingly there are any actions at all of the sort described by "causing things to 
happen", there must be actions which are not caused to happen by the man who performs them. '
98 MOYA, C. J. 1990. p. 14 
99 DANTO, A. C. 1966. Freedom and Forbearance, in LEHRER, K. (Ed. ). Freedom and Deterininism. New 
York: Random House. p. 48. Emphasis in original, quoted in MOYA, C. J. 1990. p. 14 
100 MOYA, C. J. 1990. p. 15 
101 This point is also made by Searle although he makes it in respect of all reductionist explanations of action 
102 DANTO, A. C. 1968. p. 54 
103 DANTO, A. C. 1968. p. 58 
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By contrast new volitional theorists look for the root of actions in states, such as tryings or 
attemptings. O'Shaughnessy supports his argument that tryings are distinct events by analysis 
of what Danto would call the negatively abnormal; the case of someone who through paralysis 
is unable to move his arm but still tries to move his arm. `When a man intentionally raises his 
arm, trying to raise the arm causes the act neutral event of arm rising ... I think we can take 
this to be the sense of the perfectly harmless and intuitively obvious truth, that, when a man 
raises his arm by intent, then he brings about the movement of his arm. We can now say how 
he brings this about: it is by trying. ' 104 McCann1 ' and Hornsby similarly view tryings as causal 
events. Hornsby differentiates action from its results, ̀ [a]ctions are peoples' doings of things, 
and what is done is never an action'. 106 Hornsby defines basic action as follows 
We can ask whether there are descriptions of action so basic that they are free of any 
specific commitment to consequences like the body's movingsi, or the muscles 
contracting,. Is there any type of events instances of which can be shown to occur 
before the muscles contract, and instances of which can be shown to be actions? I shall 
answer these questions "Yes" ... 
Every action is an event of trying or attempting to act, 
and every attempt that is an action precedes and causes a contraction, of the muscles 
and a movement, of the body. 1°7 
It is on this view of tryings as basic to the causation of action that Moore bases his theory of 
action in his book Act and Crime. In his book Moore sets out to provide a theory to support 
his contention that there is a ̀ univocular act' requirement in the criminal law. He sees this 
theory as necessary to support the voluntary act requirement in codifications of the criminal 
law. 
Why base criminal law descriptions of action on metaphysical concepts? Particularly concepts 
that are clearly contentious. Why distinguish between the mental and the physical? Shapira 
104 O'SHAUGHNESSY, B. 1973. Trying (as the Mental "Pineal Gland"). Journal of Philosophy, 1973, vol. 
70,365-86, p. 375. Emphasis in original. Quoted in MOYA, C. J. 1990. p. 23 
105 McCANN, H. 1974. Volition and Basic Action. Philosophical Review, 1974, vol. 83,451-73 
106 HORNSBY, 11980. Actions. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul p. 4 
107 HORNSBY, J. 1980. p. 33. Emphasis in original. The definition of action which emerges is complex in the 
extreme, The letter , is used to convey the fact that such happenings are non actional. Hornsby uses 
the letter T to denote action which involves transitive movements, that is those mom deseril ed 
by a transitive verb. Subsequently Hornsby following the consideration of her theory by Moore M. 
comments, ̀reading Moore has made me regret the use of "movement T" which needs careful 
handling. ' HORNSBY, 11994 p. 1729 
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supplies an answer: 
In the legal arena, there is one good practical reason for disregarding mental actions or, 
more precisely, for abstaining from ascribing operative significance to them: ̀The 
thought of man is not triable, for the devil himself knoweth not the thought of men. ' 
This practical rule, which is mainly derived from an evidentiary constraint, has misled 
many legal commentators into believing that a conceptual difficulty is at stake, namely, 
that mental actions are in some sense less of an action than physically overt ones. As a 
matter of fact, bans on mental actions, however hard to enforce, are not conceptually 
impossible. While secular legal systems are bound to assume that the internal realm is 
practically impervious to inspection, religious systems may rely on the divine ability to 
engage in such scrutiny and, therefore, they often punish ̀evil thoughts. ' It is not at all 
uncommon to ascribe moral significance to thoughts for the purposes of non- 
enforceable moral theories, relying on some moral feeling that voluntas rep utabatur 
pro facto. 1 °8 Moreover, there are well-known historical examples of legal prohibition of 
thoughts as such, which were eventually excluded from criminal codes on grounds of 
liberty and privacy or because of the mentioned administrative difficulty. Eliminating 
the mental Actus Reus is therefore a contingent fact rather than a conceptual 
inevitability. 
There is nothing wrong, of course, with an attempt to devise a special theory for 
`legally acknowledged actions' that would exclude mental acts simply because they are 
not punishable in Anglo-American modem legal systems. Such an attempt, however, 
would run counter to the thrust of the policy seeking to establish criminal law largely 
on metaphysical grounds, and would also be inconsistent with the WBM [willed bodily 
movement] treatment of willed non-movements. A central theme of the WBM 
approach is that willed non-movements, due to compelling metaphysical 
considerations, cannot be considered actions even if they constitute an acknowledged 
source of criminal liability. In a pragmatic theory concerning the legal use of the 
technical term ̀ action, ' this formulation would make no sense. '" 
This line of argument merely supports Searle's argument that the creation of two mutually 
exclusive territories, the mental and the physical, serves to confuse more than it explains. 
Another practical problem with the legal requirement that an act be voluntary is how to define 
such action so as not to conflict with the existing mens rea descriptions contained in offences. 
Conceptions such as tryings, beliefs and desires are in some philosophical descriptions tied to 
intentional states. However the law contains its own quite different and more restrictive 
108 The use of the maxim 'voluntas rep utabatur profacto' meaning the will is to be taken for the deed was 
employed in England in the fourteenth century because ̀the criminal law had become far too lenient 
in cases of murderous assaults which did not cause death. ' POLLOCK, F. & MAITLAND, F. W. 1989 
p. 476n. Emphasis in original. Pollock and Maitland refer to this as ̀a momentary aberration' 
109 SHAPIRA, R. 1998. p. 376-7 
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definition of intention, as defined in the mens rea of crimes requiring legal intention. Lawyers 
themselves disagree over the philosophical map within which they operate. There is no 
agreement amongst criminal lawyers as to whether the voluntary act requirement forms part of 
the mens rea or actus reus element of criminal offences. Smith views it as, ̀ a more fundamental 
element of criminal liability than the intention to cause, or foresight of the results of the act we 
normally think of as mens rea. ' 10 However, Norrie places it firmly in the actus reus category. 
`The law of actus reus has as its central requirement that acts must be carried out 
voluntarily. '"' 
Fitzgerald, argues that the problem for jurists is that they conflate two separate questions; ̀(1) 
what is an act? (2) when is conduct involuntary? ' Fitzgerald suggests that 
The problem of defining an act owes its importance partly to the constant recurrence 
throughout the common law of a certain theme, namely the requirement of an act ... This problem ... gains further significance from the recognition by the common law that 
... 
involuntary conduct, does not involve the actor in any responsibility because it is 
said there is in reality no act on his part. For this reason it becomes necessary to define 
the term "act" to provide the test by which we can decide whether a man's conduct 
should involve him in any responsibility. 12 
In summary there is no uniform definition given within jurisprudence or the philosophy of 
action as to the nature of the voluntary act requirement. The law does make a distinction 
between the mental and the physical. Shapira suggests that jurisprudentially there is an attempt 
to give such definitions a metaphysical base. An approach he strongly repudiates. Though the 
approach of criminal law theorists may have been to take a reductionist approach to voluntary 
action some courts adopt a less reductionist approach to involuntariness in relation to the 
defence of automatism in that they see the evaluation of degrees of consciousness as relevant 
110 SMITH, J. C. 1999. p. 38 
111 NORRIE, A. 1993. p. 111 
112 FITZGERALD, P. J. 1961. p. 1 
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to crfininal culpability. 113 
A metaphysical approach to criminal law definitions 
In Moore's book Act and Crime, he reviews the metaphysical basis of the voluntary act 
requirement. Moore defines action in terms of willed bodily movements: 
we end up, then, with the notion of an act as a willed bodily movement that is indeed 
the opposite (contrary or contradictory) of status, mental event, omission and 
involuntary bodily movement. If the two parts of this definition bodily movements and 
willings - themselves have a unitary nature, then so does the criminal law requirement 
that there be a willed bodily movement that is an act. 14 
Moore then sets out the ̀ serious metaphysical critiques' he needs to examine in order to prove 
that there is ̀ a univocular act requirement'. These are ̀whether the act of my finger moving 
can be identical to the bodily movement of my finger moving, whether my mental state can 
cause an action, whether there are "volition" or states of "willing" that can cause actions, 
whether basic acts like moving my fingers can be identical to more complex actions like 
killing. '5 It is not possible or necessary in this thesis to examine all of these questions in 
detail. Some of the criticisms of Moore's work will be briefly examined. However, prior to 
examining these criticisms a further question needs to be asked. Is there a univocular act 
requirement? 
Norne argues that though the law might aim at rationality and consistency it does not achieve 
113 Note that in Rv Stone Bastatrache J. took the view that consciousness and voluntariness are not 
synonymous. ̀I therefore prefer to define automatism as a state of impaired consciousness, rather than 
unconsciousness, in which an individual though capable of action, has no voluntary control over that 
action. ' (1999) 134 CCC (3d) 353.417. He also said later `voluntariness, rather than consciousness is 
the key element of automatistic behaviour since a defence of automatism amounts to a denial of the 
voluntariness component of the actus recs. ' (1999) 134 CCC (3d) 353,421. Emphasis in original. It 
is not clear what Bastatrache J. meant by these two statements as they show confusion as to the role of 
consciousness in the defence of automatism 
114 MOORE, M. 1993. p. 39-40 
115 MOORE, M. 1993. p. 43 
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its aim. 16 He explains this is because: 
the criminal law is neither rational nor principled so that the extraordinary is as much 
the norm as the ordinary. It is not that there is no rationality or principle in the law at 
all, but rather that the elements of reason and principle are constantly in conflict with 
other elements in the law itself. This means that the `rationalising enterprise' is 
frequently rationalisation only in the pejorative sense of an apparent rationality 
papering over the cracks of deeper contradictions. "' 
Presumably Norrie therefore would not accept the possibility of a univocular act requirement. 
Indeed later in his book he writes: 
The principles of responsibility upon which the law is based are given their particular 
shape by what is excluded from the subjective assessment of fault, and by the political 
interventions of the social elite charged with their development. That which is 
excluded, the subterranean forces of the political and the ideological, continually 
irrupts within the law, unsettling its formal appearance of consistency and disturbing its 
conceptual categories. "" 
Such an ad hoc or piecemeal law making process hardly seems likely to yield a univocular act 
requirement. Indeed it seems with regard to criminal law definitions of voluntary action that 
the practical realities of social protection policy have been particularly instrumental in the 
shaping of this component of criminal responsibility. However, this should not defeat the 
search for principle within the law from which rational judgment may be attempted, neither 
does Norrie deny that such attempts should be made. His concern is that the process should 
avoid ̀ papering over the cracks of deeper contradictions. ' 
Hart, who Moore criticises for undermining belief in a unitary condition of voluntary action, "" 
is arguing a completely different thesis from Moore. He sees lack of voluntary action as 
foundational to certain excusing conditions. Hart traces this argument back to Blackstone, 
116 NORRIE, A. 1993. Chapters 1-3 
117 NORRIE, A. 1993. p. 110 
118 NORRIE, A. 1993. p. 110 
119 See MOORE, M. 1993. p. 40-3 
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who wrote that certain excuses were accepted because, `the concurrence of the will when it 
has its choice either to do or avoid the act in question [is] the only thing that renders action 
praiseworthy or culpable'. 120 
Hart's main argument concerning the voluntary act requirement revolves around his conception 
of justice. He suggests that the voluntary act requirement has been narrowed: `in its admission 
of excuses it [the law] has concentrated almost exclusively on lack of knowledge rather than 
defects of volition or will. "" Though he admits that to allow a defence based upon `whether a 
person had sufficient capacity of will to conform to the law's requirements opens wider 
general issues and what shall count as evidence for or against is far from clear. "22 
In summary Hart's approach is that the concept of voluntary action has been narrowed in two 
ways. Firstly by judicial application of the mens rea principle: and secondly by the restriction of 
its operation to cognitive failures, rather than the inclusion of failures of volition. Interestingly, 
although Hart may have preferred an ordinary language definition of the word action, he 
suggests that the voluntary act requirement might act as a unifying principle. What concerned 
Hart was a `universal idea of freedom or justice and the value of individual liberty. ' He 
therefore argued `[w]hat is needed is a reinterpretation of the notion of desert and 
responsibility, a fresh account of the principle that a voluntary act should normally be required 
as a condition of liability to punishment. ' This for Hart was expressed in the proposal `unless a 
man has the capacity and fair opportunity to adjust his behaviour to the law its penalties ought 
not to be applied to him'. 123 
However, Hart himself agrees that the means of proving such an assertion were far from 
clear. 124 If capacity is fundamental to liability how is it to be proved? Mackay agrees that 
capacity is ̀ a fundamental feature which distinguishes basic action from a mere bodily 
120 Commentaries, Book N, Chapt II, quoted in HART, RL. A., 1968. p. 174 
121 HART, H. L. A. 1968. p. 175 
122 HART, H. L. A. 1968. p. 176 
123 HART, H. L. A. 1968. All quotations p. 181 
124 HART, H. L. A. 1968. p. 176 
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movement such as a knee jerk reflex. ' 125 Mackay sees basic action as a useful tool in 
disentangling more complex action sequences. ̀In a sense, therefore, a basic act is the 
irreducible minimum which is to be found in all cases of human action and requires us to focus 
attention on initial outward manifestations of complex human behaviour. ' 126 Mackay 
substantiates the link between basic action and capacity with a quotation from Danto: 
Behaviour becomes more uniform and culturally differentiated as the force of beliefs 
approaches zero, and hence responses verge on reflexes. Thus men spontaneously, and 
without reference to their beliefs withdraw their hands abruptly from hot irons. What 
keeps this a basic action and not a pure response is that it is capable of inhibition by a 
sufficiently determined person, concerned to show self control or demonstrate 
innocence at a witch trial, whereas no such options are available for the pre patellar 
reflex. '27 
Capacity in this sense is the capability to inhibit bodily motion. This is not the broader sense of 
capacity advocated by Hart which saw the need for the evaluation of behaviour in a wider 
context. 
The description is useful however because it focuses of the split second decision to act or 
refrain from acting that is relevant to criminal liability. The requirement hat action be 
voluntary in this sense and as described by Libet is a fundamental requirement for the 
imposition of responsibility. There is one part of Danto's statement hat needs refinement, that 
is his stipulation of self control, in terms of involuntariness as it relates to automatism, what is 
required is not control but the ability or capacity to exercise it. 
Other action descriptions. 
Moore's analysis of action was subject to stringent academic criticism at the symposium, 
125 MACKAY, RD. 1995. p. 18 
126 MACKAY, RD. 1995. p. 18 
127 MACKAY, RD. 1995. p. 18. Quoting DANTO, A. C. 1973. The Analytical Philosophy of Action, 
Cambridge University Press. p. 115 
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particularly by Hornsby, "' who produced her own definition of a voluntary act for the 
purposes of criminal liability as ̀ [t]here is an action if and only if there is an event of a person's 
intentionally doing something. "29 By this definition `intentionally' becomes central to the 
definition of action and the root of criminal liability. Hornsby argues that by this means Moore 
could avoid having to identify basic actions with bodily movements. An identity which she 
asserts is untenable, ̀ [u]sing Moore's terminology, one says that an action is identical with a 
movement, when what one means is that a movement; is part of an action. "" Hornsby rejects 
the need for volitions as a mediating state between beliefs and/or desires and action. 
From my point of view, then Moore introduces a volition as a substitute for applying 
(to an event that is a person's moving a bit of her body) the concepts that enable us to 
see a person as an agent (who does things intentionally). If `actions' can be adequately 
defined in the way I suggest, volitions must now be viewed as figments, filling an 
imaginary lacuna. 131 
Hornsby argues that Moore's volitions are tied to bodily movements and as such cannot 
attribute a sense of normal human agency, 
And if people usually move their bodies without exercising any detailed bodily 
movement concepts, then someone voliting a bit of her body to move; ... will be rather 
rare.... so the volition in his story [his analysis] cannot be allowed to be as uncommon 
as a common sense account of ourselves as agents would suggest. `2 
This is not totally surprising as Moore based his explanation of action on what he sees as the 
Austin/Bentham construction of voluntary action. The problem is that the statement hat an act 
is a willed bodily movement does not make clear what it is for action to be voluntary. 
128 HORNSBY, J. 1994. p. 1719-47 
129 HORNSBY, J. 1994. p. 1727 
130 HORNSBY, J. 1994. p. 1729 
131 HORNSBY, J. 1994. p. 1732 
132 HORNSBY, J. 1994.1734-5., This is very similar to Ryle's comments: ̀However, when a champion of the 
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Bratman argues that Moore's theory has two prongs, `both the idea that voluntary action must 
involve a bodily movement, and that the cause of the voluntary movement must be volition. "33 
Bratman reviews the second of these, the `Mental Cause Thesis' and suggests that Moore's use 
of volition as a `species of intention' is redundant. Bratman explains the fuller sense with 
which he endows intention by the example of raising an arm to signal for a cab. ̀I would 
explain my arm raising by citing an appropriate relation to my relevant desire and belief. It is 
natural to suppose that this belief desire explanation is what insures (sic) that my arm raising is 
both intentional and done with the intention of signalling for a cab ... In this way we are 
led to 
see intention at least as it figures in action, not as a distinctive state of mind, but consisting of 
certain relations between actions, desires and beliefs. ''' Bratman argues for a less reductive 
view of intention, particularly with regard to future intentions which may never be realised. For 
Bratman the issue which should be of concern to the criminal law, is the human ability to plan. 
`I only claim that we - normal, adult human agents whose actions are the standard concern of 
the traditions of the criminal law at issue here - are planning agents, and this is central to the 
kind of agents we are. "" However, as noted previously, his model of action encounters 
difficulty with habitual or spontaneous action. ' 
For the purposes of the law any description of action which does not encompass habitual or 
spontaneous action will be unusable because it cannot express the normative requirements of 
the criminal law. Furthermore, there are problems with basing arguments which seek to justify 
the criminal law requirement for voluntary action in the realm of metaphysics. Not the least of 
these problems is the fact that however well any metaphysical definition is argued it will always 
be open to philosophical criticism and debate. Perhaps this explains Duffs scepticism about the 
separation of actions into distinct events: 
To ask which is ̀ the action itself is as absurd as to ask what is ̀ the event itself when 
the roof of the house is damaged in a storm - is there one event (the roof being 
damaged); or are there ̀ really' many events (each individual tile being damaged)? 
133 BRATMAN, M. E. 1994. p. 1705 
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Actions and events are identified and individuated only by our descriptions of them: 
what someone does can be described in various ways, drawing different distinctions 
between ̀ the action' and its circumstances or consequences, and which of these 
possible descriptions we offer depends not on some objective truth about what action 
really is (since there is no such truth), but on our own interests (and on the vocabulary 
available to us). 137 
To conclude this section on legal and philosophical descriptions of human action, there is no 
agreement as to whether there is or is not a univocular voluntary act requirement, and if there 
is such a requirement what its definition might be. Most jurists subscribe to or at least debate 
the proposition that a voluntary action is a willed bodily movement. 138 However, the adoption 
of such a definition poses problems. Hart and Austin both noted that the definition does not fit 
easily with common language descriptions of events. Obtaining a satisfactory definition of 
action in metaphysical terms is difficult to achieve, will always be subject to criticism, and 
some doubt that it is possible. Feinberg suggests when attempting to answer the question, 
`[w]hat is the difference between a fully fledged human action and a bodily movement? ', that 
the ultimate answers to certain metaphysical questions are beyond a definitive answer. ̀ Here as 
elsewhere in philosophy, analytical techniques help to answer the penultimate questions, while 
the ultimate ones being incapable of answer, must be come to terms with in some other 
way. ' 
139 
Additionally the definition of action as a willed bodily movement is open to criticism as being 
too reductionist. This may be argued in two senses. Firstly a willed bodily movement does not 
successfully describe acts of omission, which are identified as culpable acts by the criminal law. 
Secondly it is difficult to describe all willed bodily movements as voluntary. Some instances of 
apparently purposive human action do not seem to fit within the popular view of voluntary 
conduct, for example sleep walking and epileptic fits. 140 
Moore in seeking the simplest act description in order to provide the criminal law with a 
137 DUFF, R. A. 1990. Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability. Oxford: Blackwell p. 41 
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`univocular' act requirement, conflates two philosophical discussions of action and because of 
this confusion ensues. The first type of action is the description or actus reus, that is what 
ingredients which are the `acts' of an accused constitute a crime. So shooting somebody dead, 
might supply the actus reiss of murder. The discussion here may take two forms. Was the 
description, `shooting' metaphysically an accurate description of a person's act, clearly on the 
metaphysical descriptions above it is arguable that it would not be. 14' The second form the 
discussion takes is that someone cannot be held responsible when she is not an agent. This 
again splits into two parts. The first requires that at some point after `acting' there has to be a 
cut off point regarding the consequences for which an agent is to be responsible. The second is 
concerned with the question: was there agency in the sense of ownership of the action? 
Descriptions of action are further complicated because in considering the voluntariness of an 
action the reasons an agent has for acting or not acting become relevant. This is more apparent 
when somebody interferes and causes an actor to do something which she would not otherwise 
have done. For example someone else aims the gun an actor is holding and forces her to pull 
the trigger. In this case she is neither acting nor an agent. This case may be easier to envisage 
but this does not mean that when I have no mental reason to act as I do that such 
considerations become irrelevant and are subsumed into a `univocular' act requirement. The 
jury has two considerations: did this person commit the series of acts called the actus reus, and 
if the matter is raised were these ̀ acts' voluntary? 142 In this way agency, in the sense of the 
voluntariness/involuntariness of the action, becomes a more fundamental question in 
establishing criminal responsibility. 
However at the level of attributing voluntariness to action, the sense of agency required is 
minimalist. It is not every act committed without reason which should be excused only those 
that the agent did not have the ability to control in accordance with her reasons for acting. TI As 
is still a reductionist conception of agency but not so reductionist as willed bodily movement. 
It asks for an evaluation of the agent's capacity to control her movements. It is phrased in 
terms of her abilities to control her actions rather than her level of self control This is an 
141 For a detailed consideration of the metaphysics of action and agency see HORNSBY, J. 1997. Simple 
Mindedness. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 
142 The Australian court appears to have taken a similar approach in Jiminez v The Queen, where the 
defendant was clearly driving the car but fell asleep. The court felt the relevant consideration was 
whether his act was voluntary. See discussion of case chapter 3 p. 136-9 
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important distinction vis ä vis her responsibility as an agent. "" 
The mental physical divide. 
Is Searle correct in stating that treating the mental and physical as mutually exclusive provides 
a hopeless philosophical map? On some approaches both to philosophy and the criminal law 
agency is not simply a matter for consideration as part of the act requirement, but forms part 
of the mens rea conditions for criminal liability. Williams felt the willed bodily movement thesis 
could be confusing: 
Considerable confusion reigns, both in ordinary and in legal speech, on what is meant 
by an act, or a voluntary act. The most acceptable language is to say that an act means 
willed bodily movement, so that if A pushes B against C and so causes C to fall over, 
we attribute the pushing of C to A not B. However, in a situation like this there is 
really no need to go into the meaning of act. If B were charged with assaulting C, or 
with murdering C in the event of C's death, the obvious defence would be lack of the 
mental element, and there would be no occasion to discuss whether B had ̀ acted'. ' 
There is no doubt that some of the reasons, for acting are considered by the criminal law as 
mens rea items. Or that on the traditional legal view of action all reasons for bodily movement 
do not fall to be considered under the description of actus reus. Hornsby, felt that there were 
two alternative approaches to the problem and expounded what in her view might be the 
reasoning behind the differences in approach explained by Williams: 
This distinction between two different ways of using actus reus shows up in a 
distinction between two possible places for a legal defence of automatism. Intuitively, 
such a defence makes the claim that the defendant's part in the putative crime was not 
the part of an agent, so that there could have been no actual crime. If actus reus is used 
so as [to] have application only when there is an action, then the defence would 
naturally come prior to any consideration of what specific things D might have done; 
for if the defence were successful, there could have been no actus reus. If, on the other 
hand, actus reus is used so that it is the ̀ pure', psychologically uncontaminated notion, 
then the automatism defence will be more or less on a par with other possible defences 
that appeal to particular aspects of mens rea. Questions about any actus reus could 
now be thought of as questions merely about whether an event in which D (or his 
143 For farther discussion of this point see chapter 5 
144 WILLIAMS, a. 1983. p. 146-7 
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body) participated led to some consequence - to someone's death, say; and the defence 
of automatism would amount to the claim that, although there was an actus reus, 
nevertheless D cannot be a criminal killer, because he did not satisfy certain 
psychological conditions at the time of the killing. 
Different systems of criminal law, with their different rules of evidence, go different 
ways on this matter. But even if it is decided to use actus reus in the second, restrictive 
way - so that in the first instance, questions about actus rei come free from all 
questions about mens rea ... one may make a sharp division among requirements of 
culpability between those which are and those which are not psychological 
requirements. But it would be an error to suppose that this division could be founded 
in any distinction used in our ordinary practices of interpretation. In courts of law, 
there can be subtle questions about people's states of mind, and these questions may 
remain unanswered even when every question about actus reus in the restrictive sense 
seems to have been settled. But this legal situation must not encourage a picture by 
which our attitude to people is in the first instance as to automata, so that it is at a 
second stage that we turn to questions about their ̀ internal' or `mental' states. 
Artificial principles that may be useful for analytical purposes may reveal nothing about 
our actual (human, moral) predicament. '45 
This is a long quotation, but it highlights a very important distinction that needs to be made in 
the evaluation by the criminal law of what an involuntary act might be. Hornsby appears to be 
arguing that what is being judged, in cases of automatism, is a ̀ (human, moral) predicament'; 
and that for the purposes of the criminal law it may be possibly to separate psychologically 
culpable from other states of culpability. She seems to acknowledge that the application of 
such a specialist filter may indeed be necessary for the purposes of the criminal law. But she 
makes a strong plea for the retention of sufficient subjectivity in the judgement of action for 
the judgement to be meaningful. This is supported by comments in the minority judgment in 
Rabey ̀I cannot accept the notion that an extraordinary external event, i. e. an intense 
emotional shock, can cause a state of dissociation or automatism, if and only if all normal 
persons subjected to that sort of shock would react in that way. "' Hornsby sees her second 
notion as most applicable to the law, she notes ̀ [i]n considering whether a defence of 
automatism is appropriate, we seem not to be thinking so much about whether the agent had a 
motivating reason to do something she did, as about whether the agent was able to control her 
movements in accord with any such reason. ' 
145 HORNSBY, J. 1993b. On What's Intentionally Done. in SHUTE, S., GARDNER, G., & HORDER, J. 
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Hornsby says: ̀ [t]he idea that an action is a prerequisite of any ascription of legal responsibility 
may not most happily be understood in the context of a definition of `an action' in which 
intentionality has entered. ' 147 Hornsby makes this statement in the course of an essay 
evaluating Duffs explanation of intention. "" Reading this essay and Hornsby's subsequent 
response to Moore's Act and Crime149 it is clear that Hornsby feels that the problem with the 
evaluation of agency is the criminal law's designation of evaluations of agency as fitting within 
the act requirement. She is clear that evaluations of agency may not be obtained by 
incorporating the philosophical notion of intentionality within the act requirements of the 
criminal law. 
Earlier, we considered the defence that D's part was not that of an agent at all ... It 
seems right to think of this defence as claiming that the minimal psychological notions 
appropriate to an imputation of responsibility have no application. But it is not at all 
obvious that the particular way of understanding the defence to which the philosophy 
of action will lead us - that nothing was intentionally done - is any improvement on an 
older idea, where the claim was that there was no voluntary act. In considering whether 
a defence of automatism is appropriate, we seem to be involved in thinking not so 
much about whether the agent had a motivating reason to do something she did, as 
about whether the agent was in a position to control her movements in accord with any 
such reason. The idea that an action is a prerequisite of any ascription of legal 
responsibility may not be most happily understood in the context of a definition of `an 
action' in which ̀ intentionally' has entered. 150 
Again, despite the problems of the conceptual map, what emerges is that in the case of 
automatism what is relevant is the ability to control action. This ties back to the concerns that 
she has previously expressed about agency and the opaqueness of agency from the objective 
viewpoint. She questions ̀whether the introduction of "an action" actually does supply the 
materials needed' for finding a mental requirement within the act requirement. She points out 
that this is controversial, ̀[s]leepwalkers and people under the influence of hypnotism (for 
instance) may not exhibit the kind of voluntariness involved in general mess rea, but their 
147 HORNSBY, J. 1993b. p. 71 
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deeds seem to be actions none the less. "" Hornsby again seems to be expressing doubts as to 
whether the action requirement of the criminal law can mesh with the philosophical definitions. 
The reason it will have difficulties is twofold. Firstly, because of the need in the criminal law to 
impose responsibility for actions and the linked problem of where responsibility for action 
begins and ends. Secondly and more relevantly to questions of involuntariness, Searle would 
argue that further problems will arise with the separation of the mental from the physical in 
action descriptions. On this view criminal jurists are not merely employing difficult 
philosophical concepts: they are utilising the wrong map in trying to understand them. 
Both Hornsby and Nagel express concerns about the introduction of excessive artificiality into 
the principles of the evaluation of responsibility. Nagel suggests excessive objectivity simply 
reduces the effectiveness of ethical judgements: 
There is a problem of excess objectivity also in ethics. Objectivity is the driving force 
of ethics as it is of science: it enables us to develop new motives when we occupy a 
standpoint detached from that of our purely personal desires and interests, just as in the 
realm of thought it enables us to develop new beliefs. Morality gives systematic form 
to the objective will. But escaping from oneself is as delicate a matter with respect to 
motives as it is with respect to belief. By going too far one may arrive at skepticism or 
nihilism; short of this there is also a temptation to deprive the subjective standpoint of 
any independent role in the justification of action. "' 
One explanation for the minimalist approach to subjective experience found in the criminal law 
definition of involuntary action is the fact that the law is normative. Voluntariness is said by 
the courts in England and Wales to be fundamental to criminal liability. Therefore the legal 
construction of involuntary action is likely to reflect the values inherent within the legal 
system. The criminal law is also a system which requires gradations of culpability, in order to 
make gradations it divides human behaviour into somewhat counterintuitive divisions. 
However, in order to make sure these divisions function effectively it is necessary that the 
compartments relate as nearly as possible to modem jury conceptions of behaviour so that an 
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understanding of what they are being asked to evaluate becomes possible. Before leaving the 
philosophical discussion of action it will be helpful to consider a philosophical explanation of 
action which employs a different conceptual map. 
Searle and the structure of human behaviour 
The key to understanding the structure of human behaviour according to Searle is 
`intentionality'. Searle distinguishes intending from intentionality. He defines intentionality in 
the following way: 
To say that a mental state has intentionality simply means that it is about something. 
For example, a belief is always a belief that such and such is the case, or a desire is 
always a desire that such and such should happen or be the case. Intending, in the 
ordinary sense, has no special role in the theory of intentionality. Intending to do 
something is just one kind of intentionality along with believing, desiring, hoping, 
fearing and so on. 
An intentional state like a belief, or a desire, or an intention in the ordinary sense, 
characteristically has two components. It has what we might call its `content', which 
makes it about something, and its `psychological mode' or `type'. The reason we need 
this distinction is that you can have the same content in different types. So, for 
example, I can want to leave the room, I can believe that I will leave the room, and I 
can intend to leave the room. In each case, we have the same content, that I will leave 
the room; but in different psychological modes or types: belief, desire, and intending 
respectively. '53 
In Searle's explanation of action, as it is in many philosophical constructions of action, 
intentionality is central)) The content of mental states is seen as important because it is how 
individuals form representations of the world. They enable individuals to `represent how it [the 
world] is, how we would like it to be, how we fear it may turn out, what we intend to do 
about it and so on. ''ss 
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What Searle describes next is how intentional states ̀cause things to happen'. Causation 
occurs when an ̀ intentional mental state' coincides with the ̀ state of affairs' which it 
represents. 
In Searle's example of `going to the movies': 
In such cases there is an internal connection between the cause and the effect, because 
the cause is a representation of the very state of affairs that it causes. The cause both 
represents and brings about the effect. I call such kinds of cause and effect relations, 
cases of `intentional causation'. Intentional causation as we will see, will prove crucial 
both to the structure and to the explanation of human action. It is in various ways quite 
different from the standard textbook accounts of causation, where for example one 
billiard ball hits another billiard ball, and causes it to move. For our purposes the 
essential thing about intentional causation is that in the cases we will be considering the 
mind brings about the very state of affairs that it has been thinking about. '56 
The strength of this explanation is that it offers an explanation to misquote Nagel of what it is 
like to perform an act. From this basic notion of intentionality Searle constructs a definition of 
human action based on eight principles. "' 
The first principle is that actions ̀characteristically consist' of a ̀ mental component and a 
physical component' and his second that the mental component must be ̀ an intention'. This 
second component in his words ̀ determines the success or failure in the action'. He gives 
examples of what in his view makes action unintentional. 
The best way to see the nature of the different components of an action is to carve each 
component off and examine it separately. And in fact, in a laboratory, it's easy enough 
to do that. We already have in neurophysiology experiments, done by Wilder Penfield 
of Montreal, where by electrically stimulating a certain portion of the patient's motor 
cortex, Penfield could cause the movement of the patient's limbs. Now, the patients 
were invariably surprised at this, and they characteristically said such things as: 'I 
didn't do that - you did it. ' In such a case, we have carved off the bodily movement 
without the intention. Notice that in such cases the bodily movements might be the 
156 SEARLE, J. 1984. p. 61 
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same as they are in an intentional action, but it seems quite clear that there is a 
difference. What's the difference? Well, we also have experiments going back as far as 
William James, where we can carve off the mental component without the 
corresponding physical component of the action. In the James case, a patient's arm is 
anaesthetised, and it is held at his side in a dark room, and he is then ordered to raise it. 
He does what he thinks is obeying the order, but is later quite surprised to discover that 
his arm didn't go up. Now in that case, we carve off the mental component, that is to 
say the intention, from the bodily movement. For the man really did have the intention. 
That is, we can truly say of him, he genuinely did try to move his arm. 
Normally these two components come together. We usually have both the intention 
and the bodily movement, but they are not independent. What our first two principles 
try to articulate is how they are related. The mental component as part of its conditions 
of satisfaction has to both represent and cause the physical component. Notice, 
incidentally, that we have a fairly extensive vocabulary, of `trying', and `succeeding', 
and `failing', of `intentional' and `unintentional', of `action' and `movement', for 
describing the workings of these principles. 
It becomes clear on this explanation that in the traditional legal definition of action, volition or 
`act of will' takes the place of `intentional causation'. But this does not mean the willed bodily 
movement model is the same as Searle's model Volition is a more reductionist trigger of 
action than Searle's conception of `intentionality'. The concept of `intentional causation' is 
central to his argument and differs from legal and objectively based scientific explanations. He 
says that: 
The kind of causation which is essential to both the structure of action and the 
explanation of action is intentional causation. ... What is special about intentional 
causation is that it is a case of a mental state making something else happen, and that 
something else is the very state of affairs represented by the mental state that causes it. 
Searle's approach is useful in identifying what is left out of the willed bodily movement 
account. The major difference is that the willed bodily movement account does not require the 
coincidence of the mental representation and the state of affairs it causes. It simply requires a 
more reductionist psychological item, volition, to cause muscular contractions. What Searle 
describes as intentionality is a concept which becomes fragmented by incorporation into the 
framework of criminal responsibility - where it is split between three component parts: actus 
reus, mens rea and the voluntary act requirement. 
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This poses a dilemma for the criminal law. The problem does not stem from Searle's 
explanation of action but rather from the difficulty of imposing the structure of mens rea and 
actus reus elements, to differentiate levels of blameworthiness within the criminal law. "' On 
the one hand the acceptance by the criminal law of Searle's explanation of action would be 
extremely difficult as within its notion of `intentional causation' it includes separate mens rea 
states. Additionally the acceptance of such a definition of action would compromise the 
traditional distinction between actus reus and mens rea; particularly if the voluntary act 
requirement is seen as going to actus reus. On the other hand Searle gives a convincing answer 
to the question that Bratman raised regarding spontaneous action and provides a less 
reductionist and therefore more meaningful description of action. On Searle's explanation 
action occurs when an actor brings about something which matches his mental component. 
Therefore spontaneously catching a ball will have a matching mental component. It is an 
appropriate response. 
Searle's fourth principle endorses this conclusion. In it he makes the distinction between ̀prior 
intentions' and ̀ intentions in action, which are the intentions we have while we are actually 
performing an action"" Herein lies one of the strengths of his explanation for the purposes of 
the criminal law. Searle suggests that explanations of action make a common mistake: 
A common mistake in the theory of action is to suppose that all intentional actions are 
the result of some sort of deliberation, that they are the product of a chain of practical 
reasoning. But obviously, many things we do are not like that. We simply do something 
without any prior reflection. For example, in a normal conversation, one doesn't reflect 
on what one is going to say next, one just says it. In such cases, there is indeed an 
intention, but it is not an intention formed prior to the performance of the action. It is 
what I call an intention in action. In other cases, however, we do form prior intentions. 
We reflect on what we want and what is the best way to achieve it. This process of 
reflection (Aristotle called it `practical reasoning'), characteristically results either in 
the formation of a prior intention, or, as Aristotle also pointed out, sometimes it results 
in the action itself. 
He then goes on to consider in his fifth principle how `prior intentions' might operate. He 
158 For a discussion of this see WILLIAMS, B. 1994 
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concludes that generally such intentions will be the result of `practical reasoning'. He defines 
practical reasoning as ̀ how best to decide between conflicting desires. ' How an action is 
described subjectively is by the selection of a `preferred description'. The preferred description 
`is determined by the intention in action. ' Actions are therefore explained by reference to inner 
mental states. Searle's explanation of action is thus able to give a greater depth to explanations 
of action, by making reference to psychological states as causes of action. On his explanation: 
`[t]hose states relate to the action either by being steps in the practical reasoning that led to the 
intentions or the intentions themselves. ' This contextual explanation of action is what makes 
our own actions understandable and influences our interpretations of other people's actions. 
Yet psychological explanations of behaviour are omitted from consideration of voluntariness if 
voluntary action is only comprised of willed bodily movement. 160 
160 Searle's sixth, seventh and eighth principles are interrelated. His sixth principle states: ̀The explanation 
of an action must have the same content as was in the person's head when he performed the action or 
when he reasoned toward his intention to perform the action. ' 
In his view this is what distinguishes action explanations from explanations of events in the natural 
world such as hurricanes. For natural events 'the content in the explanation only has to represent 
what happened and why it happened. It doesn't actually have to cause the event itself. But in 
explaining human behaviour, the cause and the explanation both have contents and the explanation 
only explains because it has the same content as the cause. ' 
Searle argues that such intentional causation does not occur ̀ out of the blue. ' Characteristically it 
emerges as a result of 'practical reasoning. ' This is a special form of reasoning ̀that leads not to 
beliefs or conclusions of arguments, but to intentions and to actual behaviour. And when we 
understand this form of reasoning, we will have made a great step toward understanding the 
explanation of actions. ' To understand such states, he argues that one must understand the setting 
within which they take place, which he calls 'the network of intentionality'. 
This network of intentionality becomes a requirement of understanding action. Principle 7 states: 
`[a]ny intentional state only functions as part of a network of other intentional states. And by 
"functions" here, I mean that it only determines its conditions of satisfaction relative to a whole lot of 
other intentional states. ' To explain what he means by a `network of intentionality', Searle describes 
intention required for the process of driving from London to Oxford. This network may be 
spontaneous but the content of several interrelated mental states is required. 
`I may have that quite spontaneously, but nonetheless I must still have a series of other intentional 
states. I must have a belief that I have a car and a belief that Oxford is within driving distance. 
Furthermore, I will characteristically have a desire that the roads won't be too crowded and a wish 
that the weather won't be too bad for driving. Also (and here it gets a little closer to the notion of the 
explanation of action) I will characteristically not just drive to Oxford, but drive to Oxford for some 
purpose. And if so, I will characteristically engage in practical reasoning - that form of reasoning 
that leads not to beliefs or conclusions of arguments, but to intentions and to actual behaviour. And 
when we understand this form of reasoning, we will have made a great step toward understanding the 
explanation of actions. ' 
(continued.. ) 
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Searle's account of what it is to act has a compelling authenticity but, as stated, it poses real 
problems for criminal law accounts of action which aim to split the story of a defendant's 
behaviour into various separate requirements of criminal responsibility. It must be 
acknowledged however that those requirements are increasingly out of step with reality, being 
based, as they are, on outdated philosophical and scientific notions of acting. 
However, one of the problems with philosophical definitions is the difficulty of including terms 
such as ̀ intentionality', ̀ intention in action' and ̀  intentional causation' which differ 
significantly in their meaning from the criminal law's use of the term ̀ intention'. Incorporating 
philosophical notions of intentionality into the criminal law whilst at the same time retaining 
the current legal definitions of intention would cause potential confusion for jurors handling 
unfamiliar concepts. Added to this the social policy inspired normative requirements of the law 
increase the distortion between an act as a legal term of `art' and the reality of `acting'. Where 
Searle's account is of value is that it sets out clearly how an intuitive account of action might 
relate to both philosophical and scientific explanations of action. His argument is that it is not 
possible to know what causes an act without knowing the content of these mental 
representations. His explanation makes two problems very clear. Firstly the distinction 
between mental and physical is unhelpful. 16' Secondly in his reliance on internal mental 
representations as being the cause of actions Searle, like Hornsby and Nagel, seems to view 
explanations of agency as opaque from an objective viewpoint. According to Searle 
unintentionality occurs either when the physical response to a mental representation cannot 
occur or when the neuronal activity in the brain stimulates movement without the normal 
mental representation that movement will occur. Unintentionality is measured in terms of 
either the mental ability to form a representation of the movement or the ability to turn the 
representation into action. It is the ability to monitor and control movement which is at issue. 
160( ... continued) Searle then introduces a further requirement for action and that is the existence of `skills, habits, 
abilities, etc. against which intentional states function "the background of intentionality". ' This leads 
to the final principle. Principle 8: ̀ [t]he whole network of intentionality only functions against a 
background of human capacities that are not themselves mental states. ' So without the skills or 
capacities relevant to driving it would not be possible to choose to drive to Oxford at all 
161 For a discussion of different types of action explanation and the problems of incorporating them into the 
criminal law see DUFF, RA. 1996. Criminal Attempts. Oxford: Clarendon. Particularly chapter 11 
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In order for action to be involuntary this ability must be extinguished. 
Summary 
After considering some of the scientific and philosophical approaches to action what emerges 
is a slightly clearer picture of what action might be. Philosophical discussions of action tend to 
focus on questions such as: what is an action, how does this conception relate to mental 
causation or how should agency be defined? Philosophers and scientists differ in their approach 
to these questions. To some extent their judgements are coloured by their view of the 
mind/brain debate. If they see brain events as determining the outcome of actions they will 
utilise a narrower description of action than that outlined above. 
Searle's construction of action may satisfy a need for a more common sense approach to what 
action is, and inform judgements as to what it is to be a human agent and to `act'. Does such 
an exercise help to gain a clearer vision of the criminal law act requirement? Where Searle is 
particularly useful is in asserting that in the traditional views of action we are utilising the 
wrong map. His description of action is also useful in explaining when action is unintentional. 
What emerges from this part of the philosophical debate is the need to make sure that in 
evaluations of criminal responsibility a full enough sense of human agency is encompassed, that 
the test of agency is not based upon ideas which are so reductionist that they render the 
meaningful evaluation of agency, by judge and jury, impossible. This leads to the second 
conclusion. The incorporation of the philosophy of action's concept of intentionality within 
criminal law descriptions of responsibility would be problematic for two reasons. The first is 
simply, as Hornsby points out, it does not mesh with existing culpability requirements and the 
second is pragmatic, the criminal law has sufficient problems in making explicit the concept of 
intention as a mens rea requirement, the inclusion of a requirement of intentionality in the 
requirement that an act be voluntary might confuse juries and would compromise the separate 
wens rea definitions of blameworthiness. 
nally the alternative concept of mental causation which emerges from the philosophical 
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debate and the doubts it raises about the value of a scientific view of mental causes are 
relevant to the construction of a framework of criminal responsibility. Scientifically, it seems 
relatively uncontentious that the commencement of action is subconscious. Explanations of 
how consciousness occurs and how conscious mental events cause action to take place are far 
more debatable. Greenfield puts forward a credible neuroscientific explanation of how 
conscious experience may vary in intensity. Libet, provides evidence that the ability to control 
action may only enter conscious appreciation immediately prior to action taking place, but in 
sufficient time for action to be aborted. Medically there is evidence that Lord Denning's 
definition of unconscious states must include states of partial consciousness. Neither 
concussion nor sleepwalking appear to be states where the defendant is totally unconscious. In 
assessing whether movements made by the partially conscious are culpable, the willed bodily 
movement model encounters difficulties because of the reductionist nature of the evaluations 
that it permits. It is not whether a defendant was conscious that should be relevant but whether 
she is sufficiently conscious to be able to monitor and control movement. 
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Chapter 5 
In this chapter certain questions remain to be addressed regarding the definition of involuntary 
action within the criminal law. Not the least of these is how notions of involuntary action 
relate to the requirements of criminal responsibility. One of the first aims of this chapter is to 
discuss the meaning normally attributed to fine will within the criminal law and to examine 
how this interacts with the more determinist notions of causation exemplified by medical and 
scientific explanations of behaviour. If voluntariness is fundamental to liability within the 
criminal law, as it seems to be, then a key factor in criminal responsibility is removed, once 
involuntariness is proved. In the last chapter it was suggested that this key element should be 
the capacity to control movement. This description of involuntariness in relation to movement 
will be discussed later. '
Action and Blameworthiness 
English law requires a voluntary act before criminal liability may be imposed. However, the 
criminal law definitions of responsibility are seen as needing to encompass both act and 
omission, in order for culpable omissions to be blameworthy. Fletcher suggests that the whole 
argument is redundant in terms of the definition of involuntary action: ̀ [i]n the case of 
commission by omission, the problem is statutory interpretation and the danger implicit in 
extending the verb "killing" to encompass "letting die. "'2 The second problem for the law lies 
in the idea of punishing people for failures to act. Clearly, the capacity to monitor movement, 
the test proposed in the last chapter, is fundamental to acts of omission as well as acts of 
commission. If a defendant cannot control the outcome of her action then she cannot be 
responsible for what she is unable to do. Fletcher also makes this point: 
The act requirement speaks to the critical importance of human agency in our theory of 
I Legal commentators continue to discuss the philosophical underpinnings of action descriptions see 
SIMESTER, A. P. 1998; SHAPIRA, R. 1998; ZAILBERT, L. A. 1998; ROBINSON, P. 1997. 
Structure and Function in the Criminal Law Oxford: Clarendon; DUFF, R. A. 1996; MOORE, M. 
1993. and 1997; CORRADO, M. 1990. Automatism and the Theory of Action. (1990) 39 Emory Ll 
1191-1228. See also the discussion following the publication of MOORE, M. 1993. in (1994) 142 
UPLR 
2 FLETCHER, G. P. 1994. p. 1447 
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moral and legal responsibility. But whatever the act/omission distinction is about, it is 
not about the problem of human agency. Agency is built into the standard example of 
the bystander who lets the child drown. The example would not even be interesting 
unless we assumed that the bystander chose to remain motionless and that she had an 
unrestrained option to intervene and rescue the child.; 
In defining the voluntary act requirement he philosophy of action is useful and informative but 
not definitive because of the impossibility of definitely resolving the metaphysical discussion of 
action as a concept. Thus, whilst the arguments that theorists may make about basic actions 
are of interest and may highlight the distinction which it is necessary to make between loss of 
self control and loss of a capacity to control, being based as they are on metaphysical notions 
of what it means to act they are informative rather than determinative. However, the law needs 
to be aware of the current debate regarding voluntariness and consciousness both in terms of 
philosophy and neuroscience, " particularly where the two disciplines intersect. It will not be 
helpful, in evaluating modem scientific or medical statements regarding involuntariness, to 
continue to use outdated descriptions of action. It is possible to remain sceptical about the 
mind/body debate and avoid much of the controversy, but at the same time acknowledge that 
the discussion of the problem has moved forwards It seems that this would be the most 
3 FLETCHER, G. P. 1994. p. 1444 
4 For a discussion of this see Journal of Consciousness Studies. 1999, vol. 6, no. 8-9: INGVAR, D. H. 1999. 
On Volition: a neurophysiologically oriented essay. 1-10; SPENCE, S. A. & FRITH, C. D. 1999. 
Towards a Functional Anatomy of Volition. 10-29; SCHULTZ, W. 1999. The Primate Basal Ganglia 
and the Voluntary Control of Behaviour. 31-45; LIBET, B. 1999; GOMEZ, G. 1999. Volition and the 
Readiness Potential. 59-76; CLAXTON, G. 1999. Whodunnit? Unpicking the ̀ seams of free will'. 99- 
113; SCHWARZ, J. M. 1999. A Role for Volition and Attention in the Generation of New Brain 
Circuitry: Towards a neurobiology of mental force. 115-42; STAPP, H. P. 1999. Attention, Intention 
and Will in Quantum Physics. 143-64; MOHRHOFF, U. 1999. The Physics of Interactionism. 165-84; 
WILSON, D. L. 1999. Mind-Brain Interaction and Violation of Physical Laws. 185-200; HODGSON, 
D. 1999. Hume's Mistake. 201-24; LOWE, E. J. 1999. Self: Agency and Mental Causation. 225-39; 
McCRONE, J. 1999. A Bifold Model of Freewill. 241-59; LANIER, J. 1999. And Now a Brief Word 
From Now. Logical Dependencies Between Vernacular Concepts of Free Will, Time and 
Consciousness. 261-8; BLAUVELT, W. 1999. Y's Domain. 269-74; FREEMAN, A. 1999. Decisive 
Action: Personal Responsibility All the Way Down. 275-8; CLARKE, T. W. 1999. Fear of 
Mechanism: A Compatibilist Critique of `The Volitional Brain'. 279-93. See also BURNS, J. E. 1999. 
Volition and Physical Laws Journal of Consciousness Studies. 1999, vol. 6, no. 10,27-47 and see 
Journal of Consciousness Studies. 2000. vol. 7, no. 10: SEARLE, J. R. 2000. Consciousness, Free 
Action and the Brain. 3-22; GALLESE V. 2000. The Inner Sense of Action: Agency and Motor 
Representations. 23-40; FREEMAN, A. 2000. Responsibility Without Choice: A First-Person 
Approach. 61-7 
5 ̀ In recent years, a certain conception of consciousness and its relation to the brain has been emerging in 
philosophy, cognitive science and neuroscience and is becoming more commonly accepted in 
(continued... ) 
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appropriate way for the criminal law to proceed. 
Involuntary action, free will and criminal responsibility. 
The legal requirement for a voluntary act encompasses the minimal ingredients required for the 
imposition of criminal liability. The reason why a claim of involuntariness is felt to be 
fundamental is because of its ability to excuse criminal liability despite the fact that 
wrongdoing has occurred. In cases where claims of involuntariness are accepted an important 
line is being drawn between criminal responsibility and acquittal. Involuntariness in this sense 
may take a number of forms. It could be that what otherwise would be a crime occurs without 
any real action by the defendant. Examples of this sort include cases where someone else takes 
hold of an actor's arm and uses it to inflict harm on a third party, or alternatively where a car's 
brakes fail and this leads the driver of the car to have a fatal accident. 
Alternatively it may be that there is some malfunction of the body which causes a fit or spasm 
and there is no authorship in any meaningful sense of the act, an example of this is the ̀ dental 
patient who kicks out while coming round from an anaesthetic"'. In Ross v HMAdvocate, ' 
Lord Brand describes automatism as similar to the defence of accident and it seems in cases of 
this type that this is true. The more problematic defendant for the law is the individual who 
carries out what would be the actus reus of a crime whilst in a confused or semi conscious 
state. An example of this type of potential defendant is the epileptic who killed her baby by 
putting her in a microwave during an epileptic attack. The newspaper eport states that: 
Suddenly struck by the [epileptic] attack ... she put the six week old child in the oven instead of the milk.... Dutch epilepsy expert Dr. Gerald Brekelmans said: ̀During an 
s (... continued) 
those disciplines. It is profoundly opposed to both materialism and dualism as these have 
traditionally been conceived. It rejects those forms of materialism that attempt to reduce 
consciousness to behaviour, computer programs, or functional states of a system, but at the same 
time - while granting the reality and irreducibility of consciousness - it also rejects dualism in the 
sense in which dualism claims that mental states are not ordinary parts of the physical world. ' 
SEARLE, J. 2000, p. 3 
6Rv Quick [197313 WLR 26,31 
71991 SLT 564,578 
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attack, patients do bizarre things and don't remember anything later. " 
This suggests that the mother was unable to recall any of the details of the attack. There are a 
variety of ways in which the prosecution authorities in England and Wales might approach this 
type of case. ' 
The question of where the line between criminal responsibility and acquittal should fall is a 
difficult one and this thesis in examining automatism considers the most problematic case. 
Cases where automatism is claimed are frequently emotive, and medical practitioners and 
scientists may well express differing opinions. Differences of opinion as to the credibility of 
claims of incapacity have existed throughout the history of mental condition defences. 
Bastarache J. in Stone said that `automatism is easily feigned'. 1° A similar argument could be 
made in respect of the claim of self defence where the defendant might be the only witness to 
the events which might incur criminal liability. In Stone the other explanation put forward for 
the defendant's behaviour was that his wife had provoked his violent attack, which led to her 
subsequent death. However, Bastarache J., confined his criticisms with regard to feignability 
to the automatism defence though the same facts had given rise to both claims and Stone was 
the only witness to his wife's death. Similar comments concerning the defence have been 
expressed in British courts. Comments such as those made in Stone or by Lord Denning in 
Bratty that ̀ blackout is one of the first refuges of the guilty conscience and a popular excuse'" 
might suggest an approach to the defence of automatism which is not entirely open minded. " 
8 Daily Mail 12.9.2000 p. 17. The incident took place in Holland 
9 The most plausible explanation of her behaviour is that given by Dr. Breckelmans that is, because of her 
epilepsy, she did something ̀bizarre'. Therefore any claim to a defence in English law, assuming that 
the prosecution could prove mess rea in respect of the crime with which she was charged, would seem 
to be based on her epilepsy, which could only found a defence of insanity as non-insane automatism 
would not be an available defence following Rv Sullivan [1983] 2 All ER 673 
10 (1999) 134 CCC (3d) 353,425 
11 Bratty v Attorney General for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386,414 quoting Stable J. in Cooper v 
McKenna ex parse Cooper [1960] Qd LR 406,419 
12 Therefore it would seem an appellant whose case or appeal had been the subject of comments of this type 
from the judge might well have a right of appeal based on article 6 of The European Convention an 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The European Court of Human Rights case law protects 
the defendant from bias through the interpretation of the right to a fair trial. The courts in England 
(continued... ) 
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However, it is not disputed that, judges have to walk the tightrope between the demands of 
society for retribution, the protection of society from those who may be dangerous, and the 
fair imposition of criminal responsibility. But it is argued that there is a need for discussion of 
the principles that underlie their decisions to see whether a more rational approach to 
questions of voluntariness/involuntariness is possible. Though the difficulties are evident it is 
possible that the courts could be less restrictive in their views as to what constitutes non- 
insane automatism. In the case of the epileptic who cooked her baby is the imposition of 
criminal liability really appropriate? Is it really appropriate in such cases that, if automatism 
were to be claimed, the only verdict available should be an acquittal on the basis of insanity? It 
could be argued that this sort of case would never come to trial. But in a sense that argument 
avoids the real issue. Should the police, or the Crown Prosecution Service, be the arbiters of 
how such cases are handled? Should the only means of avoiding a not guilty by reason of 
insanity verdict in such cases be prosecutorial discretion? If the facts are altered slightly the 
pressure to prosecute may become greater. Suppose that the woman was a nurse or a 
childminder and that there were a number of babies and bottles involved. Should those whose 
babies were killed have an opportunity to hear the case argued in court? 
Perhaps these are some of the toughest questions any judge or jury might have to face. What 
sort of definition of action and involuntariness would assist a jury in such a case? How does 
the law view free will in these circumstances? The criminal law views choice in relation to 
action in a more limited sense than that which is envisaged by a normal use of the word. This 
is because of the view the law takes of compulsion. " An example of the view adopted by the 
criminal law to responsibility for choices made, is in its treatment of choices made by a 
12( ... continued) 
and Wales must when considering the Convention take into account European Court of Human Rights 
decisions when determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right 
Human Rights Act 1998 s 2. A defendant's right to a fair trial may be compromised when the judge 
could have formed an opinion of the defendant's case prior to its being heard. ̀Whether these 
misgivings should be treated as objectively justified depends on the circumstances of each particular 
case' Bubi v Austria (1997) 24 EHHR 84 para 33. For a discussion of the issues raised by a claim of 
bias under Article 6 and an interpretation of European Court of Human Rights case law relating to 
such a claim see CATLEY, P. & CLAYDON, L. 2000. Pinochet, Bias and the European Convention 
on Human Rights. in WOODHOUSE, D. (Ed. ). 2000. M Pinochet Case. Oxford: Hart. 
13 For a discussion of the approach taken by the criminal law to duress, coercion and necessity see SMTIHH 
J. C. 1999. p. 231-52 
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defendant who claims the defence of duress. For the purposes of criminal liability, it is only 
acceptable to claim the defence of duress in limited circumstances. What the court is 
evaluating is the blameworthiness of a defendant's choice. A court never assumes that a 
defendant's free will is totally unfettered. 
Free will and blameworthiness. 
One of the problems for the criminal law in constructing liability is that the concept of blaming 
depends to some degree on notions of free will. Much discussion has taken place regarding the 
necessity or otherwise of free will in constructions of moral culpability and of criminal 
responsibility. Here it is necessary to note those discussions" and to state that there is 
insufficient space to examine all the arguments which surround the notion of free will. 
Notions of blameworthiness are frequently connected to ideas of deserved punishment. Boldt 
writes that: 
All human behaviour can be understood from two perspectives. The first, which can be 
thought of as objective in nature, holds that conduct is always the product of some 
matrix of causal factors that necessarily determines choice. The second ... regards the 
great bulk of human activity as having been produced through the agency of an agent's 
free will. It is this second perspective that is generally given voice in the criminal law. " 
Boldt concludes that in its acceptance of the second perspective the criminal law adopts a 
compatibilist stance: 
a key element in this construction of individual responsibility and a key feature of 
14 ALLEN, F. A. 1977. Criminal Law and The Modern Consciousness: Some Observations on 
Blameworthiness. (1977) 44(3) Tennessee LR 735-63; ARENELLA, P. 1992. Convicting the Morally 
Blameless. Reassessing the Relationship between Legal and Moral Accountability. (1992) 39 UCL4 
LR 1511-1662; DUFF, R. A. 1996. particularly Part H. HART, H. L. A. 1%7. Varieties of 
Responsibility. (1967) 83 LQR 346-64; KENNY, A. J. P. 1978. Freewill and Responsibility. London: 
Routledge & Kogan Paul; PILSBURY, Sit 1992. The meaning of Deserved Punishment: An Essay 
on Choice, Character and Responsibility. (1992) 67 Indiana LI 719-52 
15 BOLDT, R. C. 1992. The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law. (1992) 140 UPLR 2245-87, 
p. 2246 
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excuse theory generally is the criminal law's rather stylized treatment of the human 
capacity for reasoning. As a theoretical matter, it is fair to assert that the process of 
practical reasoning, through which alternative courses of conduct are weighed and 
decisions reached, is itself in every instance fully determined by factors beyond the 
autonomous control of the actor. At the same time, conduct which results from this 
sort of cognitive work does seem to belong to the human actor. It is in this respect that 
conduct can be simultaneously described as determined and free. "' 
The compatibilist stance may be contrasted with hard determinism. Littman describes hard 
determinism as a belief that `freedom and determinism cannot co-exist. '" The effect of this 
stance when applied to the criminal law is to view `the environment rather than genetics as a 
cause of behaviour. ' In contrast with soft determinism (compatibilism) Littman suggests that 
hard determinists do not see behaviour as ̀ free in a determined world'. They believe 
`ultimately our desires and choices are caused by factors outside of our controL"' 
Compatibilists argue that ̀ determinism is indispensable to free action'. " Thus cause is 
essential to action, and actions may be brought about in a number of ways: 
My doing something thus consists of a certain event taking place because I want it to. 
This view requires that there be some connection between my wanting to perform the 
action and its occurrence. The obvious connection suggested to the compatibilist, is a 
causal one. The wanting causally produces the doing. If this view or any variation of it 
is correct, then my doing something requires its being caused by some psychological 
state within me. Consequently, action and therefore free action must be compatible 
with causal determination since it involves causal determination as a constituent 20 
However where compatibilism differs from hard determinism is in its view as to what causes 
are relevant to action and within action descriptions compatibilism accepts the relevance of 
psychological states as causes. Reasons, beliefs and desires on this view become relevant to 
16 BOLDT, R. C. 1992. p. 2248 
17 LITTMAN, U. 1997. Adequate Provocation, Individual Responsibility, and the Deconstruction of Free 
Will. (1997) 60 Albany Law Review, 1127-70 p. 1137 
18 LITTMAN, R. J. 1997. p. 1137 
19 CORNMAN, J. W. & LEHRER, K. 1968. Philosphical Problems and Argwnents. New York: MacMillan 
p. 171 
20 CORNMAN, J. W. & LEHRER, K. 1968. p. 172 
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agent responsibility. Compatibilism or soft determinism works by adapting the determinist 
thesis to allow evaluations of behaviour other than those which are purely physical causes. 
Another category identified by Littman is a belief in free will or indeterminism. Littman 
distinguishes indeterminists from soft determinists because indeterminists ̀believe there is no 
way to predict how a particular person will act in a given situation, due to the indeterminate 
character of nature itself. '21 A distinction is made between indeterminists and soft determinists: 
Indeterminism does not focus so much on whether the act was freely chosen but 
whether the individual had the freedom to make the choice. Indeterminism holds that 
to be `truly responsible for one's actions, ' one must be a free agent. The agent must be 
both undetermined by external causal factors and self-determined. The self-determined 
quality of a free agent is premised on the concept that ̀ the process of deliberation 
(however perfunctory or inexplicit) that leads us to make whatever choice we do 
finally make is truly our deliberation. ' The ability to recognize and consider available 
choices is thus a prime element of the free will theory. ' 
The problem with the acceptance of any definition as compromising watertight characteristics 
is that it tends to obscure the subtleties of argument which may cross the borders of the 
distinctions between say compatibilism and indeterminism. But the point of relevance to the 
understanding of the basis on which the criminal law predicates blame is that both 
indeterminism and compatibilism hold that someone may be held responsible for the choices 
which they make. This point is well made by Honderich: 
Both sides agree in assigning to all of us a certain belief, which they take to be a plain 
truth. It is the factual belief that something is necessary for something else. A free 
choice is necessary for holding the person responsible. The sides differ ... about what 
we are all supposed to take a free choice to be. 23 
21 LITTMAN, R. J. 1997.1127-1170 p. 1131. Theories of human nature based upon chaos theory are of 
relevance here. For a discussion of these theories see HODGSON, D. 1991. The Mind Matters. 
Oxford: Clarendon ; PENROSE, R. 1989. The Emperor's New Mind Oxford University Press; 
PENROSE, R. 1994; NUNN, C. 1996, particularly chapter 4 
22 LITTMAN, RJ. 1997. p. 1131-2. Quoting from STRAWSON, G. 1986. Freedom and Belief. Oxford: 
Clarendon. p. 47 
23 HONDERICH, T. 1993. How Free Are You? Oxford University Press. p. 100 though confusingly he refers to 
Indeterminism as incompatibilsm, whereas Littman refers to hard determinism as incompatibilism 
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This debate clearly underlies the discussion of what it means to be free and to act but is 
complex. Determinist theories do not support the idea of retributive justice, 24 whereas the 
criminal justice system is based in part on retributive justice. Also the restriction of 
explanations of human behaviour to purely mechanistic causes poses problems in evaluating 
the culpability of an individual's behaviour. 
Searle and the explanation of free will, and voluntariness 
Searle poses the possibility that the whole argument has taken the wrong direction. He 
suggests that what is relevant in terms of voluntary action, responsibility and freedom of 
action are the reasons a person has for acting. In his view at the basis of voluntary action is an 
irreducible self. This self acts voluntarily in three ̀ gaps' which Searle identifies in the 
explanation of action. 
First, there is a gap between the reflection on the reasons for an action and the decision 
or the formulation of the prior intention to perform that action; second there is the gap 
between the formation of the prior intention, and the actual initiation of the action in 
the form of an intention in action; and third, there is a gap in the case of any action 
extended through time 25 
Searle sees the explanation of voluntary action and free will as existing within these ̀gaps'. 
According to Searle it is in the relationship between the gaps, causation and consciousness 
that the explanation of free action may be found. In his opinion the key to understanding 
voluntary action lies in the role which reasons play in relation to causally sufficient conditions 
for action. Searle writes: 
I want to characterize the relationship between the gaps, causation, and consciousness, 
more precisely. In the most general form, we can say that in the case of conscious 
voluntary actions, the psychological antecedents of the action are not perceived as 
causally sufficient for the performance of the action. In conscious decision making and 
acting, my reasons for the action do indeed function causally in the production of the 
24 HONDERICH, T. 1993. Chapter 10 
25 SEARLE, J. 2000. p. 7 
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decision, and the decision does function causally in the production of the action, but in 
neither case am I aware of either the reasons for the action producing the decision, or 
the decision producing the action by causally sufficient conditions. That is, the 
antecedents function causally, but they do not function by way of causally sufficient 
conditions. This is a crucial point for any discussion of five will. " 
Searle acknowledges the argument made by Nagel and others that his explanation might give 
rise to the argument that on this view of action the determinants of action are too random and 
therefore do not explain ̀why that action was performed as opposed to some other action 
which could have been performed consistently with all of the psychological causes. '27 Searle 
suggests that to pose this argument is to misunderstand the ̀ nature of rational explanations of 
human action. ' This misunderstanding rests on the distinction between ̀the explanation of 
human action by citing reasons and other causal explanations. ' The explanation of human 
action lies not in the investigation of the causally sufficient condition for action but in the 
reasons for acting of an irreducible self. 28 
In such explanations the notion of a self is ineliminable and irreducible. Actions are 
complex events consisting of intentions in action (roughly speaking, tryings) plus their 
conditions of satisfaction (typically bodily movements). So you can reduce actions to 
events, but you can't reduce or eliminate the notion of the self, and you cannot 
eliminate the concept the self acting on a reason from this form of explanation. " 
26 SEARLE, J. 2000. p. 7 
27 SEARLE, 12000. p. 8 
28 SEARLE, J. 2000. p. 8 Searle is reluctant to postulate such an irreducible self but feels that such a self lies at 
the root of action explanations 
29 Searle's justification for this reasoning needs to be cited in full. He ties the irreducible self to causally 
sufficient conditions as follows: 
`To develop, however briefly, the argument for this conclusion, let's go through some of the 
features that explanations of rational behaviour have. As always in such cases we must proceed 
from the first-person point of view. ... Suppose that I voted for Clinton in the 1992 election and I 
did so on the basis of a specific reason, I thought he would be better for the economy. Now let us 
ask the following questions. 
1. Did my reason function causally in the production of my action? 
Answer: yes. 
2. Did it function by setting causally sufficient conditions? 
(continued... ) 
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If this explanation of voluntariness is correct then clearly there is going to be an irreconcilable 
difficulty in explaining a person's behaviour in terms of either a Humean or a scientific 
approach to voluntariness when what is being sought is a rational account of the reasons 
behind someone's action. Put more simply the difficulty arises in trying to extract from 
scientific explanations of behaviour the reasons why someone acted. 
The problem of mechanistic explanations of human behaviour and culpability. 
In the Introduction, consideration was given to the suggestion that the work of scientists such 
as Crick and Blakemore posed problems for determinations of criminal responsibility. As has 
been discussed the acceptance of this argument depends upon the belief that only certain, 
scientifically observed, causes of action count in the evaluation of criminal liability. This 
assertion may be refuted by giving consideration to what these action explanations offer to 
determinations of criminal responsibility. 
29 (... continued) 
No. For given the reason, I still might have decided otherwise. I might have done something 
different. 
3. Is the explanation adequate as it stands? 
Absolutely. I had a lot of reasons pro and con, but I voted for Clinton for that reason, and 1 made 
that reason effective by acting on it. Citing the reason is a perfectly adequate explanation of my 
action. 
4. Is there an element of chance or randomness in any such explanation? 
Not at all. It is a traditional mistake to suppose that where you do not have causal sufficiency, you 
have randomness. That is definitely not the case where rational conscious action is concerned, 
because in rational conscious action the agent acts on a reason, not at random, even though the 
agent's behaviour is not fixed by causally sufficient antecedent conditions. 
5. Is consciousness essential to this process? Answer: yes. We are talking about conscious 
processes. The problem of freedom of the will is essentially a problem about a certain aspect of 
consciousness, namely that form of consciousness that manifests the gaps of the sort that I have 
been discussing. 
There is no question that rational explanations of human behaviour, that is, explanations that cite 
the reasons the person acted on, are both non deterministic in form and at the same time 
completely adequate as explanations. How is that possible? I believe that the existence of the gap, 
and the adequacy of non deterministic explanations presupposing the gap, require us to postulate 
an irreducible, non-Humean self. We can only make sense of this form of explanation if we sup- 
pose that in rational decision making there is something more than a Humean bundle of 
perceptions. ' 
SEARLE, J. 2000. p. 8-9. Emphasis in the original 
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A scientific explanation of human behaviour leads Blakemore to suggest that the present 
system of criminal justice is not sustainable. But his argument is predicated on the most 
suitable disposal of those who have committed wrongful acts and the genetic inheritance of 
defendants rather than issues of culpability. He accepts that science and the law make 
decisions regarding individuals' behaviour by differing means: 
The problem comes when we try to mix the judicial system with medical science and 
expect them to use the same language. The courts are concerned with questions of 
both action and guilt. But science has no simple place for right and wrong; it seeks 
causal explanations for events. No one would try to assign responsibility for the fact 
that the earth orbits the sun. Nor is it the job of science to decide whether people are 
responsible for actions that society judges to be wrong. 30 
Blakemore seems to be stating that scientific explanations of events cannot be determinative of 
responsibility. Morse also makes this point. On this basis reductionist scientific explanations 
of movement are not useful when trying to ascribe responsibility. The whole of Morse's 
explanation is included here because it underlines the relevance of making a distinction 
between medical/scientific and legal explanations of behaviour in relation to the imposition of 
responsibility. His argument is expressed in a slightly different manner to Blakemore's. What 
Morse is discussing is how medical or scientific notions of behaviour should be utilised by the 
courts in addressing issues of responsibility. He points to the different approaches taken by 
law and medicine to explanations of behaviour: 
When one asks about human action, ̀Why did she do that?, ' two distinct types of 
answers may be given. The reason-giving explanation accounts for human behavior as 
a product of intentions that arise from the desires and beliefs of the agent. The second 
type of explanation treats human behavior as simply one bit of the phenomena of the 
universe, subject to the same natural, physical laws that explain all phenomena. 
Suppose, for example, we wish to explain why Molly became a lawyer. The reason- 
giving explanation might be that she wishes to emulate her admired mother, a 
prominent lawyer, and Molly believes that the best way to do so is also to become a 
lawyer. If we want to account for why Molly chose one law school rather than 
another, a perfectly satisfactory explanation under the circumstances would be that 
Molly chose the best school that admitted her. 
30 BLAKEMORE, C. J. 1988. p. 270. Emphasis in original 
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The mechanistic type of explanation would approach these questions quite differently. 
For example, those who believe that mind can ultimately be reduced to the biophysical 
workings of the brain and nervous system-the eliminative materialists-also believe 
that Molly's `decision' is solely the law-governed product of biophysical causes. Her 
desires, beliefs, intentions, and choices are therefore simply epiphenomenal, rather than 
genuine causes of her behavior. According to this mode of explanation, Molly's 
`choices' to go to law school and to become a lawyer (and all other human behavior) 
are causally indistinguishable from any other phenomena in the universe, including the 
movements of molecules and bacteria. 
As clinical and experimental sciences of behavior, psychiatry and psychology are 
uncomfortably wedged between the reason-giving and mechanistic accounts of human 
conduct. Sometimes they treat actions as purely physical phenomena, sometimes as 
texts to be interpreted, and sometimes as a combination of the two. Even 
neuropsychiatry and neuropsychology, the more physical branches of their parent 
disciplines, are similarly wedged because they begin their investigations with action 
and not simply with abnormal movements. One can attempt to assimilate reason-giving 
to mechanistic explanation by claiming that desires, beliefs, and intentions are genuine 
causes, and not simply rationalizations of behavior. Indeed, folk psychology, the 
dominant explanatory mode in the social sciences, proceeds on the assumption that 
reasons for action are genuinely causal. But the assimilationist position is 
philosophically controversial, a controversy that will not be solved until the mind-body 
problem is ̀ solved' - an event unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. 
Law, unlike mechanistic explanation or the conflicted stance of psychiatry and 
psychology, views human action as almost entirely reason governed. The law's 
concept of a person is a practical reasoning, rule-following being, most of whose 
legally relevant movements must be understood in terms of beliefs, desires, and 
intentions. As a system of rules to guide and govern human interaction-legislatures 
and courts do not decide what rules inf ahuman species must follow-the law 
presupposes that people use legal rules as premises in the practical syllogisms that 
guide much human action. No `instinct' governs how fast a person drives on the open 
highway. But among the various explanatory variables, the posted speed limit and the 
belief in the probability of paying the consequences for exceeding it surely play a large 
role in the driver's choice of speed. For the law, then, a person is a practical reasoner, 
a being whose action may be guided by reasons. The legal view of the person is not 
that all people always reason and behave consistently rationally according to some 
preordained, normative notion of rationality. It is simply that people are creatures who 
act for and consistently with their reasons for action and are generally capable of 
minimal rationality according to mostly conventional, socially constructed standards. 
On occasion, the law appears concerned with a mechanistic causal account of conduct. 
For example, claims of legal insanity are usually supported and explained by using 
mental disorder as a variable that at least in part caused the defendant's offense. Even 
in such cases, however, the search for a causal account is triggered by the untoward, 
crazy reasons that motivated the defendant Furthermore, the criteria for legal insanity 
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primarily address the defendant's reasoning, rather than mechanistic auses. For 
example, in addition to a finding of mental disorder, acquittal by reason of insanity 
requires that the defendant did not know right from wrong or was unable to appreciate 
the wrongfulness of her act. Conduct motivated by crazy reasons is intentional human 
action. The law excuses a legally insane defendant, however, because her practical 
reasoning was non-culpably irrational, not because her behavior was caused by 
abnormal psychological or biological variables. Indeed, it is a simple matter to devise 
irrationality criteria for legal insanity that would excuse all people now found legally 
insane, but which make no mention whatsoever of mental disorder or other alleged 
mechanistic auses. " 
This is a long passage but it makes it clear how the law views explanations of behaviour and 
how it utilises explanations of human behaviour to establish criminal responsibility. Blakemore 
on the other band sees constructions of responsibility as based upon morality, an area in which 
he admits, scientific explanations have no particular claim to be preferred to other 
explanations. Nonetheless he feels that scientific explanations of the world do have a place in 
determining the best disposal options for those who commit wrongdoing. " 
Issues of responsibility may therefore become complicated by scientific explanations which do 
not have the same focus as the criminal law. The criminal law focusses, inter alia, on 
blameworthiness, whereas medical and scientific explanations focus largely on mechanistic 
causes and the most appropriate treatment for the identified medical cause of the problem. To 
underline this argument consider Blakemore's view that human beings respond to their 
environment because of genetic inheritance: 
All our actions are products of the activity of our brains. It seems to me to make no 
sense (in scientific terms) to try to distinguish sharply between acts that result from 
conscious intention and those that are pure reflexes or that are caused by disease or 
damage to the brain. We feel ourselves, usually, to be in control of our actions, but 
that feeling is itself a product of the brain, whose machinery has been designed, on the 
basis of its functional utility, by means of natural selection. 33 
31 MORSE, S. J. 1996. Brain and Blame. 1996.528-9. Emphasis in original. Morse is describing the American 
view of the insanity defence 
32 BLAKEMORE, C. J. 1988. p. 270 
33 BLAKEMORE, C. J. 1988. p. 270 
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This argument is clearly relevant to theories about the genetic causes of crime. Crime on this 
view becomes a matter of `natural selection' and presumably the manner of dealing with it 
becomes treatment and not punishment. Both Blakemore and Morse seem to be suggesting 
that there is a problem with relying on scientific explanations of behaviour in assessing 
responsibility. If Blakemore's view of causation is accepted then the legal conception of 
responsibility disappears. 
Morse makes this point most effectively: 
All phenomena in the universe are presumably caused by the necessary and sufficient 
conditions that produce them. If causation were an excuse, no one would be 
responsible for any conduct, and society would not be concerned with moral and legal 
responsibility and excuse. 34 
On this view the genetic determinants of behaviour are not relevant to criminal responsibility. 
Scientific explanations imply form one explanation of human behaviour and in legal decision 
making they should not be preferred over other explanations of behaviour. 
Fault and criminal responsibility. 
If scientific descriptions of action do not mesh with the requirements of criminal responsibility 
how do the philosophical descriptions which were given to voluntary action in the last chapter 
relate to the criminal law? Hornsby's description of action might be compared with that of a 
focussed control requirement. Fischer and Ravizza refer to this type of control as guidance 
control. They argue that this type of control ̀ should be understood in terms of two elements: 
the agent's "ownership" of the mechanism that actually issues in the relevant behaviour, and 
the reason responsiveness of that mechanism. ' This is seen by them as an essential element of 
moral responsibility: ̀an agent is morally responsible for an action, on our account, to the 
extent that this action issues from the agent's own, reasons-responsive mechanism'; ' 
34 MORSE, S. J. 1996. p. 532 
35 FISCHER, J. M. & RAVIZZA, K 1998. p. 241. Both quotations 
208 
Hart referred to this type of legal liability as capacity responsibility. ' This type of 
responsibility was ̀ the most important criterion of moral liability - responsibility'. " Implicit in 
Hart's argument regarding the importance of capacity responsibility is the idea that in order to 
be just the law must treat a defendant as an autonomous agent. Gardner points out that the 
idea of agency which emerges from this discussion may be seen as a limited one. He argues 
that capacity in this sense is a condition of moral responsibility which in turn is a condition of 
moral agency. " 
Ashworth describes the approach taken to individual autonomy by the criminal law as having 
important normative elements; and being based upon Hart's conception of capacity 
responsibility: 
No less important a part of the principle of autonomy are its normative elements: that 
individuals should be respected and treated as agents capable of choosing their acts 
and omissions, and that without allowing independence of action to individuals they 
could hardly be regarded as moral persons. Some such principles He at the centre of 
most liberal political theory, and can be found, for example, in Ronald Dworkin's 
principle that each individual is entitled to equal concern and respect. The principle of 
autonomy assigns great importance to liberty and individual rights in any discussion of 
what the state ought to do in a given situation. Indeed, a major part of its thrust is that 
individuals should be protected from official censure, through the criminal law, unless 
they can be shown to have chosen the conduct for which they are being held liable.... 
H. L. A. Hart's famous principle, that an individual should not be held criminally liable 
unless he had the capacity and a fair opportunity to do otherwise, is also grounded in 
the primary importance of individual autonomy. " 
Whilst accepting to a certain extent the concept of individual autonomy the courts have limited 
36 HART, H. L. A. 1967. Hart identified four main types of responsibility. role responsibility, causal 
responsibility, liability responsibility and capacity responsibility. HART, H. L. A. 1967. p. 346 
37 HART, H. L. A. 1967. p. 360 
38 See GARDNER, J. 1998. On the General Part of the Criminal Law. in DUFF, R. A. (Ed. ). 1998. See also 
BAKER, M. 1992. Theorizing About Responsibility and Criminal Liability. (1992) 11 Law & 
Philosophy 403-30 
39 ASHWORTH, A. 1999a. p. 28. For a discussion of the approach adopted by Hart see SMITH K. J. M. & 
WILSON, W. 1993. Impaired Voluntariness and Criminal Responsibility: Reworking Hart's Theory 
of Excuses - The English Judicial Response. (1993) 13 OILS 69-98 
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its application by the application of the concept of prior fault. ' In terms of automatism, in 
Quick, Lawton L. J. saw the question of prior fault as of great importance: 
In this case Quick's alleged mental condition, if it ever existed, was not caused by his 
diabetes but by his use of the insulin prescribed by his doctor. Such malfunctioning of 
his mind as there was, was caused by an external factor and not by a bodily disorder in 
the nature of a disease which disturbed the working of his mind. It follows in our 
judgment that Quick was entitled to have his defence of automatism left to the jury and 
that Bridge J. 's ruling as to the effect of the medical evidence called by him was wrong. 
Had the defence of automatism been left to the jury, a number of questions in fact 
would have had to be answered. 
These questions are clearly fault related. Firstly Lawton L. J. asked ̀If he was in a confused 
mental condition, was it due to a hypoglycaemic episode or to too much alcohol? ' Lawton L. J. 
then asks a series of questions which seem to be directly related to the defendant's culpability 
`[i]f the former [the hypoglycaemic episode], to what extent had he brought about his 
condition by not following his doctor's instructions about taking regular meals? Did he know 
that he was getting into a hypoglycaemic episode? If yes, why did he not use the antidote of 
eating a lump of sugar as he had been advised to? ' 41 Culpability was in Lawton L. J. 's view 
determinative of the issue as to whether Quick's defence should succeed. 
On the evidence which was before the jury Quick might have had difficulty in 
answering these questions in a manner which would have relieved him of responsibility 
for his acts. We cannot say, however, with the requisite degree of confidence, that the 
jury would have convicted him. It follows that his conviction must be quashed on the 
ground that the verdict was unsatisfactory. 42 
In Quick the Court of Appeal considered Rv Lipmcm43 and concluded that the policy 
restrictions placed on defences based on claims of negation of mens rea because of the 
consumption of too much alcohol should also apply to the failure to take sufficient insulin. 
40 See DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443 
41 [1973] 3 WLR 26,35-6. All quotations 
42 [1973] 3 WLR 26,36 
43 [196913 All ER 410 
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Such malfunctioning, unlike that caused by a defect of reason from disease of the mind, 
will not always relieve an accused from criminal responsibility. A self-induced 
incapacity will not excuse ... nor will one which could have been reasonably foreseen 
as a result of either doing, or omitting to do something, as, for example, taking alcohol 
against medical advice after using certain prescribed drugs, or failing to have regular 
meals whilst taking insulin. 44 
Mackay examines the requirement of prior fault, and concludes that social policy in respect of 
intoxicated defendants has affected the application of the prior fault doctrine with respect to 
defendants who claim a mental condition defence. ̀The rule relating to self - induced 
intoxication is undeniably strict and is the result of policy factors. Thus in Majewski it was 
made clear that an intoxicated offender could be convicted of a basic intent offence even if his 
condition was akin to automatism. '45 This policy restriction raises problems for defendants 
who claim automatism when it is not clear whether their incapacity was induced by the 
consumption of alcohol. Where alcohol is not involved or, the side effects of a medically 
prescribed drug are viewed as unforeseen, the courts have been less strict in their application 
of prior fault. In these cases the courts seem to take the view, that unless the risk is 
appreciated, the behaviour which precedes the automatism is less blameworthy, than in cases 
involving alcohol or dangerous drugs. This seems to be because the courts take the view that 
lack of mens rea or automatism brought about by a risk of which the defendant was unaware 
does not entail sufficient fault on the part of the defendant' If the behaviour results in 
automatism the courts consider that it only attracts criminal responsibility where the risk of the 
self induced automatism is perceived by the defendant. This seems an acknowledgement on the 
part of the courts of the concept of individual autonomy. 
The question of whether self induced automatism should be treated in the same manner as 
44 [197313 WLR 26,35 
45 MACKAY, RD. 1995. p. 153 
46 Similarly evaluating whether a defence is actually invalid because of the self induced condition of the 
accused has been considered by the courts in relation to mens rea. In Rv Hardie [1984] 3 All ER 848 
the defendant, following the ingestion of a number of valium tablets, set fire to his girlfriend's flat, 
whilst she and her daughter were in the flat. His defence was that he did not have the requisite mens 
reu for the crime charged. The effect of the valium was felt by the court to have been unexpected 
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claims of no mens rea based on the consumption of alcohol was considered in Rv Bailey. "' In 
Bailey the court considered the policy relating to the imposition of fault in cases where alcohol 
was claimed to have impaired the ability of the defendant o form mens rea. 48 It also 
considered the approach adopted in Quick regarding self induced automatism resulting from a 
failure to take food after insulin. Bailey's claim to the defence related to his failure to take 
food after his prescribed dose of insulin. Griffiths L. J. said that there existed a ̀ material 
distinction' between someone ̀who consumes alcohol or takes dangerous drugs and one who 
fails to take sufficient food after insulin to avert hypoglycaemia. '49 This view seems clearly 
linked to different considerations from the protection of society from the anti-social and 
sometimes violent behaviour of the dangerous offender. It can be seen as an attempt to 
mitigate what might be seen as the harshness of the rigorous application of the Majewski 
doctrine. 
There is, however, an apparent inconsistency between the approach taken in Bailey and that 
taken in Quick. In Bailey, Griffiths L. J. argues that only those who appreciate the risks ̀ of 
aggressive, unpredictable and uncontrollable conduct' resulting from a failure to take food 
after insulin should be held criminally liable. The criminal law requirement of recklessness will 
be met where the defendant ̀deliberately runs the risk [of self induced automatism] but 
otherwise disregards it' S0 The decision in Quick suggested that any self induced automatism 
might make it difficult for a defendant to plead automatism. But, following Bailey, this will not 
apply in the case of failure to take food after insulin if the risk of the automatistic episode, 
even where self induced, was not foreseen. 
In Bailey the alleged criminal behaviour was the same type of behaviour as that discussed in 
Quick -a violent attack. Griffiths L. J. concludes from his consideration of Quick that the 
Court of Appeal may not ̀ have intended to lay down an absolute rule' regarding self induced 
47 [1983] 2 All ER 503 
48 The most relevant case law was considered by the court to be that contained in Rv Lipman [1969] 3 All 
ER 410 and DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443 
49 [1983] 2 All ER 503,507. Both quotations 
50 [1983] 2 All ER 503,507. Bath quotations 
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incapacity. Griffiths L. J. notes that in Quick Lawton L. J. took the view that the jury should 
consider the fault of the defendant in relation to the reasons for his hypoglycaemic episode. 
Griffiths L. J. states ̀[t]hese questions suggest that even if hypoglycaemia was induced by 
some action or inaction on the part of the accused his defence will not necessarily fail. "' The 
Court of Appeal took the view that in Bailey's case the recorder should have asked the jury to 
consider questions of the type raised in Quick. 
However, as in Quick, the Court of Appeal did not order Bailey's retrial. The court concluded 
that the decisive factor for the jury in determining Bailey's guilt was that: ̀ [t]here was 
abundant evidence that he had armed himself with an iron bar and gone to Harrison's house 
for the purpose of attacking him, because he wanted to teach him a lesson and because he was 
in the way. 'SZ It seems in Bailey the Court of Appeal found the most determinative factor for 
the jury was their interpretation of the agent's background reasons for acting as he did. 53 
Additionally the medical evidence with relation to automatism showed: ̀it was extremely 
unlikely that such an episode could follow some five minutes after taking sugar and water. 54 
It seems therefore that in evaluations of fault, where the ingestion of alcohol or dangerous 
drugs is not an issue, what is relevant is whether the defendant knew that by her actions she 
might cause herself to suffer automatism. Such evaluations will need detailed attention by the 
trial court. The defendant's views will be informative but the courts will face further and 
difficult decisions. The policy of social protection might suggest that society has a right to 
protect itself from people who fail to inform themselves of the basic requirements of taking 
medication. In Bailey, Griffiths L. J. was concerned with the risk to a potential defendant of 
becoming unconscious. He does not seem to have considered the difficult question of whether 
fault might attach to a defendant who put herself into a potentially stressful situation without 
ensuring that her blood sugar levels were appropriately balanced. Here, questions about what 
51 [198312 All ER 503,507. Both quotations 
52 [1983] 2 All ER 503,508 
53 A conclusion aided by the fact that the Court of Appeal in Bailey saw the defence as going to wens roe 
54 [1983] 2 All ER 503,508 
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the defendant knew or should have known, about her diabetes arguably should be relevant. " 
The problems related to the introduction of a notion of prior fault are illustrated by the Scots 
case of Finegan v Heywood. 56 The case concerned an incident of sleepwalking following the 
ingestion of alcohoL The court heard that on three occasions prior to the commission of the 
offence with which he was charged Finegan had suffered episodes of parasomnia following 
drinking alcohol. The High Court said that in view of this Finegan could not claim automatism, 
despite the fact that `when the appellant took the car and drove it while drunk, his conscious 
mind was not controlling his actions. ' There is no suggestion, in the case report, that Finegan's 
previous attacks of parasomnia had led to his driving vehicles whilst drunk. However, the 
court held that: `the defence of automatism cannot in our view be established on mere proof 
that the appellant was in a transitory state of parasomnia which was the result of, and indeed 
induced by, deliberate and self induced intoxication. ' S' This may seem harsh in terms of what 
an individual defendant might have foreseen. However, it is similar to the approach suggested 
by the Law Commission in England. 
Law Commission discussion of the distinctions to be drawn in cases where automatism 
results from mixed factors which include alcohol. 
The question of what criminal liability should be attributed to the defendant whose automatism 
results from a mix of alcohol and an underlying condition has been considered by the Law 
Commission. 38 In Quick, Lawton L. J. seems to have viewed the question as being answered by 
understanding which factor most determined the defendant's behaviour - alcohol or lack of 
55 For a discussion of the operation of the defence of automatism in relation to offences requiring recklessness 
see MACKAY, R. D. 1999. p. 155-7 
56 2000 SCR 461 
57 2000 SCR 461,464. Both quotations 
58 In David Peter Stripp (1978) 69 Cr App R 318. The Court of Appeal considered a claim of automatism 
raised where the defendant claimed to have suffered concussion, when he had also been drinking. The 
Court concluded that them was insufficient evidence to found the defence of automatism 
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insulin. 59 The Law Commission has taken an apparently more strict view of the relevance of 
prior fault and has stated: 
We recommend that, ... Recommendation 6 above (that automatism caused by 
voluntary intoxication should be no defence) should apply equally where the 
automatism is caused partly by voluntary intoxication and by some other factor. '
The Law Commission's acceptance of this proposal is said to be based on the following 
argument made by Smith and Hogan: 
Intoxication is no defence to a charge of a crime not requiring specific intent because 
this is thought necessary for the protection of the public. If the public needs protection 
against one whose condition is wholly brought about by intoxication, it also needs 
protection against one whose similar condition is partially so brought about. D should 
be found guilty of the offence. 61 
Again the policy of social protection seems to be affecting the balance of criminal 
responsibility. Culpability, once again is being seen as less relevant because there might be 
dangerous wrongdoing. The effect of the Law Commission's suggestion, in relation to the 
defence of automatism, does not extend simply to those who are dangerous but could 
potentially affect the culpability of those who are unfortunate. On this suggestion once enough 
alcohol is taken for the defendant o be deemed voluntarily intoxicated she loses the chance to 
claim automatism Even if there is no relationship between her consumption of alcohol and her 
automatism. 
Despite this it seems that the Law Commission still wished to permit a defence of automatism 
for the inadvertently intoxicated. An example of this might be a diabetic who has a minimal 
59 ̀ If he was in a confused mental condition was it due to a hypoglycaemic episode or too much alcohol. If the 
former, to what extent had he bought about his condition by not following his doctor's instructions 
about taking regular meals. ' Rv Quick [1973] 3 WLR 26,35. For further discussion of this see 
MACKAY, R. D. 1995. p. 157 
60 Legislating the Criminal Code: Intoxication and Criminal Liability. (Law Corn no 229,1995) para 6.44 
61 The Law Commission makes specific reference to this fact in para 6.43. The report states that the quotation 
is taken from SMITH, J. C. & HOGAN, B. 1988. Criminal Law. (61 edit. ). London: Butterworths. p. 
191 
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quantity to drink but, because of unexpected changes in her blood sugar levels, of which she 
could not be expected to be aware, enters a diabetic episode and as a result commits a crime. 
Alcohol, by the definition of intoxication in part VIII of the Law Commission's report clearly 
is an intoxicant. However, there is provision for the exclusion of the defendant who was not 
aware that he was taking something which `was or might be an intoxicant' or alternatively `he 
is intoxicated because he was unusually susceptible to the intoxicant, and he was not aware 
that he might be so susceptible (or, where he is so susceptible because of anything he did or 
omitted to do after taking it, if he was not aware at the time that he might become so 
susceptible)'. ' By a rather convoluted process the nature of the Law Commission's definition 
of involuntary intoxication provides some automatous defendants who imbibe intoxicants with 
access to the defence of automatism because their intoxication is deemed involuntary. It is not 
necessary to examine the problems of basic and specific intent crimes in this thesis but the 
reason that the Law Commission had to indulge in this convoluted reasoning seems to be its 
acceptance of the Majewski ruling 63 The only comment that seems relevant here is that 
refinements of criminal responsibility at the dictat of social policy seem to obscure criminal 
responsibility rather than strengthen its underlying principles. 
Social protection policy and determinations of criminal responsibility 
In the application of policy considerations it has been argued that judges in the appellate 
courts when considering whether evidence of the defendant's involuntariness gives rise to the 
possibility of a defence of non-insane or insane automatism have given priority to the social 
policy issues regarding the disposal of those deemed to be dangerous. This in turn focusses the 
court's attention on the determinants of legal insanity rather than other determinants of 
criminal responsibility. 
A particularly difficult area for the courts is where the automatism is said to be triggered by 
external mental pressures. In Rv Hennessy the court stated: 
62 Law Com no 229,1995 - para 8.12. Both quotations 
63 For a discussion of the difficulty in distinguishing between alcohol and other triggers of automatism see 
MACKAY, RD. 1995. p. 158-9 
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In our judgement, stress, anxiety and depression can no doubt be the result of the 
operation of external factors, but they are not, it seems to us in themselves eparately 
or together external factors of the kind capable in law of causing and contributing to a 
state of automatism64 
Given the complexity of the claims of automatism that the acceptance of such a defence would 
have introduced it is hardly surprising that the court wished to exclude such factors from 
consideration. The argument before them was that Hennessy had suffered a hyperglycaemic 
episode caused by external factors - stress, anxiety and depression. If he had been successful in 
arguing his case at first instance, Hennessy would have gained an acquittal on the grounds of 
non insane automatism 
The Court of Appeal supported the determination of the trial judge that Hennessy's plea was 
one of insane automatism. Thus Lord Lane, whilst not discussing the more usual definition of 
non-insane automatism directly, refers to the possibility of an acquittal for Hennessy as 
existing where a defendant ̀did not know the nature and quality of his act because of 
something which did not amount to defect of reason from disease of the mind'. " In expressing 
the defence in this manner Lord Lane was creating an alternative definition of non-insane 
automatism stemming from the M'Naghten test of insanity. Normally the defence of 
automatism would not be expressed in this manner, indeed such a definition seems to widen 
the defence. An automaton is generally assumed by the courts to be either not conscious or 
partially conscious or to be in the throws of a muscular spasm or convulsion. Lord Lane's test 
includes within the realms of non-insane automatons anyone who does not fit within the 
M'Naghten Rules and does not know the nature and quality of their action. 
In Rv Burgess' Lord Lane had to consider an appeal against an insanity verdict where the 
defendant had claimed non-insane automatism. His claim was based upon the fact that he was 
sleepwalking when he committed the offence with which he was charged. Lord Lane discussed 
the tasks of a trial judge in respect of a plea of automatism: 
64 Rv Hennessy [1989] 1 WLR 287,294 
65 Rv Hennessy [ 1989] 1 WLR 287,291 
66 [199112 All ER 769 
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Where the defence of automatism is raised by a defendant two questions fall to be 
decided by the judge before the defence can be left to the jury. The first is whether a 
proper evidential foundation for the defence of automatism has been laid. The second 
is whether the evidence shows the case to be one of insane automatism, that is to say a 
case which falls within the M'Naghten Rules, or one of non-insane automatism. "' 
Again the case raises the issue of dissociative states. The Crown's expert argued that if 
Burgess was unconscious, `the most likely explanation was that he was in what is described as 
a hysterical dissociative state. '68 The description given by Lord Lane to such a state is one in 
which ̀ for psychological reasons, such as being overwhelmed by his emotions, the person's 
brain works in a different way. He carries out acts of which he has no knowledge and for 
which he has no memory. '69 The defence argued that Burgess was sleepwalking when he 
committed the offence with which he was charged. Lord Lane concluded that ̀ violence in 
sleep is not normal. '" By this means he distinguished the case before him from the Canadian 
case of Rv Parks, where sleep was considered a normal state. " 
However, there is something problematic about the designation of a sleepwalker or diabetic as 
insane, neither sleepwalking nor diabetes are medically recognised mental illnesses. 
Furthermore, it is extremely doubtful whether the application of the M'Naghten Rules in this 
manner would withstand an appeal under the Human Rights Act 1998. It is suggested that a 
more appropriate manner to deal with the problems posed by cases such as Hennessy and 
Burgess would be to employ a more realistic test of when someone may be said to act 
involuntarily. 
The actual medical argument advanced by the defence in the Court of Appeal in Hennessy 
was: 
67 [199112 All ER 769,771 
68 [1991] 2 All ER 769,775 
69 [199112 All ER 769,775-6 
70 [1991] 2 All ER 769,775 
71 (1990) 56 CCC (3d) 449 Out CA. This is despite the fact that the crimes with which Parks was charged 
were violent crimes 
218 
The appellant's depression and marital troubles were a sufficiently potent external 
factor in his condition to override, so to speak, the effect of the diabetic shortage of 
insulin upon him. 72 
Presumably the argument was made to negate the arguments put forward by the judge at first 
instance that Hennessy's diabetes was a disease of the mind. The first notable problem with 
this argument is that it is expressed in terms of the internal/external distinction, which is 
medically unsupportable. As an explanation of the defendant's behaviour it seems 
unsustainable on the facts. However, it conveniently attempts to fit outside the M'Naghten 
Rules. The argument attempts to establish an external cause for Hennessy's diabetic episode. 
It suggests depression and marital (environmental) troubles are the operative cause of the 
appellant's criminal behaviour, rather than his failure to take insulin for a period of days. The 
real question for the court should be whether at the time of the potentially criminal act the 
defendant's diabetic condition could have caused him to lose his ability to act voluntarily. The 
strength of any test of voluntariness will be whether it allows a meaningful distinction between 
cases in which the capacity or ability to act voluntarily is lost and those in which it is not. It is 
suggested that the present test of automatism does not permit that distinction to be drawn and 
this is particularly apparent in cases where dissociative states are pleaded. 
Dissociation and post traumatic stress disorder 
As a result of the decision in Burgess and Hennessy, in England and Wales, a disease or 
disorder which is caused by stress, depression or anxiety may not form the basis of a non- 
insane automatism defence. " However the Canadian Supreme Court faced just such a plea in 
72 [1989] 1 WLR 287,293 
73 However, such a defence has been accepted by trial judges in the lower courts in RvT but rejected by the 
jury . In Rv Janjirker (unreported) automatism was argued before two separate juries. The claim was 
according to the newspaper reports linked to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Janjirker obtained an 
acquittal to charges of murder and manslaughter. The first jury was unable to reach a decision in 
respect of the manslaugter charge so that part of his case was reheard in front of a fresh jury. 
According to the Daily Express, the defendant ̀may have been struck by "automatism" and 
unknowingly stabbed the teenager to death in the confrontation. The jury heard medical evidence that 
there was a strong connection between trams, and dissociation. ' 26'" September 2000 p. 6. For a 
historic discussion of the case law surrounding dissociative states see MACKAY, RD. 1980. Non- 
(continued... ) 
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Rv Stone. The court also faced additional policy pressures because automatism in the guise 
argued by Stone raised the issues of a defendant being excused criminal responsibility for the 
murder of his wife. Bastarache J. said that his attention was directed to the risk of violent 
offenders obtaining a discharge by a case commentary in the Canadian Bar Review. 74 It is 
interesting to consider the points made in the case commentary in some depth because they 
point to the difficulty of deciding issues relating to voluntariness where the acts of the 
defendant are deemed to be dangerous and the issue of mental disorder falls to be considered. 
The case commentary concerned Rv Parks75 in the Canadian Supreme Court. In Rv Burgess 
Lane L. C. J. considered the earlier hearing of the case before the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
In Rv Parks the Supreme Court was asked by the Crown to reconsider its designation of 
sleepwalking as non-insane automatism, in view of the arguments made by Lord Lane in 
Burgess. It did so and found the two cases distinguishable. The Supreme Court supported the 
decision of the Canadian Court of Appeal In the case commentary Grant and Spitz are 
troubled by the dependence of the court ̀ on medical evidence and its explanation of the 
distinction between insane and non-insane automatism. '76 In Parks the Supreme Court was of 
the opinion that: 
It is clear from the evidence that there is almost no likelihood of the recurrence of 
violent somnambulism.... It seems unlikely that the recognition of somnambulism as 
non-insane automatism will open the floodgates to a cascade of sleepwalking defence 
claims. First of all, the defence of somnambulism has been recognised albeit in obiter 
discussion in an unbroken line of cases stretching back at least a century, yet I am 
unaware of any current problem with specious defence claims of somnambulistic 
automatism. " 
73( ... continued) Organic Automatism - Some Recent Developments. [1980] Crim LR 350-61 
74 GRANT, 1. & SPITZ, L. 1993. Accused killed While Sleepwalking - Acquittal or Not Guilty by Reason of 
Insanity. (1993) 72 Canadian Bar Review 224-37 
75 [199212 SCR 871 
76 GRANT, 1. & SPITZ, L. 1993. p. 229 
77 [1992] 2 SCR 871,907-8 
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The Supreme Court found the two Canadian tests: the `distinction between internal and 
external causes' and `the "continuing danger" test' difficult to apply to Parks. La Forest J. 
gave a reason for this. He said that the distinction between internal and external causes is 
blurred when applied to cases of sleepwalking. 
As Martin J. A. suggested in Rabey, somnambulism is an example of a condition which 
is not well suited to analysis under the internal cause theory. The poor fit arises 
because certain factors can legitimately be characterised as either internal or external 
sources of automatistic behaviour. For example, the Crown in this case argues that the 
causes of the respondent's violent sleepwalking were entirely internal, a combination 
of genetic susceptibility and the ordinary stresses of everyday life (lack of sleep, 
excessive afternoon exercise, and a high stress level due to personal problems). These 
`ordinary stresses' were ruled out as external factors by this Court in Rabey (although 
by a narrow majority). However, the factors that for a waking individual are mere 
ordinary stresses can be differently characterized for a person who is asleep, unable to 
counter with his conscious mind the onslaught of the admittedly ordinary strains of life. 
One could argue that the particular amalgam of stress, excessive xercise, sleep 
deprivation and sudden noises in the night that causes an incident of somnambulism is, 
for the sleeping person, analogous to the effect of a concussion upon a waking person, 
which is generally accepted as an external cause of non-insane automatism; ... In the 
end, the dichotomy between internal and external causes becomes blurred in this 
context, and is not helpful in resolving the inquiry. '
The court was also critical of the continuing danger theory, but concluded that it might be 
looked on as a factor at the ̀ policy stage of the inquiry" regarding the issue of insanity. 
Grant and Spitz feel that some indication should have been given by the Supreme Court in 
Parks as to what states of dissociation were to be classified as insane S0 Furthermore, the 
question of the violence displayed by Parks troubled Grant and Spitz. It also troubled Lamer 
C. J. C. who in part dissented from the majority of the Canadian Supreme Court in Parks. 81 The 
Supreme Court based its decision on the fact there was evidence that it was extremely unlikely 
that Parks would commit a similar act. It was accepted that Parks' condition was not amenable 
78 [1992] 2 SCR 871,902-3 
79 [1992] 2 SCR 871,905 
80 GRANT, I. & SPITZ, L. 1993. p. 229-30 
81 For Lamer C. J. C. 's discussion see [1992] 2 SCR 871,892 
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to treatment. Additionally sleep was seen as a normal condition, 82 therefore the 
internal/external distinction was not considered. 
Rather than considering the nature of voluntariness, Grant and Spitz then engage in a detailed 
discussion of the internal/external distinction in establishing insanity. They argue that, as 
Parks' behaviour was abnormal for a sleepwalker, the court should have examined the 
reasonableness of the behaviour as a ̀ reaction to a normal phenomenon'. " If this sort of 
external/internal test were applied to claims of involuntariness it is hard to see how any 
defendant could be acquitted on the basis of non-insane automatism. The legal presumption is 
that voluntariness is the norm, by implication therefore, involuntariness is abnormal: may an 
abnormal reaction be said to be reasonable? Their suggestion runs into the problem of making 
the definition of insane automatism over inclusive. It would seem that, if as Grant and Spitz 
wish, violent offenders should be detained then the Canadian ̀continuing danger' theory might 
offer more assistance than the internal/external distinction. The continuing danger theory is 
similar to the view expressed in the English courts: ̀ any mental disorder which has manifested 
itself in violence and is prone to recur is a disease of the mind. At any rate it is the sort of 
disease for which a person should be detained in hospital rather than be given an unqualified 
acquittal. '" However, in Parks, according to Grant and Spitz the continuing danger theory did 
not assist. This was because the court asked the wrong question and thus removed the 
effectiveness of the test. In the opinion of Grant and Spitz the likelihood of Parks having a 
recurrence of violent behaviour was not quantifiable and therefore the test was redundant: 
`[w]henever a legal determination is based on the prediction of something that is simply 
unpredictable, because its occurrence is so rare and poorly understood, one wonders what 
82 ̀ Sleepwalking is not a neurological, psychiatric or other illness but rather is a sleep disorder very common 
in children and also found in adults; and ... there is no medical treatment as such, apart form good 
health practices, especially as regard to sleep. ' [1992) 2 SCR 871,889 (Lamer CJ. C. ) He does 
qualify this comment by saying that: `This is not to say, however, that sleepwalking could never be a 
disease of the mind in another case on different evidence. ' 
83 GRANT, I. & SPITZ, L. 1993. p. 235 
84 Bratty v Attorney General for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 396,412 
222 
function the test serves except in the most obvious cases. "'I 
In Stone, Bastarache J. accepted this argument: 
The reasoning of the logic of Grant and Spitz is difficult to deny. Indeed it reveals that 
an assessment of the likelihood that the particular accused will again encounter the 
trigger alleged to have caused the current automatistic episode, or a similar one of at 
least equal severity, may assist a judge in assessing the continuing danger factor. The 
greater the anticipated frequency of the trigger in the accused's life, the greater the risk 
posed to the public and consequently, the more likely it is that the condition alleged by 
the accused is a disease of the mind. " 
It is hard to see why Bastarache J. found this logic convincing. The relevant factor, as argued 
by Grant and Spitz and adopted by Bastarache J., in the continuing danger theory is the trigger 
rather than the defendant's response to the trigger. They argue any determination regarding 
the continuing danger posed by a defendant should not be based on the likelihood of the future 
response of the defendant o the trigger which caused his automatism; but on the likelihood of 
the recurrence of the particular trigger which caused his automatism. This is because a 
defendant's likely future response to the trigger is troublesome to quantify. On this view 
insanity determinations of criminal responsibility or irresponsibility depend on factors which 
are only connected to the defendant by his reaction to them on one occasion, the time of the 
alleged criminal act. It is not quite clear why the use of this test makes assessing criminal 
responsibility easier. Indeed it would seem to provide an opportunity to increase the number of 
defendants found to be irresponsible on the grounds of mental disorder. It is argued that the 
most relevant factor in assessing whether a defendant will continue to be a danger to society 
lies in her future responses to the type of event that triggered the automatic episode on the 
occasion of her alleged criminal act. However, such an approach encounters further 
difficulties. In Stone the court had heard that his wife's behaviour triggered his violent attack. 
As she is dead this particular trigger is very unlikely to recur. Yet posing the question in terms 
of any behaviour which causes annoyance seems far too wide. 
85 GRANT, 1. & SPITZ, L. 1993. p. 235 
86 (1999) 134 CCC (3d) 353,440 (Bastarache J.) 
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Loss of self control as opposed to loss of the capacity to control. 
How to deal with `dangerous offenders' is a really difficult issue for the courts. "' In England 
and Wales the risk of recurrence of dangerous behaviour is an issue which determines one of 
the boundaries as to which defendants should be classified as not guilty by reason of insanity. 
Dangerous behaviour is often associated with violent behaviour, as it was in Parks and in 
Stone. At the conclusion of the Canadian case report there is a potentially disturbing assertion: 
Grant and Spitz remark that Parks is a problematic case because it concerned sleepwalking, 
`and we have all experienced altered levels of consciousness in the process of sleep. Hence it 
may be easier for judges and juries to identify with losing control over one's actions in sleep 
altered states than in some forms of altered consciousness. '" 
There is a problem with conceiving of automatism as a loss of control over actions if that is to 
be interpreted simply as losing self control, rather than the loss of the ability or capacity to 
control movement. The emphasis in cases such as Parks and Stone should be upon 
investigating whether this capacity has been removed. There is a far greater risk of violent 
offenders escaping liability through the automatism defence if automatism is identified simply 
with this wider definition of losing control over one's actions. Such a definition of the 
involuntariness defence would broaden the ambit of the defence enormously. In England it 
would make the provocation defence less relevant because a successful defence of non-insane 
automatism secures an acquittal. It is no wonder if the defence is viewed in this manner that 
the writers of the article are concerned about the disposal of potential defendants. But the 
difficult question to answer is what is the appropriate test of involuntariness as expressed by 
the voluntary act requirement. If control is to be utilised as a measure of voluntariness then 
clearly its use as a test will have to exclude the wider definition of loss of self control. The use 
of the M'Naghten Rules in order to deal with the disposal of potentially dangerous defendants 
87 For a discussion of the problem of assessing risk see: BROWN, M. & PRATT, J. (Eds. ). 2000. Dangerous 
Offenders. London: Routledge; MONAHAN, J. & STEADMAN, H. J. (Eds. ). 1994. Violence and 
Mental Disorder: Developments in Risk Assessment. University of Chicago Press; WALKER, N. 
(Ed. ). 1996. Dangerous People. London: Blackstone 
88 GRANT, I. & SPITZ, L. 1993. p. 237 
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who might otherwise gain acquittal has also had the unfortunate effect of distorting both the 
test of voluntariness and insanity. 
Dixon writing shortly after the decisions in Kemp and Charlson expressed concern that the 
recognition of an automatism defence in Kemp had created a situation where the guilt of the 
prisoner had been demoted in the arguments put before the court. 
We are told by one report - `It was accepted that at the time of the act the accused was 
suffering from arteriosclerosis and that he did not know what he was doing - that he 
did not know the nature or quality of his act. ' And by another report - `It was common 
ground that at the time of the attack the prisoner did not know the nature and quality 
of the act and that all the requirements of the M'Naghten Rules for establishing a 
defence of insanity were present, save that the question whether the prisoner was 
suffering from a disease of the mind was in issue. ' This means that it was not part of 
the case for the Crown that the prisoner was guilty of the crime for which he was 
indicted, but that the prisoner did not agree in the Crown's reason for this conclusion 
and preferred another one. In other words, what, in the terminology once in use, 
appeared to be a criminal inquest was not in truth held to determine the guilt of the 
prisoner but was an inquiry into the question whether he should be held as a criminal 
lunatic. Is that to be a purpose of indicting or presenting a man? ' 
This emphasis on the M'Naghten Rules is evidenced by the case of Rv Hennessy. 90 As has 
been discussed the consideration of Hennessy's appeal took place against the background of 
the insanity defence. On the reasoning of the trial judge in Hennessy, once any defence of 
automatism is raised and the defendant's state of mind is put at issue - `the preliminary 
question' which has to be decided ̀is whether this was truly a case of automatism or whether 
it is a case of legal "insanity"'. This reasoning was approved by the Court of Appeal. 91 
Interestingly neither the Court of Appeal nor the court of first instance seems to have 
considered whether Hennessy's failure to take his medication from Monday until after the his 
arrest on the Thursday should be seen as creating a foreseeable risk that he would lapse into a 
89 DIXON, O. 1957. p. 259 
90 [1989] 1 WLR 287 
91 [1989] 1 WLR 287,291 
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diabetic episode. ' 
An unfortunate consequence of the Court of Appeal's reasoning with regard to the preliminary 
question to be considered when automatism is raised, is that once an appellant's state of mind 
is put in question by the defence the attention of the trial judge and jury becomes focussed on 
the M'Naghten Rules. This approach seems to concentrate on the consideration of social 
policy factors rather than criminal responsibility. This approach creates real difficulties. Firstly, 
it directs the attention of the court, particularly in the case of violent offenders from the issue 
of criminal culpability, to the M'Naghten Rules and the issue of the defendant's 
dangerousness. Secondly, it is problematic where the condition from which the defendant 
claims to be suffering is not a medically recognised mental disorder. Therefore any declaration 
by the court that the defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity may face challenge under the 
Human Rights Act 1998. 
The problem with any argument hat deals with the question of disposal prior to questions of 
criminal culpability is that it will tend to make definitions of insanity over inclusive and will 
create injustice. Real problems are caused when determinations of insanity are made unfairly. 
In America the courts have declared that it is against the interests of society to burden the 
hospital system with someone who is not medically insane. There is also a problem in terms of 
dissociative states and post traumatic stress disorder to ensure that the distinction is made 
between loss of self-control and loss of the capacity to act voluntarily. Someone who is violent 
as a result of extreme rage should not be excused criminal responsibility unless it can be shown 
that her action is involuntary. 
How have the courts reached the position of finding it difficult to evaluate claims of 
automatism in common sense terms that address the issues of criminal responsibility and may 
be understood by both judges and juries? The answer to this seems to be that the courts are in 
this difficult position for two reasons. Firstly they have accepted an apparently mechanistic test 
of voluntariness which is based on a narrow determination of willed bodily movement and then 
92 This can be contrasted with the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in Rv Quick and Rv Bailey 
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they have supplemented it so that it becomes comprehensible to judges and juries with a wider 
test of voluntariness. The first test ̀ an act which is done by the muscles' really doesn't assist in 
determining whether action is involuntary. As will be discussed in the conclusion to this thesis 
it is hard to think of any act which is done by the muscles alone except perhaps the knee jerk - 
and even that is the result of an artificial stimulus. 
It seems therefore there is a need within the law for a definition of involuntariness which 
focusses the court's attention and medical practitioner's opinions when giving evidence on the 
requirements of criminal responsibility. What is needed is a viable definition which is readily 
comprehensible by juries and accords with modern scientific understanding of the concept of 
involuntariness. Adopting the present approach has had the disadvantage of unnecessarily 
widening the defence of insanity to encompass all types of epilepsy, conditions such as 
sleepwalking and certain types of diabetes. 
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Conclusion 
Problems with the tests of involuntariness 
In the course of this thesis a number of explanations of involuntariness have been considered. 
Two different types of involuntariness seem to emerge from the English case law. One, where 
loss of control over movement results in wrongful conduct and the second where the 
defendant is not fully conscious and is therefore not aware of what she is doing. Lord Denning 
attempted to describe both of these types of involuntariness in Bratty: 
No act is punishable if it is done involuntarily: and an involuntary act in this context - 
some people nowadays prefer to speak of it as ̀ automatism' - means an act which is 
done by the muscles without any control by the mind, such as a spasm, a reflex action 
or a convulsion; or an act done by a person who is not conscious of what he is doing, 
such as an act done whilst suffering from concussion or whilst sleep-walking. " 
There are problems with both of these definitions if they are considered against the 
background of current neuroscientific knowledge and the debate it engenders regarding states 
of consciousness. 
Taking the first of Lord Denning's descriptions of involuntariness, `an act done by the muscles 
without any control by the mind', this would seem to be a description which might encompass 
an epileptic who accidentally kicks out during a fit. However, if the neuroscientific description 
of an epileptic who kicks out is considered the problems exemplified by the mind/brain debate 
become immediately apparent. Lord Denning when describing what is caught by the test gives 
as an example ̀a reflex action or a convulsion'. 
However, the epileptic who in a convulsion kicks out, does so as a result of neural activity in 
the brain. The following description of an epileptic seizure clarifies this: 
93 [19611 AC 386,409. Note that in Rv Sullivan [198312 All ER 673 it was held that a defendant who made 
a violent attack on someone whilst in the ̀ third or post ictal stage of petit mal' should be classified as 
an insane automaton, p. 675 and p. 678 
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Epilepsy is a neurological condition. The brain has tens of millions of neurones, each 
connected to about 6,000 other neurones. When the brain is functioning normally, 
thousands of neurones fire (that is, give out a burst of electrical energy), transmitting 
information from cell to cell. Their activity is usually well organised, but sometimes - 
and this is what happens with epilepsy - the brain becomes too excitable and this 
super-excitability leads to areas going out of control, with many cells firing together. 
These bursts of abnormal firing activity can last from seconds to minutes, and then the 
brain returns to its normal functioning state. While the discharge lasts, it causes a 
temporary change in our emotions, consciousness, intellect or behaviour, which is 
known as a seizure or 'fit' . 
94 
It is clear from this description that kicking out during a seizure is the product of neural firings 
in the brain and in this sense is controlled by the brain, in that it could not happen were brain 
activity not taking place. The first test ̀ an act done by the muscles without any control by the 
mind' cannot include epileptic fits or convulsions where brain activity results in muscular 
movement unless mind is viewed as a separate entity to the brain. If mind is viewed as a 
separate entity to the brain the test is altered. It ceases to be a purely reductionist test of 
muscular movement and develops another dimension, which might be categorised as some 
form of internal observer in the brain. If Lord Denning's description of involuntariness as ̀ an 
act done by the muscles without any control by the mind' is said to be a reductionist test, one 
where mind equates to brain, then the only movement described by the first test would be the 
knee jerk and similarly artificially triggered responses. Clearly, by the inclusion of convulsions 
within his list of examples, Lord Denning meant to encapsulate more than the knee jerk. 
It is impossible to know whether Lord Denning was envisaging a mind separate from the other 
component parts of the body or simply some controlling ability arising within the neural 
networks of the brain which could lead to human action. Where the explanation would become 
scientifically contentious would be if Lord Denning meant to encapsulate the idea of what 
94 The Observer Health. 29.10.2000. p. 67 The article also makes the point that epileptic fits are not 
uncommon in the population. 
`Anyone might have a seizure, and in fact one in 20 people will have a major one during their 
life, but two thirds of those who have a single seizure will never have another one. Seizures can 
be the result of disease, injury, birth trauma, brain infection (such as meningitis or encephalitis), 
brain tumour, stroke, as well as drug or alcohol abuse and withdrawal. A tendency to seizures 
may develop for no obvious reason, though, or there may possibly be an inherited predisposition. ' 
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Searle calls ̀ an irreducible self. 
Lord Denning's first test of involuntariness suggests that legally the mind is seen as having the 
ability under normal conditions to influence muscular movements. But the test is unnecessarily 
confusing. It implies that in order to know whether the act was done by the muscles it would 
be necessary to have some understanding of what the ̀ mind' was doing at the time the brain 
and the muscles were acting. There is a further problem with the test. It conflates two different 
conditions: reflexes and convulsions. Whilst convulsions involve brain activity, certain reflex 
responses do not. What they seem to have in common is a loss of control over bodily 
movement. It is not really necessary to include any description of what the mind is doing in an 
explanation of this type of involuntariness, but it is necessary to identify the types of 
movement for which legal liability is to be imposed and to consider what the conditions which 
exclude such an actor from criminal liability may be. 
What is the distinction, neurologically speaking, between a reflex and a convulsion? Greenfield 
makes it clear that the reflex is one type of muscular contraction exemplified by the knee jerk. 
This type of movement is a stretch reflex and its neuroscientific explanation is: 
the tap at the critical point on the knee in effect compresses a tendon by which the 
muscle in the lower leg is suspended, thereby exerting extra pressure on the muscles 
and stretching it. In order to compensate for this lengthening, the leg muscle contracts, 
so that the leg shoots forward. "' 
There is a clear distinction between this type of muscular contraction and a convulsion caused 
by epilepsy. ̀In epilepsy there is a miniature brain storm of certain groups of brain cells that 
can lead to convulsions. '" Yet in the legal test reflexes and convulsions appear in the same 
category. 
A further problem arises from common usage of the term reflex which do not accord with 
95 GREENFIELD, S. 1997 p. 35 
96 GREENFIELD, S. 1997 p. 57 
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neuroscientific definitions. This confusion is exemplified in the Australian case of Ryan' 
where a claim of involuntariness was made by a defendant who had shot his victim in the 
course of a theft. Ryan claimed that his finger pulled the trigger as a reflex response to being 
startled. On the Greenfield explanation the squeezing of the trigger was not a reflex reaction, it 
may have been an instinctive response, but instinctive responses are capable of being 
controlled in a manner in which pure reflex reactions caused by the artificial stimulation of 
muscle groups are not. Involuntariness in the Greenfield sense of reflex occurs because there 
isn't any control of movement by the brain. Instinctive or habitual reactions require the brain 
to initiate, through neural activity, the co-ordinated response of the various muscle groups 
which are required to move the finger to pull the trigger. Applying Greenfield's description of 
how movement akes place reflex actions are comparable with other forms of involuntariness 
over which the actor has no control, such as being pushed against another person without the 
ability to restrain the movement or where unavoidable mechanical failure causes a car to 
crash. "' Similarly the quality of involuntariness that attaches to convulsions seems to be that 
they are movements which no amount of mental effort on the part of the defendant could 
prevent. In this way they may be distinguished from instinctive or habitual behaviour. Spasms, 
convulsions and reflexes are the products of neuronal or physical stimulation which is beyond 
the individual's control. 
Proposing a new test for this first type of involuntariness seems to be reasonably 
straightforward. It seems clear that the principle of autonomy, minimally applied, demands that 
anyone who totally lacks the ability to control their movements is not acting voluntarily. This 
type of behaviour would be typified by Greenfield's description of reflex actions, but would 
also encompass convulsions, and movements by people who clearly cannot prevent their 
movements doing damage to someone else. " By tying the control to movement rather than 
acts or action and avoiding the distinction between the mental and the physical many of the 
97 Ryan vR (1966-7) 121 CLR 205 
98 See SMITH, J. C. 1999. p. 40 for a discussion of this type of case 
99 This type of case was envisaged by Lawton L. J. in Rv Quick [1973] 3 WLR 26,31 when he said. ̀ [t]he 
law would be in a defective state if a patient accused of kicking a dental nurse by kicking her while 
regaining consciousness could only excuse himself by raising the defence of insanity. '
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pitfalls pointed out by philosophers and neuroscientists may be avoided. Fischer and Ravizza 
suggest in their description of responsibility and control that such an actor has no guidance 
control. " Ryan does not seem to fit within this category. 
Lord Denning's second test of involuntariness concerns the defendant's mental state at the 
time of the wrongful act: ̀ an act done by one who is not conscious of what he is doing such as 
an act done whilst suffering from concussion or whilst sleepwalking'. 1°' Viscount Kilmuir's 
opinion in Bratty reveals a similar train of thought to Lord Denning's in his acceptance of the 
definition of automatism given by the Court of Appeal: 
The state of a person who, though capable of action, is not conscious of what he is 
doing ... it means unconscious 
involuntary action, and it is a defence because the mind 
does not go with what is being done. 1°2 
Neurologically speaking, in such cases, the brain has to go with what is being done, otherwise 
movement would not occur. In fact it has to `go' before any movement can occur. What 
seems to be being argued is that the internal observer in the brain is not aware of what is being 
done. The inclusion of an undefined notion of consciousness or unconsciousness within the 
identification of involuntariness confuses the issue. Descriptions of this type stipulate that in 
order for action to be voluntary a defendant should be conscious of what ̀ he is doing'. 
However, people who carry out routine tasks may well not be consciously aware of what they 
are doing. Conversely, on some explanations of consciousness, omnambulists may be viewed 
as conscious. 10' The more relevant question should be has the defendant he capacity to 
monitor what she is doing? If she has, she retains the capacity to alter her behaviour in order 
100 `an agent is morally responsible for an action in so far as he has guidance control of it, where 
guidance control consists in the action's issuing from the agent's own, moderately reasons-re- 
sponsive mechanism. ' 
FISCHER, J. M. & RAVIZZA, M. 1998. p. 231 
101 [19611 AC 386,409 
102 [1963] AC 386,401 
103 For a full discussion of somnambulism see SHAPIRO, C. & McCALL SMITH, A. (Eds. ). 1997. Forensic 
Aspects of Sleep. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. For a description of what happens during sleep see 
HOBSON, J. A. 1989. Sleep. New York: Scientific American Library 
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to prevent the wrongful act occurring. 
When a person instinctively catches a projectile that is thrown at her, her response - catching 
the ball - may be initiated by the neurons in the brain before the event enters her 
consciousness. Whilst she may not be conscious of what she is doing until the moment before 
she catches the ball this does not mean that she is unconscious, or that she has lost the 
capacity to act or refrain from acting. Consider again the case of Ryan, who did not fit within 
the first category of involuntary defendant. Even if Ryan pulled the trigger as an instinctive 
response to his situation, there is evidence that in taking a loaded gun and having his finger on 
the trigger the pulling of the trigger, if only in extremis, must have been part of his overall 
plan. What happened, if his version of events is to be believed, is that the plan went wrong. By 
taking a loaded gun with him to the scene of the crime Ryan seems to have decided that he 
might need to fire the gun should sufficient reasons exist for his doing so. 104 The Libet 
explanation of action suggests that acts occur following readiness potential. Libet's 
experiments uggest that, at a time some milliseconds before action, inhibition of that action 
can occur. Ryan, for whatever reason, did not abort the movement of his finger on the trigger. 
He may well not have been consciously aware of his capacity to restrain his movement, but 
that does not mean that his capacity to prevent that movement was impaired. He may have 
panicked and fired the gun but that does not mean that he did not retain the capacity to act 
otherwise. The courts in England and Wales have refuted claims based on lack of 
consciousness of surroundings in the driving cases. 10S However, taken at face value the present 
test tends to admit those who suffer from impaired consciousness without asking the further 
pertinent question - that is whether they lacked the capacity to act voluntarily. 
Additionally the courts have responded to the problem posed by defendants who commit one 
104 Or alternatively he may have been careless with regard to whether the gun was loaded or not. But even if 
this is the case there was a point during his preparation for the robbery when he decided to take a gun. 
If he didn't check the gun before taking it, it must be acknowledged that there was a possibility that it 
might be loaded. These issues, however, are more relevant to the question of mens rea than the 
question of voluntariness 
105 AO's Reference (No 2 of 1992) [1993] 4 All ER 683 
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off dangerous and wrongful acts by invoking social policy to control the perceived risk of a 
flood of dangerous defendants who might obtain acquittal. This has resulted in the 
identification of insane automatism with certain conditions where previous defendants have 
exhibited dangerous behaviour. The courts have introduced the tests of `disease of the mind' 
and have utilised the internal/external cause distinction in an attempt to prevent the possibility 
of acquittal. The result is injustice to those who might be felt by society at large to most 
deserve an acquittal. The Daily Mail was most sympathetic to the unfortunate Dutch woman 
who cooked her baby. But in England, had she successfully pleaded the defence of 
automatism, she would have been found insane. In certain states of America the response of 
the court might well have been a prison sentence. Recently in New Kent, Virginia a 20 year 
old woman who suffered from epilepsy was jailed for five years for killing her five month old 
son, ̀by putting him in a microwave and turning it on. ' She said of her alleged offence ̀ I can't 
remember doing this, if I did'. The newspaper eport states: 
Otte was charged with involuntary manslaughter and said that, whilst she did not admit 
guilt, she accepted that there was enough evidence to convict. Judge John Alderman 
said: ̀ It is possible that this child's death was a tragic accident. "' 
Is it appropriate that a prison sentence may be imposed on such a defendant if in reality the 
evidence, according to the judge, points to the possibility that the death of her child was - `a 
tragic accident'? 
A further difficulty exists in this type of case in England and Wales when in order to protect 
the public the court determines that a defendant only has the defence of insane automatism. 
The definition given to disease of the mind within the M'Naghten rules is extremely wide and 
encompasses states of sleepwalking, hyperglycaemic diabetic episodes and all types of 
epileptic episode. The case law of the European Court of Human Rights makes it clear that 
deprivations of liberty in such cases should only occur in certain limited circumstances: 
106 All quotations from Ellison M. 2000. Woman put her baby son in oven, Guardian 15.12.2000, p. 16 
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In the Court's opinion, except in emergency cases, the individual concerned should not 
be deprived of his liberty unless he has been reliably shown to be of `unsound mind'. 
The very nature of what has to be established before the competent national author- 
ity-that is, a true mental disorder-calls for objective medical expertise. Further, the 
mental disorder must be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement. What 
is more, the validity of continued confinement depends upon the persistence of such a 
disorder. 107 
As previously discussed this is likely to create problems for the application of the M'Naghten 
rules in cases of automatism. ' 
Consciousness and involuntary action 
How does case law suggest hat consciousness hould be viewed? Lord Simon stated ̀[t]he 
first concept that the law accepts generally as a datum is that of the conscious mind. "' He 
went on to say that ̀ punishment as a deterrent' was aimed at `halting action on the verge of 
consciousness' as well as ̀ instituting a utilitarian debate in the conscious and reasoning mind 
whereby the pleasures and pains consequent upon prohibited action are weighed against each 
other. ' It seems clear from these quotations that Lord Simon perceived what Searle would 
describe as an irreducible self, not simply a brain, something which was capable of applying 
conscious reasoning processes to decisions to act. Lord Simon rejects the determinist 
argument with regard to free will and defines free will as - `a potentiality in the conscious mind 
to direct conscious action - specifically the power of choice in regard to action. "" 
Where the difficulty with this statement seems to he in relation to voluntariness is in applying it 
to apparently purposive actions committed in states of partial consciousness. How is 
involuntariness to be defined in this sense? Lord Simon's opinion was that 'there may be 
107 Winterwerp v The Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387 para 39. The European Court of Human Rights 
recently affirmed all three parts of the Winterwwp test in the case of Varbanov v Bulgaria judgment 
given 51 October 2000 Application No 31365/96 
108 See chapter 2 p. 80-81 
109 DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653,688. All quotations 
110 [1975] AC 653,689 
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physical movements which are not the subject of choice - cases of so called "automatism"". 
Lord Simon's explanation rests on the power of choice, though he makes it clear that this 
choice is not unfettered. 1' According to Stephen what makes choice relevant to voluntariness 
is the ̀ determination to take a particular course' which becomes a ̀ volition' and then leads to 
the ̀ direction of conduct towards the object chosen'. Stephen calls this an 'intention'. "' After 
this choice, ̀there takes place a series of bodily motions or trains of thought and feeling fitted 
to the execution of the intention. " 14 
This type of explanation entails free action or the ownership of behaviour implying a mind or a 
conception of an irreducible self, which is responsible for wrongful choices. Lord Simon's and 
Stephen's explanations perhaps have their basis in the Aristotelian notion that what makes 
action involuntary as distinct from action under duress is the ability to choose. Hornsby 
suggests that whether someone is responsible for their actions lies within an assessment of 
whether the action is ̀ ours'. The answer to this question she suggests lies in the actor's 
`thoughts and wants', the ̀ causal ancestry' of movement. According to Fletcher the willed 
bodily movement model being mechanistic annot define responsibility. Searle suggests that 
Humean or scientific causation will not explain voluntariness or involuntariness. Though it 
may be argued that scientific causation will assist in the identification of some of the 
components which create such states. According to Searle when a person makes something 
happen the movements of his body are caused by a psychological item which he calls ̀ intention 
in action'. The ability to act voluntarily is the product of an irreducible self according to 
Searle. He argues that in all probability the sense of free action lies within unified conscious 
fields created by the brain's neural networks. It is in the neural activity that stimulates these 
unified fields of consciousness that the psychological antecedents of action begin. 
If one accepts the argument that psychological items are the causal antecedents of movement, 
111 [1975] AC 653,689 
112 [1975] AC 653,690 
113 STEPHEN, J. F. 1883. p. 100 
114 STEPHEN, J. F. 1883. p. 101 
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a problem arises when one attempts to fit this explanation within the traditional framework of 
jurisprudential arguments regarding criminal responsibility. "' Firstly such an explanation does 
not fit the willed bodily movement model. There is also a further problem if the philosophical 
description of intentionality is considered. This brings the discussion back to the argument 
made by Hornsby that `any ascription of legal responsibility may not most happily be 
understood in the context of "an action" in which intentionality has entered. ' 16 This is 
because of the number of specialist definitions within the law relating to actus reus and mens 
rea, not the least of which is the distinction which is made between differing types of intention. 
Additionally there is according to Fitzgerald a problem with the common law requirement that 
there be an act before criminal liability is imposed. This he claims has led to the situation 
where the common law requires ̀that certain conduct, involuntary conduct does not involve 
the actor in any responsibility because it is said there is in reality no act on his part. ' I" 
Overlaying these difficulties is the lack of philosophical agreement as to what action or 
intention may be and as to what type of action explanations are to be preferred. However, 
there seems to be agreement as to the types of state which are relevant to whether action is 
voluntary. At its most straightforward a total absence of control of movement constitutes 
involuntariness. At its most complex the loss of the capacity for conscious awareness and the 
concomitant loss of the ability to choose1' how to behave seems to underlie the second legal 
test of involuntariness. 
Loss of the conscious capacity to monitor behaviour also seems to underlie the distinction 
between loss of self control and automatism Loss of self control seems to be explained by 
`giving way' to an impulse to do something which the individual would not normally consider 
115 For a discussion of these arguments see MACKIE, J. L. 1977. The Grounds of Responsibility. in HACKER, 
P. S. & RA7, J. (Eds. ). Law Morality and Society - Essays in Honour of HLA Hart. Oxford: 
Clarendon. p. 175-88 
116 HORNSBY, J. 1993b. p. 71 
117 FITZGERALD, P. J. 1961. p. 1 
118 In the more limited legal sense of choice - actions taken under duress are still voluntary, because the 
ability to act otherwise remains 
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appropriate behaviour. In cases of automatism what seems to be being asserted is that the 
individual was not sufficiently conscious to be aware that the impulse existed and there was 
therefore no possibility of preventing the wrongful behaviour occurring. More complex 
automatism claims are based upon the perception that co-ordinated movements may occur 
without the person making the movements having any sense of ownership of her acts. The 
problem is how to encapsulate this idea into a sufficiently workable test. 
Scientific descriptions of behaviour do not seem able to explain adequately how consciousness 
is relevant to this type of involuntariness. This is because scientists at present can only 
speculate as to how the neuronal activity in the brain may stimulate movement and the 
accompanying sense of control over behaviour. Judgements as to responsibility are taken 
against the background of a particular person's reasons or lack of reasons for acting. It seems 
that what should be relevant to the attribution of legal responsibility, is whether the medical 
explanation suggests that a particular defendant lacked sufficient consciousness to have the 
capacity to alter her behaviour. Thus the question to be answered by medical evidence is fairly 
straightforward. It is whether the evidence supports the assertion that the defendant is making, 
that is that her criminal act resulted from involuntariness, and whether this explanation, 
together with any other evidence, offers a plausible explanation of the defendant's behaviour. 
The wider issue of whether she could be described as conscious or not on this view may either 
support or detract from the argument that her capacity to control action was extinguished but 
it will not answer the specific question, though it may point to what the answer might be. 
Scientific evidence should be specifically aimed at providing information aimed at informing 
the jury's discussion of the most pertinent question. How should this test be expressed? It is 
suggested that any new test should include consciousness as a measure of involuntariness but 
should be more focussed. Consciousness clearly is highly relevant as it should be necessary for 
a defendant o have the capacity to be consciously aware that she is behaving in a certain way 
in order for criminal liability to be imposed. But full consciousness is not required for liability 
to be imposed, in the case of those engaged in habitual or instinctive action there is still the 
capacity for conscious appreciation of the fact of action. So what is required is not full 
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consciousness but sufficient consciousness to monitor behaviour. Monitor in the sense of the 
capacity to utilise the perceptual inputs that the body receives and initiate appropriate 
behaviour in response to those inputs. Legally automatism relates to an inability to control 
movement. The law has taken the approach that `his mind did not go with what was being 
done'. "" Expressing this concept in words a jury would understand is problematic. 
Three alternative forms of expressing the ̀ doing' part of the ̀ what he is doing test' suggest 
themselves. These are ̀behaviour', ̀acts' and ̀movement'. The word `act' presents two 
problems. Firstly there is the dispute as to the philosophical meaning of action and the 
attempts to fit philosophical meanings within the present framework of criminal liability. 
Linked to this is the second problem, it seems illogical to refer to omissions as acts. Behaviour 
has a variety of meanings of which the most relevant are: 
Manner of bearing oneself, demeanour, manners, observable actions; treatment shown 
to or towards another or others. ... 
2. An instance or way of behaving: an observable 
pattern of actions, a response to a stimulus. 
The meaning of movement is more limited: ̀ [t]he action or process of moving; change of 
place, position or posture, passage from one place to another, activity. ' 12° It is suggested that 
it is movement which seems best to encapsulate the legal test of `what he is doing'. 
Finally, taking account of the descriptions of action considered in chapter 4 what the test 
needs to encapsulate is not whether an action is willed but rather whether the actor had a 
sufficient degree of consciousness to have the capacity to monitor the translation of the 
psychological antecedents of action into movement. It is suggested that the test should be split 
into two parts in order to avoid conflation of the two different concepts which underlie the 
119 Bratty v Attorney General for Northern Ireland [1963] 396,401 
120 Definitions taken fron The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3'd edit). 1993. vol. 1. Oxford: 
Clarendon. Emphasis in original 
239 
present definitions of involuntariness: 121 
Involuntariness would exist: - 
when an actor lacked any ability to control her movements, or 
when an actor lacked a sufficient degree of consciousness to have the 
capacity to monitor movement 
When formulating the test consideration was given to whether the second test should be 
limited to a particular defendant's movements. However, this poses problems with the second 
test in terms of liability for omissions. This does not affect the first test because anyone who 
cannot control her movements cannot control her omissions. However, with respect o the 
second test it may not just be the defendant's own movements which are relevant. For 
example, someone who because of a malfunction cannot perceive the movements of others 
may omit to act - yet the omission would be involuntary. 
Applying the test in the case of the epileptic mother who cooked her baby the relevant 
question becomes: did she have a sufficient degree of consciousness to have the capacity to 
monitor her movements? Presumably her argument that she lacked a sufficient degree of 
consciousness would be based on her epilepsy. Medical evidence would therefore be relevant 
121 The Draft Criminal Code Bill 1989(Law Com. No. 177), clause 33 similarly suggests that the definition of 
the defence should be split into two parts: 
`(1) a person is not guilty of an offence if - 
(a) he acts in a state of automatism, that is, his act - 
(i) is a reflex, spasm, or convulsion; or 
(ii) occurs while he is in a condition (whether of sleep, unconsciousness, impaired 
consciousness or otherwise) depriving him of effective control of the act; and 
(b) the act or condition is the result neither of anything done or omitted with the fault 
required for the offence nor of voluntary intoxication. ' 
The Draft Bill makes it clear that epileptics and hyperglycaemics would not have a non-insane 
automatism defence. Sleepwalkers and those who were hypoglycaemic might have an automatism 
defence. With the exception of sleepwalking the Draft Bill retains the existing common law 
distinctions between non-insane and insane automatism which have been criticised in this thesis as 
arbitrary and unfair. 
The second part of the test relies on the conception of control in relation to impairments to 
consciousness. The problems of this approach ave already been discussed 
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with regard to her own medical condition and the potential impact of epilepsy, in particular 
whether it could so affect consciousness o that she could lose her capacity to monitor her 
movements to the extent that she no longer recognised the distinction between her baby and 
the bottle. If the jury was satisfied that she lacked a sufficient degree of consciousness to have 
the capacity to monitor her movement hen legally she would be acting involuntarily and 
therefore would not be criminally responsible for her baby's death. It is argued that the 
adoption of this more focussed test of involuntariness would permit accurate evaluations of a 
defendant's behaviour. 
While insanity is not the subject area of this thesis, the interface between the insanity and the 
automatism defence is clearly relevant to the discussion of involuntary action. There remains 
the problem of how claims of involuntariness relate to the defence of insanity. It is accepted 
that the concerns of social policy are likely to influence where the borderline is drawn. Searle 
has argued strongly that any map based on two separate territories - the mental and the 
physical - will obscure investigations into what action might be and the relationship between 
mind and body. The same may be argued in relation to the internal/external distinction. It may 
be argued that the internal/external test is not a test of automatism but of insanity, and that it 
has arisen in automatism cases as a means of distinguishing between defendants who pose a 
danger to society because of a recurrent underlying medical condition and those who do not. 
But even so it still seems to serve to obscure more than it serves to enlighten. It is difficult to 
explain the arbitrary distinction between hypoglycaemia and hyperglycaemia. Both types of 
diabetic episode may be brought about by the defendant's own conduct. Both may result from 
her medical condition; why one is viewed as insane and the other not is difficult to understand. 
This distinction is increasingly unsupportable scientifically or philosophically or in terms of 
common sense explanations of behaviour and it would be sensible for the courts to abandon it 
as a means of evaluating insanity. Where the court finds that there is no criminal responsibility; 
and the evidence shows no medically recognised mental disorder and no serious risk of 
reoffending by a defendant he question has to be asked why deem her criminally insane even 
when she has committed a dangerous act? Such a defendant has been proved not to be 
criminally responsible, and there is no evidence that she is a future risk to society. To detain 
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such a person is to cross the boundary set by the principle of personal autonomy. Furthermore, 
it is clear that the M'Naghten Rules would seem to contravene the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. How the courts will balance the competing needs 
of social protection and individual human rights is not clear. It is however clear that the 
present definition given to disease of the mind in the M'Naghten Rules is over inclusive. 
The application of the Convention in English law following the Human Rights Act 1998 is 
bound to have a profound effect upon the legal definition of insanity. It casts doubt on 
whether it will be possible to deprive people of their liberty on the grounds of illnesses which 
do not satisfy the Winterwerp test. This is likely to have most effect in the area of insane 
automatism where the legal definition of disease of the mind has had the effect of subsuming 
certain claims of automatism within the insanity defence. The utilisation of the proposed test 
together with the application of the Winterwerp test will focus the courts' attention on issues 
of culpability and personal autonomy. It is suggested that this is a better focus for the courts' 
discussion in relation to the fundamental claim that action was involuntary rather than issues of 
whether a defendant has lost her self-control. 
The proposed test has many advantages. It should be more easily understood by juries and 
expert witnesses than a test which suggests that muscles act without instruction from the 
mind, or that those who are unconscious should be excused when they don't know what they 
are doing. It sets a framework within which medical explanations of behaviour may be 
evaluated. It does not suggest hat behaviour will be excused when it is instinctive or habitual, 
if the actor is sufficiently conscious then his capacity to monitor movements exists and 
criminal liability should be imposed. The word act has been avoided. The controversy over 
what description of action is relevant to moral responsibility will continue to be debated. 
However, nothing is lost in terms of instructing a jury by focussing their attention on the 
ability to control movement or the capacity to monitor movement. The use of an alternative 
word to action also removes the problem of defining omissions as acts. Thus criminal liability 
for omissions might be imposed when the defendant had the ability to control her movements 
or a sufficient degree of consciousness existed for her to monitor movement. The test also 
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makes the distinction between extreme states of rage or shock which cause dissociation and 
provocation in a manner which should focus a jury's attention on what is relevant to 
involuntariness. The test also works in relation to other types of involuntary behaviour. The 
person whose hand is used to inflict harm or the driver whose car suffers brake failure, may 
fall within the description of someone who has lost any ability to control movement. It 
provides a framework from within which medical or scientific explanations of behaviour may 
be evaluated without any distortion of the medical evidence to fit a legal definition which does 
not accept advances in scientific knowledge. It is clearly expressed and should be readily 
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